ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Secretary of State was asked-

Saville Inquiry

Robert Goodwill: On what date he expects the Saville inquiry to report.

Shaun Woodward: Lord Saville recently informed me that he does not expect to deliver his report until the week beginning 22 March next year.

Robert Goodwill: That date is three days before one of the possible dates for a general election. Does the Secretary of State agree that it would be impossible to publish the report during the final stages of a general election campaign? Is there anything that he can do to bring forward the publication of that already overdue report?

Shaun Woodward: The House will understand that it is not for me to speculate on dates of general elections. I can, however, tell the House that I have again met the families and the soldiers, and I am grateful to hon. Members for facilitating those meetings. The families are deeply disappointed by yet another delay; it is agonising for them. The same is true for the soldiers and their families. This delay is causing very real distress, and it is clearly compounding an already very anxious situation.

Gregory Campbell: Given that the publication date that Lord Saville has indicated is a possible, if not a likely, date for a general election announcement, is he aware of the toxicity and controversy that will undoubtedly follow his report in that context?

Shaun Woodward: I had the opportunity to meet the hon. Gentleman in his constituency only a week ago, when I was also meeting the families. I am particularly concerned about the delay. With great respect to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the date of a general election is a matter for him. However, there should be no delay in publishing this report. I have urged Lord Saville, and made every effort available, to ensure that we publish it as quickly as possible.

Jim Dobbin: As well as a statement when the Saville report is published, will there be a full debate in this Chamber in Government time on the report?

Shaun Woodward: The report has taken more than 10 years to produce, and it has cost nearly £200 million, half of which has been spent on legal aid. The report has been crucial to the peace process, and we will study its findings carefully. I say that because I think that the House will want a debate on it, and the Government would want to grant it a debate on the report and its findings.

Gerald Howarth: May I thank the Secretary of State for agreeing to meet a deputation of soldiers? That was very much appreciated. Will he express to Lord Saville our anger at the expense that he has run up, and at the ultimate discourtesy to this House and to the people involved that he has not yet published the report? Please will he express our anger at his incompetence?

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman will know the concern that I have, for both the families and the soldiers who are part of the report. I am very concerned about the delay, and I very much hope that Lord Saville not only takes my representations seriously but finds the opportunity to read the  Hansard of today's questions, because it is extremely important that he understand the genuine concern across the whole House.

Paramilitary Activities

David Tredinnick: What recent assessment he has made of the extent of activities of dissident paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.

James Duddridge: What recent assessment he has made of the level of activity of dissident republicans in Northern Ireland; and if he will make a statement.

Shaun Woodward: I have today placed in the Library a copy of the Independent Monitoring Commission's 22nd report on the activities of paramilitary groups, in which the IMC states:
	"Dissident republican activity since the early summer of 2008 had been consistently more serious than at any time since we had started to report in April 2004."

David Tredinnick: Speaking as a former Grenadier Guard who served in Northern Ireland, may I ask the Secretary of State to express his condolences to the families of the three Guardsmen and two military policemen killed yesterday in Helmand province? Does the Secretary of State recognise the contribution to the peace process made by the Grenadiers in Northern Ireland, including building the peace line? Finally, will he tell the House whether the upsurge in violence is due to new terrorist activity, or to the Provisional IRA under another name?

Mr. Speaker: I heard at least three questions there, but one answer from the Secretary of State will suffice.

Shaun Woodward: In answering the hon. Gentleman's third question, may I associate myself firmly with the remarks made in his two previous ones? In response to his third question, I urge him to read the IMC report, which makes it clear that such activity cannot be attributed to the organised activities of those who may have represented paramilitary activity in the past. The report is extremely clear in laying the blame where it appropriately lies, particularly with the so-called RIRA and CIRA-Real IRA and Continuity IRA. Those groups are extremely dangerous, and a political solution is pressed as a matter of urgency.

James Duddridge: Does the Secretary of State agree that the tragic death of Constable Stephen Carroll, allegedly by a 17-year-old, means that we should look carefully again at community policing and at how it helps to stop young people getting involved with proscribed organisations?

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman will understand why I may not wish to speak about the particular individuals who have been charged with the murder of Constable Carroll, but I will say that the IMC report-I urge all hon. Members to read it-is very clear about where some of the recruitment, particularly of young males, is coming from and why it is happening. Within the report, there is also a proposal for a political intervention, which the IMC believes would be potent in having an effect on these people.

Mark Durkan: Does the Secretary of State acknowledge that the logic of the IMC today is consistent with advice that the Social and Democratic Labour party has been giving for over two years about the importance of devolving justice and policing as a way of disarming the dissident groups? Does he also acknowledge that we are concerned that the dissidents could be assisted by some of the consequences of the Ashdown review? Given the seriousness of the situation, why has only the leader of the Alliance party been given confidential security briefings and why is the Secretary of State asking the Alliance leader to go quiet on the shared future in the countdown to the devolution of justice and policing?

Shaun Woodward: You might me rebuke me, Mr. Speaker, if I chose to answer all of those questions. I will none the less try to find an envelope that might succeed in answering the purport of the question. The report is very clear about the problem that we are facing in Northern Ireland today as a result of criminals calling themselves dissidents. It is very clear that there is a political solution and the report advocates that early devolution of policing and justice powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly could provide a potent intervention. I urge that intervention on all those elected in Northern Ireland, regardless of party.

Adam Ingram: I welcome the views of the IMC and its conclusion that the time is right for the transfer of policing and justice powers to the devolved Assembly. I ask my right hon. Friend to reiterate in very strong terms the view of the IMC that the transference of those powers would, in its words,
	"be a platform for co-operation against those trying to undermine the peace process."
	That is the best signal to send to the dissidents.

Shaun Woodward: My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. It might be worth drawing the attention of the House to one of the remarks in the IMC's report today, which is that the activities of these dissidents
	"represent a challenging of the peace process by groups always violently opposed to it",
	but critically at the moment
	"not an unravelling of that process."
	We have a duty to ensure that that peace process does not unravel.

Peter Robinson: Will the Secretary of State join me in condemning the attack by dissidents at the home of a police officer under a car that was driven off by his partner, although fortuitously no lives were lost as a result? Will he underline the need for police officers and their families to be particularly vigilant at this time, as even if they consider themselves to be living in safe areas, they need to remain alert? Will he indicate what steps he intends to take to meet the challenge set by the dissident republicans from their increase in activity over the past number of months?

Shaun Woodward: I very much join the right hon. Gentleman in those remarks and I thank him for the role that he is playing in trying to drive forward progress on completion of devolution. I would none the less remind him that paragraph 5.1, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Mr. Ingram) referred, is very clear in saying that
	"the early devolution of policing and justice powers to the...Assembly...could provide a potent intervention... It would be because policing and justice would no longer be a point of contention across the political divide; rather, it would be a platform for co-operation against those trying to undermine the peace process."

Patrick Cormack: Will the Secretary of State pass on the congratulations of this House to the Police Service of Northern Ireland on the skill and vigilance that enabled it to defuse a massive bomb on the border? That occurred since the House last had Northern Ireland questions.

Shaun Woodward: I am happy to pass on those remarks to the PSNI. I am sure that the House would warmly welcome the new Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, who has taken over control of the PSNI. The PSNI does an extremely brave job, as this report demonstrates, in extremely difficult and challenging circumstances.

Alistair Carmichael: May I associate myself with the remarks of the Secretary of State and the IMC report-that the devolution of criminal justice would indeed be "a potent intervention" that politicians could effect in dealing with dissident republican groups? Does he agree with me and those with whom I am associated in Northern Ireland that, in the long term, these groups will be countered only if we are able to pursue an agenda of shared futures?

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to the importance of the shared future. There has been a lot of discussion about community confidence being built before devolution can take place. The report puts clearly before the House and the public of Northern Ireland that the real challenge to community confidence is the threat posed by dissidents. We have a choice, and we can act: early devolution would be a potent intervention, and I hope we will complete it soon.

Owen Paterson: Further to the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Bosworth (David Tredinnick), with Remembrance day approaching we should remember all those who were killed or injured serving the security forces, protecting our democracy and safeguarding our public. The latest IMC report published this morning contains some encouraging news, but also other deeply worrying information. The report states:
	"The overall level of dissident activity was markedly higher than we have seen since we first met in late 2003. The seriousness, range and tempo of their activities all changed for the worse in these six months."
	The Secretary of State has had time to analyse the report. What are his conclusions, and what does he intend to do?

Shaun Woodward: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I would like to mark our thanks to the Opposition parties who have helped in supporting the financial package put forward by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to enable early devolution to take place. The hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to the part of the report relating to the security issue, which goes on to say that the challenges
	"pose a major challenge to the law enforcement and other agencies on both sides of the border. Had it not been for the work of all these agencies North and South, more lives would have been lost."
	The report identifies a major challenge, and I hope that all parties in Northern Ireland rise to it.

Owen Paterson: On the conclusion that the report endorses the devolution of policing, the Opposition have always taken a responsible approach. We support the devolution of policing and justice, and we supported the Bill in March. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has confirmed our long-term commitment to the significant financial package proposed by the Government. We have always made clear that devolution should happen only when all parts of the community are supportive-

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am increasingly unhappy about the length of the preamble before we reach the question. Can we please now have a question? I want to make progress.

Owen Paterson: Does the Secretary of State agree that it is down to all four parties in the coalition on the Executive to work together to finalise the details and the timing?

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman is right: it is up to the four parties. But let us be clear: as the report highlights, this is perhaps a moment when whatever individual issues might still prevent parties from moving forward, they should now set aside their differences, find the points of common unity and purpose, and ensure that the dissidents do not become a major threat to people in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Paramilitaries

Shailesh Vara: What recent assessment he has made of the extent of the activities of loyalist paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland.

Paul Goggins: Although I welcome the positive leadership that has delivered major progress on decommissioning, some individual members of loyalist paramilitary organisations remain involved in criminality and punishment attacks.

Shailesh Vara: I am grateful to the Minister for those comments. However, when does he believe that the loyalist paramilitaries will disband their command structures, and what is he doing to try to ensure that that happens?

Paul Goggins: It is important that those organisations take down their command structures and desist from criminality, and that the Ulster Defence Association in particular moves to complete the decommissioning process it has begun-certainly no later than February next year, when the powers run out. I am particularly concerned about the increase, reported today by the IMC, in the number of paramilitary-style attacks in loyalist areas this year: already more than double the number last year. These people must stop taking the law into their own hands, and let the police and the courts do their job.

Eddie McGrady: Will the Minister confirm that it is the Government's urgent intent not only that there will be full and immediate decommissioning by loyalist paramilitaries, but that PSNI and the Serious Organised Crime Agency will pursue their criminally acquired assets and those of other paramilitaries past and present?

Paul Goggins: It is essential that decommissioning be completed by February next year, as the special arrangements will not be extended. My hon. Friend is also right that those who, as part of paramilitary gangs or other groups, have acquired criminal assets, often running into millions of pounds, should have them taken back off them. I reassure him that SOCA, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and the PSNI will pursue those people relentlessly and bring those assets back into the public domain.

Laurence Robertson: When the Government extended the arms amnesty until 2010 a few months ago we supported the Government, very reluctantly. Will the Minister confirm yet again that he will not seek to introduce primary legislation to extend the amnesty? We certainly could not support any further extension, because after that date we shall see these people as nothing more than criminals.

Paul Goggins: Let me once again express my appreciation for the Opposition parties' support for our approach to the decommissioning amnesty order. I believe that an unequivocal message went out from the House from all parties that there would be no tolerance of people who hold back on decommissioning, and no extension of the amnesty powers beyond February next year. Next February, the powers will run out for good. Those who still hold on to weapons must decommission them, and decommission them now.

Equality Commission

Philip Davies: What discussions he has had with the Northern Ireland Executive on proposals for the appointment of new commissioners to the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland.

Paul Goggins: The Secretary of State appointed four new equality commissioners in September this year, following a fair and open competition. Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, responsibility for making such appointments lies solely with the Secretary of State. He wrote to the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to notify them of the launch of the competition, and he informed them when the appointments were made.

Philip Davies: Will the Minister warn the new commissioners about the unease that is felt about the commission, particularly among many Unionists, and will he ensure that it does not add to the compensation culture in Northern Ireland or fuel the already crippling burden of political correctness there?

Paul Goggins: How did I guess that the phrase "political correctness" might just creep into the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question?
	The hon. Gentleman and I have discussed this issue on a number of occasions, including occasions on which I have been at the Dispatch Box, and I think it fair to say that we do not agree on it. This is not about political correctness; it is about putting fairness, justice and equality at the heart of the peace process in Northern Ireland. That is what the Good Friday agreement did when it established the Equality Commission. The hon. Gentleman should not underestimate the difference that the commission has made, and the distance that it has taken us in terms of the progress made in Northern Ireland.

Jeffrey M Donaldson: Surely it is difficult for the Equality Commission to demonstrate fairness, and to be a paragon of fairness, when the composition of its own staff is so out of kilter with the community in Northern Ireland. There is a serious under-representation of Protestants. How can the commission go to local councils and other public bodies and ask for fairness and equality when it has itself failed to practise those virtues?

Paul Goggins: The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the staff, but the commissioners themselves reflect communities across Northern Ireland. In appointing commissioners, the Secretary of State must have due regard to their community background, although there is of course an open competition. The appointments to which I referred in my first answer were made in a fair and open way, and the Equality Commission plays a very important role in the peace process in Northern Ireland.

Loyalist Decommissioning

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: What recent progress has been made on loyalist decommissioning; and if he will make a statement.

Shaun Woodward: The House will note the report from the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, which was placed in the Library last month and which records very significant acts of decommissioning by loyalist groups. The House will also know from my right hon. Friend the Minister of State that the decommissioning order will end unequivocally on 9 February next year.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The Secretary of State has made clear that the amnesty will end in February. That being so, what more can he do to encourage loyalist paramilitaries to participate in the decommissioning process so that it can be completed once and for all? Will he also make clear that those who break the law can expect the full rigour of the law to come down upon them, and that they will face due process?

Shaun Woodward: The answer to the hon. Gentleman's second question is yes. As for his first question, we are making that requirement clear. That is why we are, I believe, making substantial progress on decommissioning, although we expect more.  [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order. There are still far too many private conversations taking place in the Chamber. It is very unfair on the Member asking the question, and on the Minister answering it.

Iris Robinson: My party welcomes the progress made towards total decommissioning by loyalist paramilitaries. When that process has been completed, will the Secretary of State publish an inventory of the weapons decommissioned by both the IRA and the loyalist paramilitaries?

Shaun Woodward: As the hon. Lady knows, as part of the process there will at the end of it be a full statement by the IICD.

Historical Inquiries

David Taylor: What assessment he has made of the effect of the report of the Consultative Group on the Past on the operation of the Historical Enquiries Team of the Police Service of Northern Ireland; and if he will make a statement.

Paul Goggins: The Government have recently concluded a consultation on all the recommendations made by the Consultative Group on the Past and are currently considering the responses. Meanwhile, the Historical Enquiries Team is continuing to carry out its important work with great sensitivity and professionalism.

David Taylor: The primary task of a police unit to pursue criminal justice seems inimical to the mandate of the HET to resolve unanswered questions, which would surely be better handled by a legacy commission. Does the Minister believe that recent new money for the Province will be adequate to finance the HET and that it will not become bogged down in an expensive legal morass of Savillian proportions?

Paul Goggins: I reassure my hon. Friend first that the PSNI does a fine job in pursuing criminals and keeping Northern Ireland and its people safe. We have made no decisions yet in relation to the recommendation by the Consultative Group on the Past on a legacy commission, but I also reassure my hon. Friend that the HET is a very cost-effective way of dealing with the issue of unresolved murders. Substantial resources will be made available to the Northern Ireland Executive if policing and justice powers are devolved, but how that money is spent will, of course, be for the Justice Minister and Executive to determine.

Sammy Wilson: I have already written to the Minister about the money being spent by the HET and the alleged inefficiencies in how it is being spent. What steps is he taking to ensure that the tens of millions of pounds currently being spent by the HET are spent in an effective and efficient manner?

Paul Goggins: I believe that that money is spent in an effective and efficient manner, and, indeed, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has paid great tribute to the HET for being both effective and independent. Many hundreds of cases that have been opened and dealt with by the HET have been resolved, so I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's assertion that it is inefficient in any way; it is doing a very important job very well.

Alasdair McDonnell: Does the Secretary of State accept that there is still much work to be done before the needs of many of the innocent victims are met? A scurrilous rumour is going around that he intends to bin the report of the Consultative Group on the Past. Does he have any plans for making progress?

Paul Goggins: There is certainly absolutely no intention whatever to bin-as the hon. Gentleman puts it-the work of the Consultative Group on the Past. The work it has done has been very important. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State opened up a further consultation on its recommendations. That consultation is now completed.  [Interruption.] We are considering the outcome of the 230 representations that were made as part of that consultation, and we will publish a summary of those responses in due course.  [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that Members will have the courtesy to listen to the questions and then to the answers.

Local Government Reorganisation

Angela Watkinson: What progress has been made on reorganisation of local government in Northern Ireland; and if he will make a statement.

Paul Goggins: The reorganisation programme is the responsibility of the Minister of Environment in Northern Ireland, who recently made a statement to the Assembly that plans to reduce the number of district councils from 26 to 11 are on track and that the new structures will be in place by May 2011.

Angela Watkinson: I thank the Minister for that answer. As he will know, the new local councils are not yet in place, and I am grateful to him for confirming that the date of the local elections in Northern Ireland is May next year.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Lady will know that we delayed the elections that would have taken place this year to 2011. That is an absolutely final date so far as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I are concerned, and I am pleased that the Minister of Environment has committed to put the necessary legislation in place so that that can happen.

Nigel Dodds: On an issue that is the Minister's responsibility, can he tell us whether he will bring forward legislation to allow councillors in the current set-up to retire without the need for costly unwanted by-elections as we come to the fag end of the current councils leading up to 2011?

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point; we do not want a succession of by-elections between April next year and May 2011. I recently published a consultation document on a number of options to make sure that we deal with the issue and do not have all those by-elections to which he referred.

Devolution

Julian Brazier: What recent assessment he has made of the progress of devolution of responsibility for criminal justice and policing to the Northern Ireland Assembly; and if he will make a statement.

Shaun Woodward: It is for the parties in Northern Ireland to decide when to request transfer. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made a settlement of upwards of £800 million available to the parties if they reach agreement.

Julian Brazier: Is the Secretary of State satisfied that in no circumstances will intelligence-gathering be compromised under any possible devolution?

Shaun Woodward: Yes.

PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister was asked-

Engagements

Jamie Reed: If he will list his official engagements for Wednesday 4 November.

Gordon Brown: Before listing my engagements, I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in sending our condolences to the families and friends of the five soldiers who died in Afghanistan yesterday-three soldiers from the Grenadier Guards and two soldiers from the Royal Military Police. The death of five brave soldiers in a single incident is a terrible and tragic loss, and I want to pay tribute, as the whole House will, to their professionalism, and to their courage and service. Our thoughts must also be with the five additional members of our armed forces who were seriously injured in the same incident yesterday. Evidence is now being assembled, but it appears that they were targeted because they were engaged in what our enemies fear most-they were mentoring and strengthening Afghan forces to make Afghanistan more secure. While we will step up and strengthen our security wherever we can, we will not stop doing what the Afghan Taliban fear most. The sacrifice of our military is great and our resolve must match it.
	This morning, I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others, and, in addition to my duties in the House, I shall have further such meetings today.

Jamie Reed: I am sure that everyone in this House will associate themselves with the comments made by my right hon. Friend, for those who have fallen in the line of duty in Afghanistan have done so not only on our behalf, but on behalf of the people of Afghanistan.
	Many of my constituents have benefited from the Prime Minister's abolition of prescription charges for cancer patients and many more still welcome his cast-iron guarantee to introduce one-week screening for suspected cancer patients, but we need to do more. What more will this Government do to ensure that we end the postcode lottery and to ensure that people, whatever their wealth and wherever they live, get the cancer medicines they deserve and need?

Gordon Brown: We will not only make promises to improve cancer care in the national health service, we will deliver on these promises. We will not only have a two-week maximum before people can see a consultant, we will move to a one-week maximum before people can actually have the diagnostic tests they need. However, I think that people should be warned about the national health service, because the shadow Health Secretary said yesterday-

Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not think that we need to go into that today, Prime Minister. I call Mr. David Cameron.

David Cameron: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. May I join the Prime Minister in paying tribute to the five brave servicemen who lost their lives, three of whom were from the Grenadier Guards and two of whom were from the Royal Military Police? We must honour their memories, we must care for their families and we must never forget their service. Our thoughts and prayers, as the Prime Minister rightly said, should be with those who, I understand, were badly wounded in what was clearly an horrific incident. Given that it apparently included an Afghan police officer, it does raise some very worrying questions. Can the Prime Minister tell us what inquiries will be made and when we can expect to know more about what happened in this very disturbing incident?

Gordon Brown: I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman's condolences to all those who are affected by this terrible and tragic incident. I did say, in my initial comments, that evidence is now being assembled on what happened in this terrible incident and that security will be stepped up, where that is necessary, but we cannot desist from the practice that is absolutely essential for the future of Afghanistan and the security of our country: training and mentoring the Afghan forces. That means that our troops will be working with the Afghan police and the Afghan army. Of course, we need to take all the necessary security measures, but it is an essential element of the whole coalition strategy that we train up the Afghan forces so that they themselves are able to take over the security of their country, and that we will continue to do. It is in line with the McChrystal report, and it is in line with the statements that have been made by President Obama, with NATO statements of the past few days and with what we have set out as our strategy for the future. So, yes, we will step up security, but we must not allow ourselves to give up what the Afghan Taliban fear most: that we will have a strong Afghan security force that is Afghan-based and is able to face them.

David Cameron: Clearly, as the Prime Minister says, the training and mentoring is absolutely essential. I have seen it in Afghanistan for myself and the work that is being done is incredibly impressive, but I think that the public will be concerned knowing as they do that British soldiers, including military police, are, even as we speak, living and working side by side with the Afghan national police across Helmand. They will want to know what immediate steps are being taken to ensure that we are safeguarding our forces after what happened yesterday.

Gordon Brown: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we have been working very closely with the Afghan army and the Afghan police for a number of years. We are stepping up the closeness of our operations. I myself visited a joint Afghan-British operation where both military police and the Army from Britain were working with Afghan soldiers and police forces. Obviously we will review the security arrangements for this, but I repeat that it is an essential element of our strategy that we are not seen as an occupying army but that we work with the Afghan army and are seen to be training the Afghan forces so that they can take over responsibility for the country. Although this has been a terrible and tragic incident, all our commanders on the ground will want to maintain the strategy, which is to work with the Afghan forces so that one day they can take responsibility for the security of their country.

David Cameron: Everyone will agree with what the Prime Minister said about working with the police, but clearly the attack raises questions about the infiltration of the Afghan police by criminals, drug dealers and militants. In evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Afghan police force was described as
	"one of the most dysfunctional institutions in the country",
	with reports that the police were actively involved in criminal activities, including the drugs trade. We all agree on a more focused and targeted mission in Afghanistan, and at the heart of that mission, as the Prime Minister has just said, is training Afghans to take more responsibility for their security. Given that, what more can he say about the efforts to clean up an organisation-the Afghan national police-that is essential to the success of our strategy but still seems to be going so wrong?

Gordon Brown: I have to say to the right hon. Gentleman that while we are assembling evidence, the Taliban have claimed responsibility for this incident. It might be that the Taliban have used an Afghan police member or have infiltrated the Afghan police force, and that is what we have to look at. It is the Taliban who have claimed responsibility for this incident. There are about 98,000 police in Afghanistan, many of whom have been moved from one part of Afghanistan to another. There is an issue about their training, which we are addressing with a European effort to ensure that the police are properly trained. We will have to increase the number of police, but it is clear that we will have to increase the quality of police, too. I would not want to draw conclusions about all the Afghan police from one single incident, and what we know is that the Taliban have claimed responsibility for this.

David Cameron: Clearly what the Prime Minister says is right, although he has in the past said that the Afghan police are not seen as a fair part of the Afghan state and so progress needs to be made. Our armed forces will also need to have every confidence that stronger economic development and political effort will go in behind them. Does the Prime Minister agree that it is perhaps time, once again, to return to the idea of a single, strong co-ordinating figure-not just from the United Nations but someone who works across the coalition, including with the Afghan Government and NATO-to deliver this effort more effectively than anyone has done so far? Is it his understanding that that is being considered in Washington and should be part of the revised strategy that we hope that President Obama and his team will announce shortly?

Gordon Brown: Yes, we have been discussing that, and the possibility that we could have a co-ordinator who works more closely with the Afghan Government and with the allied forces. I have to say to the right hon. Gentleman that the first thing that we have to do is to ensure that this new Government, led by President Karzai, will adopt a set of policies that will deal with the problems that have worried not just the international community but people in Afghanistan. The first is that he should deal with corruption, and, whether he appoints an anti-corruption commission or commissioners, he will have to do far more than has been done in recent years. He will have to deal with the problem of the appointment of district and provincial governors as well as appointments at the centre. He will have to show that his new Cabinet is free of the stains of corruption. He has promised to do that and we will be looking for it in his inauguration address and in the measures that he wants to bring forward. The next, as the right hon. Gentleman rightly says, is to ensure economic and social improvement for the Afghan people, and that will need the co-ordination of allied efforts and those of the Afghan Government. Our efforts to move people from heroin to wheat production in Helmand have been successful, but the final element for the Afghan Government is the training of Afghan forces. The only way that we can look to a future where the numbers of our forces can come down while we still have security in Afghanistan is for an Afghan army, in particular, to be ready to take on the responsibility.

David Cameron: A day when we hear the news of such an appalling incident in Afghanistan is not one for obsessing about the internal workings of Parliament and the House of Commons, but is it not important that today we accept in full Sir Christopher Kelly's report? Does the Prime Minister agree that, in accepting the report, it is important that we say that, from now and into the future, Members of Parliament should not vote on our pay, expenses, pensions, terms of service, resettlement or expenses packages? Is not that an essential part of restoring faith in Parliament and politics-and in this House of Commons, which all of us care about?

Gordon Brown: People want to know that the system will be different in future. It will be open, transparent and fair. It will not be managed by MPs themselves but by an independent body that will take responsibility for that. That is why it is right to refer the Kelly report for action and implementation not by ourselves but by the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority. That is the recommendation of the Kelly report, and that is what we should do. The vast majority of MPs are trying to do a decent job on behalf of their whole communities. At the same time, we must make sure that the public trust in the institution of Parliament is restored. That is why we should accept the Kelly recommendations and make sure that they are implemented as quickly as possible.

David Blunkett: Will the Prime Minister tell the House what he thinks of the credibility of a party leader who has spent so much time and energy attacking him over the Lisbon treaty, only to reveal now that his cast-iron guarantee has turned out to be made of plywood?

Gordon Brown: rose-

Mr. Speaker: Order. May I ask the Prime Minister to focus his response on the policy of the Government rather than that of the Opposition?

Gordon Brown: Yes, Mr. Speaker. The Government will work in concert with the other 26 countries of the European Union. We will work with them on the same policies to bring about economic recovery and to bring down unemployment in our country, and we will work for greater international co-ordination. We will not make iron-cast guarantees that are broken- [ Interruption. ]

Nicholas Clegg: Mr. Speaker- [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman has a right to be heard, and I want to hear him.

Nicholas Clegg: May I first say that, after a shameful year for this Parliament, I agree that Sir Christopher Kelly's report finally gives us the opportunity to start restoring people's trust in the work of MPs here? That is why we must implement the report in full, without any further delay.
	I want to add my expressions of sympathy and condolence to the families and friends of the three soldiers from the Grenadier Guards and the two from the Royal Military Police who tragically lost their lives yesterday afternoon, and of the five who were seriously injured. People will be shocked to the core by the fact that they have been working selflessly for the Afghan people and were killed by someone whom they thought that they could trust.
	The truth is that without a legitimate and inclusive Government in Kabul and a new coherent international plan for Afghanistan, it will be increasingly difficult for our brave soldiers to do the job there that we are asking them to do. In the Prime Minister's conversations with President Karzai, how much time is the right hon. Gentleman giving him to clean up his Government? What measures will he take if President Karzai fails to act?

Gordon Brown: President Karzai said yesterday at his press conference that he was going to operate a policy in which there would be a clean-up of politics in Afghanistan. We will now have to test him by his words. I think that the first thing that he can do, in his inauguration address, is to signal the changes that he will make in the way that he runs central Government, appoints governors, and deals with the problems with corruption-especially corruption relating to heroin and drugs. It is for President Karzai to show the international community that his Government can have credibility because of the actions that he is prepared to take.

Nicholas Clegg: I am grateful for those words, but the Prime Minister needs to be more precise. May I ask him again- [Interruption.] He needs to acknowledge first that our mission in Afghanistan is in trouble because we do not have a legitimate Government in Kabul, and we do not have a coherent international plan for Afghanistan. So I ask him again what exactly he will do if the legitimate and inclusive Government whom we so desperately need in Kabul do not emerge?

Gordon Brown: I have already made it clear that the additional troops that we are prepared to make available to Afghanistan are conditional on three things. The first is that the Afghan Government can show that they are willing to take the action necessary to gain the trust of the people of the country and for the security of the people of the country. The second thing is that the Americans and our coalition partners are prepared to engage in burden-sharing. The third thing is that President Karzai and his Government are prepared to make available Afghan forces to Helmand so that we can train Afghan forces for the future. We have made it very clear what our conditions are for the future. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will agree that these are necessary conditions. Of course, they include the improvement in governance, both local and national, in Afghanistan.

David Winnick: I pay tribute to the bravery of our soldiers. Is not the country entitled to know how long British military personnel will be in Afghanistan? Can this war be won?

Gordon Brown: I have said before that as we train Afghan security forces to get them to take over the task and the responsibilities of Afghanistan-I am saying what President Obama and the other leaders have said-we will be able gradually to bring our forces home. The measure of success in Afghanistan will be that British forces can come home because Afghan forces are able to deal with the security problems of the country themselves. That is what our strategy is about-to build up the Afghan army and security forces, to build up economic prosperity for the Afghan people, and to make sure that the structures of local as well as national Government reflect the will of the people.

Tom Brake: The Government have today slashed the money available to pay for the freedom pass in London. What is the Prime Minister's estimate of the council tax increase that will be needed to pay for this financial shortfall?

Gordon Brown: No Government have done more to provide help for transport, both in London and in the rest of the country. The hon. Gentleman should know that the national concessionary pensioner fare that we introduced is not just for London, but for the whole country. The Government have supported public transport, whether it be by rail or by road, and done more than any other Government for 50 years.

Brian Iddon: Why have countries like ours with good relations with Israel allowed the blockade on Gaza to continue for so long? It is denying Gazans the essentials for life, including reconstruction materials, and denying them a good living throughout this very cold winter.

Gordon Brown: I talked to Prime Minister Netanyahu a few days ago and I made it clear that not only the policy of Britain but the will of the international community is to make sure that supplies can enter Gaza so that the Palestinian people there can be sure that they will have a winter in which shortages do not exist. That is the will of the international community, it is what we are urging Israel to do, and while I believe that the Israelis are right to be worried about security and about terrorism, there is also a humanitarian duty to make sure that the people of Gaza are fed.

Andrew Turner: Island prisoners must be guarded when they need health care outside prison. By the end of this year, the local health budget will have been exceeded by more than £1 million. That could pay for an extra 15 nurses. Will the Prime Minister ensure that this inequity is corrected urgently?

Gordon Brown: I understand the hon. Gentleman asking for more resources for the health service in his area, but we are spending more on the national health service than ever before. Where issues arise from the treatment of prisoners, we will deal with them.

Ronnie Campbell: The Prime Minister, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, brought in the family tax credit, the working tax credit and pensioner tax credit. Can he give me, in the popular phrase, a cast-iron guarantee that this benefit will not be cut or means-tested, whereas the Conservatives would pull it to shreds?

Gordon Brown: We made promises that we would create a tax credit, and we have delivered on that promise. When we have made a commitment, we have actually done what we have said we will do; and, where we have made promises, we will continue to deliver on them, unlike some other people.

Alan Beith: Is the Prime Minister aware that several police authorities, including Northumbria, are using Home Office guidance as a basis for cutting the pensions of police officers who have been forced to retire when they have been seriously injured on duty? On the principle that we should stand by those who risk their lives and face serious injury protecting us, whether in the armed forces or in the police, will he take a personal interest in the matter and investigate it?

Gordon Brown: I shall obviously look at the matter. When policemen or women retire, they receive their pension. I see no reason why their pension entitlement should be broken, if it is, indeed, an entitlement, and I shall look at what the right hon. Gentleman says.

Phyllis Starkey: Last Friday, the Youth Parliament met to debate in this Chamber, and the MYP for Milton Keynes, Sean Barnes, spoke strongly in favour of votes at 16, helping to persuade the Youth Parliament to make the issue its top campaigning priority. Will the Prime Minister respond to that clearly expressed demand by the democratically elected Youth Parliament and make sure that his Government implement a reduction in voting age and an extension of full democratic rights to 16-year-olds?

Gordon Brown: I think that bringing the Youth Parliament to this House was a tremendous innovation, and we should be very proud of it. While I do not always agree with your rulings, Mr. Speaker, your innovation in doing that was very important. I personally favour giving young people the vote at 16. It is a matter on which we should consult widely with the public, and then we should make a decision.

Bob Russell: Colchester is the fastest growing borough in the country. Despite that, Tory-controlled Essex county council plans to shut two of the town's seven secondary schools. It is now known that the council massaged the figures on projected pupil numbers. Does the Prime Minister therefore agree that the reorganisation proposals should be investigated by the Office of the Schools Adjudicator, particularly as Essex county council gave false information to the Department for Children, Schools and Families?

Gordon Brown: I shall look at the matter. Was it not the Leader of the Opposition who said, "If you want to know what a Conservative Government will look like, look at the Tory councils"? The Tory council in the hon. Gentleman's constituency proves the point.

Anne Begg: The Labour Government have made great strides in getting and keeping disabled people in work. What is my right hon. Friend's reaction to the news that the Glencraft factory in my constituency could be forced out of business by the lack of support from the Scottish National party-Liberal council? If the factory closes, more than 30 disabled people in Aberdeen will lose their jobs.

Gordon Brown: When there was a Labour council, Glencraft got a huge amount of support from it. I have heard that the grants are being cut by the SNP-Liberal administration in the area. We will look at what we can do, but it is clearly important in a recession to help those people who are most in need of support, and that includes the disabled members of our community.

David Davies: Does the Prime Minister agree that the Ministry of Defence should publish regular figures showing the number of soldiers who have lost limbs or suffered other life-changing injuries in Afghanistan? If he does, will he let me have those figures by the end of the week?

Gordon Brown: We give as much information as possible on what is happening in Afghanistan. We have 9,000 troops there, and we report to the House whenever there have been fatalities. I have reported today also that five soldiers have been seriously injured. Many of them will end up at Selly Oak hospital in Birmingham for the best treatment that they could receive, and of course I am happy to give as much information as possible, consistent with what the Chief of the Defence Staff advises.

Liz Blackman: Derbyshire firm Baltex, which is based in my constituency, makes technical textiles and has twice received the Queen's award for industry. Among its work, it reinforces hoses that go into new cars. The company tells me that sales of that particular product line have soared since the inception of the scrappage scheme. What assessment has my right hon. Friend made of the scrappage scheme in terms of jobs and sales UK-wide?

Gordon Brown: The car scrappage scheme, which was dismissed by so many people, has been a great success. So, too, has the help that we are giving to small businesses. Now 200,000 or more small businesses have received cash-flow help from the Treasury. We have taken action to help businesses to keep on employees and to train employees during this difficult recession. None of that would have been possible without the fiscal support that we were prepared to give; that is the difference between ourselves and the Conservative Opposition.

Angus Robertson: After 14 service personnel died aboard Nimrod XV230, the Ministry of Defence accepted responsibility and said that compensation would be "expedited". Three years on, compensation has not been resolved. Do not these service families deserve better?

Gordon Brown: We have just had the final report. The Government, and all those responsible for the mistakes that were made in relation to Nimrod, have apologised. I shall look exactly at the point that the hon. Gentleman has raised. The report has now finalised the issues surrounding Nimrod, and I will write to him.

Stephen Pound: The hon. and gallant Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) and I may form an unlikely combination, but we are as one in endorsing the calls made by the Greenford branch of the Royal British Legion for reserved seats at Prime Minister's Question Time for members of the armed forces. Would the Prime Minister agree to make representations to the Serjeant at Arms in order that we can achieve this?

Gordon Brown: We do want to recognise the commitment of our armed forces. Special arrangements are made in a number of different parts of our society. This is an interesting proposal that has been made on an all-party basis, and I am sure that the Serjeant at Arms and the Speaker will want to look at it. It seems to be something that we can support, but we will have to have consultations with all the different forces in the House.

Willie Rennie: Does the Prime Minister remember promising that Rosyth would not become a nuclear graveyard? Fifteen years later, not only are seven nuclear submarines still rotting in the dockyard, but the Prime Minister is considering the dockyard as a permanent location for those submarines. When will he live up to his promise?

Gordon Brown: No decision has been taken on this. I have to remind the hon. Gentleman that Rosyth dockyard is working as a result of the actions that we have taken. The aircraft carriers are coming to Rosyth to be built as a result of a decision that we have made. If other parties had been in power, there would be no Rosyth dockyard at all. We have taken the action that is necessary.

Karen Buck: With quality child care being essential both to allow parents to work and for child development, and given the huge investment that the Government have made in the national child care strategy over the years, can my right hon. Friend help me to understand why some local councils, such as Kensington and Chelsea, are proposing to close their nursery schools? What can we do to block this retrograde step?

Gordon Brown: I hesitate to use the words "iron-cast guarantee", but we have provided- [ Interruption. ] The words have become so devalued over the past few days. People will not forget that on Monday the Leader of the Opposition also made an iron-cast guarantee to the national health service; people will remember that as well. On nursery education, we are determined to ensure that three and four-year-olds have the best nursery education possible. We have increased the number of hours for nursery school, and we will continue to make sure that Sure Start provision is available in every constituency.

Paul Rowen: The Prime Minister promised in June that there would be a statement on the restoration of compensation for victims of pleural plaques. It is now November, so can he tell us why we have not yet received it?

Gordon Brown: We are meeting the Members of Parliament who have raised this issue with us, and we will come back to the House with a statement on exactly that.

Paul Flynn: Does the Prime Minister still have full confidence that the Afghan army and police will be prepared to lay down their own lives, and to slaughter those of their brother Afghans, in the service of foreign powers and in the service of a President who is corrupt and who has just rigged his own re-election?

Gordon Brown: The members of the Afghan army want a safe and secure Afghanistan, as do most of the people in Afghanistan. The members of the Afghan army who have been working with the British Army on Operation Panther's Claw are members who were sent by President Karzai in increasing numbers to back up the work of the British forces. We want to work with the Afghan army and security service. We want to train them and mentor them, and I have heard our chiefs talking about the quality, in the main, of Afghan army members, which is something that we want to continue to increase and strengthen over the months to come.

Ian Taylor: As a former Science Minister myself, I am well aware that scientific advice can be politically inconvenient, but will the Prime Minister reassure the scientific community that when disagreements happen, he will engage in rational debate rather than shoot the messenger?

Gordon Brown: Scientific advice is valued by the Government in every area. On climate change, on foot and mouth, on dealing with swine flu and on nuclear matters as well as on drugs, we have very good scientists who have been advising us. From the drugs advisory committee, we accepted all but three of more than 30 recommendations. The issue was not the ability of the committee to give advice or the expertise of the members, it was that once Ministers have had to decide a position, after listening to advice on a wider range of social issues than simply the scientific advice, it does not make sense to send out mixed messages to the whole community about drugs. That is why the Home Secretary made his decision.

Speaker's Statement

Mr. Speaker: Before I call the Leader of the House, I have an announcement to make about the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority.
	Under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, it falls to me as Speaker to select a candidate for the chair of IPSA. The Act stipulates that the candidate must be recruited on merit on the basis of fair and open competition, and that the choice must be agreed by the Speaker's Committee for the Independent Parliament Standards Authority established under the Act.
	Following an open competition carried out by an independent panel, I can today inform the House that I have selected, and the Committee has approved, Professor Sir Ian Kennedy as chair-designate of IPSA. His appointment must be confirmed by the House of Commons before he is formally appointed by the Queen. He will be paid a maximum of £100,000 a year.  [Interruption.] Order. We are fortunate- [Interruption.] Order. We are fortunate to have such an eminent candidate for this important post. Sir Ian was chairman of the Healthcare Commission from its creation until 2009, and he is well known as the chairman of the public inquiry into paediatric cardiac surgery at Bristol Royal infirmary. He originally qualified as a lawyer, and he has a long and distinguished record of chairing and being a member of public bodies.
	IPSA is charged with establishing a new and wholly independent system governing MPs' allowances that can command the confidence of the public and of this House, and I am confident that Sir Ian will bring significant leadership skills to that task.

MPs' Expenses and Allowances

Harriet Harman: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make a statement.
	Today the Committee on Standards in Public Life, under its chair Sir Christopher Kelly, has published its report setting out recommendations for a new framework for parliamentary allowances. People in this country need to be able to have full trust and confidence in their Parliament. What happened under the old allowance system has knocked that confidence.
	We come into Parliament not to serve our own self-interest but to serve the public interest, but that is not the impression that the public have. We have all acknowledged that and have recognised that to ensure that we have a system in which everyone can have confidence, we need to take action. We have already made changes and the Kelly report is another important step on that path to restoring public confidence.
	Before I turn to the Kelly report, I would like to remind the House of the action that we have already taken. To deal with the past, we are ensuring that any overpayments, including those which were simply a mistake, are paid back. That is the work that the Members Estimate Committee, which is chaired by you, Mr. Speaker, commissioned from Sir Thomas Legg. We have already taken action to change the current allowance system. In order to allow for the period while wholesale reform of our allowances is being considered, we introduced interim measures last May to pare back allowances as a result of a meeting of the party leaders and the Members Estimate Committee.
	Amid the enormous attention paid to past problems, no one should overlook the fact that we have already decided to cap the monthly amount that can be claimed on mortgage or rent; to prevent a Member from changing the designation of their main or second home; to abolish the second home allowance for outer-London Members; and to stop claims for furniture, stop claims for cleaning and stop claims for gardening. Parliament has not sat back waiting for Kelly. The current allowance system is already very different from the one which allowed for the claims that have angered both the public and the House.
	We have also recognised that for the future, it is no longer appropriate for us to set or administer our own allowance system. That is why in July we passed the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009, which sets up the new Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which will decide on our allowances and run the system, so just as we no longer vote on our own pay increases, we will not play a part in deciding or administering our allowances.
	My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in March asked Sir Christopher Kelly, the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, to review the system of MPs allowances. I would like to thank Sir Christopher and his committee for the important work they have undertaken, and also to thank all those, including many hon. Members, who gave evidence to his committee. His report was published only this morning, but it is obviously right for the House to hear an early statement and to have the chance to air initial views.
	MPs representing constituencies outside London need to be able to live in both their constituency and in Westminster because they need to work in both places. We do not want a Parliament where the only people who can come to Westminster as MPs are those who are wealthy enough to afford to pay for second homes out of their own pocket. Nor do we want to undermine the importance of MPs working in two places-the constituency and Westminster. Both are important. Nor do we want to have a situation where you cannot have your family with you if you are an MP. The Kelly report recognises that the allowances are there so that Parliament works properly on behalf of people in this country; the constituency link is sustained; Parliament is not barred to people on modest incomes; and so that Parliament is not barred to people with a young family. The Kelly report acknowledges this.
	The Kelly report covers 138 pages and puts forward 60 recommendations. Among the key recommendations are two that I would like to draw to the attention of the House. First, on the recommendation that Members should not be able to claim for mortgage interest but only for rent or hotels, the committee recommends that those with existing mortgages should be able to continue to claim for one further Parliament. It recommends that Members should not be reimbursed for the employment of family members. Those who currently employ family members will be able to continue to do so for one further Parliament.
	Turning to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, the acting chief executive, Andrew MacDonald, has been appointed and has begun work, and you, Mr. Speaker, have just announced that Professor Sir Ian Kennedy has been selected as the new chair-designate of IPSA. I will put the motion to confirm his appointment to the House in the next few days. The other members of the authority will be appointed shortly.
	The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority has already started the work of setting up the new allowance regime for MPs. A new allowance regime will be in place to come into effect in the new Parliament, as recommended by Sir Christopher Kelly. In the light of this, the Government welcome and fully accept the Kelly report, which should be taken as a whole. It will be for IPSA to take it forward. This is the approach Kelly's report itself recommends.
	Until such time as IPSA takes the Kelly report forward, we will retain the current restricted allowance rules and every claim will of course be published and available for the public to see. Because we decided in July that in future we would play no part in deciding our allowance system and that it would be done independently, it does not make sense for us now to vote on the future shape of our allowance system. Instead that is the job of IPSA. After all, that is what we set it up to do. The Parliamentary Standards Act lays down that IPSA must consult MPs and others when drawing up the allowances regime. IPSA will set to work immediately and we expect, following such consultations, it to proceed as quickly as possible to put into effect the Kelly recommendations on allowances.
	The events that lie behind the recommendations in the Kelly report have caused anger and dismay both in the public and among hon. Members. Our responsibility is to continue to take the action needed to sort the situation out and to make the changes that are necessary. The payback system is under way. The new restrictive allowance system will remain in place. Sir Christopher Kelly has recommended a new framework for our allowances, and IPSA is up and running and will set up the new allowance system and administer it. Sir Christopher Kelly's report is another important step on the road to the public knowing that the allowance system has been put on to a proper independent footing and that we are getting on with our important task of serving our constituents and this country.
	This House of Commons has yet to fully resolve this damaging episode. But with clear acknowledgement of the public anger, with the firm action already taken, with the Kelly report and the establishment of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, this will be resolved. I commend this statement to the House.

George Young: I thank the Leader of the House for her statement and may I take this opportunity to deplore the way in which Sir Christopher's report was selectively leaked last week?
	This report was commissioned because neither the House nor the Senior Salaries Review Body was able to come up with a sustainable solution to the vexed question of our allowances. On behalf of my party, I wish to thank Sir Christopher and his colleagues for producing a thorough report, whose conclusions we shall accept in full and take forward.
	My brief questions fall into two parts-first on the process for implementing reform and, secondly, on the substance of some of the recommendations. On process, does the Leader of the House agree that now that the report has been published, our priority should be to ensure that these reforms are implemented as quickly as possible? Is not the position now very different to that when Sir Christopher began his review? Then he was going to produce the definitive response on which we would vote, and possibly resolve this by Christmas. But since June, as the Leader of the House said, the Parliamentary Standards Act has been put on the statute book, giving IPSA and not Kelly the final say on our allowances. So today's report is not the end of the process-that rests with IPSA, which is not yet constituted. Does she agree that it is important, therefore, that the consultation on Sir Christopher's report and the consultation that IPSA is obliged to carry out should happen at the same time? Does that not mean that IPSA should be up and running as soon as possible, taking Kelly as its text, and if we move quickly, might IPSA come to its conclusions on the Kelly report by February? Under that scenario, can she confirm that the interim arrangements might run until the new IPSA regime kicks in, possibly at the beginning of the next Parliament? Related to that, does she recognise that the continued uncertainty of the timetable for establishing IPSA is causing anxiety for many staff at the Department of Resources, who have to keep the show on the road without knowing their future? Finally, on process, does the Leader of the House recognise that some of the recommendations will require primary legislation, and when does she plan to introduce that?
	Turning to the substance of the recommendations, I declare an interest in the employment of relatives. I believe that there is insufficient appreciation of the demanding jobs that all staff do, often at antisocial hours, and many colleagues on both sides of the House, and indeed their constituents, will attest to the invaluable service that family members can, and do, provide, as was confirmed by Sir Christopher this morning. However, does the right hon. and learned Lady accept, as I do, that in a modern Parliament the current arrangements no longer carry public confidence? Does she agree that we need to accept Sir Christopher's recommendations while considering closely his proposed transitional period to ensure that the House does not fall foul of employment law?
	On communications, we welcome Sir Christopher's endorsement of our proposal to scrap the communications allowance, and I welcome what he said on MPs who retain outside interests. I also welcome the recommendation to enable IPSA to look at pay, pensions and allowances, enabling the full spectrum of MPs' remuneration to be considered in the round. Does the right hon. and learned Lady agree that it was the fragmented approach of the past that is partly to blame for the mess that we are in today?
	On accommodation, again we support Sir Christopher's recommendations. The public have lost confidence in the current regime, and it has to change. As Sir Christopher says, IPSA will need to look closely at the proposals in the report. There are legitimate concerns with aspects of it, particularly the rules surrounding those who are expected to get back to their constituencies at night. Does the right hon. and learned Lady accept that Sir Christopher's proposals on rent will need to be monitored by IPSA to ensure that the overall package is not more expensive than it is now? Does his package meet the Prime Minister's test on reducing the cost to the taxpayer?
	Finally, the issue before us has dogged the House for the past 12 months. The public are waiting for action. Sir Christopher provides the basis for an enduring settlement that is fair to the taxpayer and Members of the House-existing and potential-who need the resources to do the job properly without relying on private means. Is it not now paramount that we make urgent progress in what remains of this Parliament, so that we can return to our core tasks of scrutinising legislation, holding the Government to account and fighting for our constituents, and so that we can bequeath to our successors in the next Parliament the opportunity of a fresh start?

Harriet Harman: I thank the shadow Leader of the House for his comments, and I agree with him in deploring the leak.
	The right hon. Gentleman raised the point about getting on as quickly as possible with the implementation of the Kelly report, and he is right of course that when Sir Christopher Kelly started his work, the idea was that he would produce a report and that it would come back to the House to be implemented. After he started his work, we decided to set up IPSA, to which his report will now go for implementation. I confirm to the House that IPSA is already up and running. We expect it, of course, to take Kelly as its text, and the current interim regime of allowances will continue and subsist until such time as the whole regime is taken over by IPSA.
	On the question about proposals for changes in the legislation on the structure of IPSA, obviously if a new Act of Parliament is brought forward and a new authority set up, it would start its work and Parliament can keep the legislative framework under review. However, I do not think that we should be addressing the question of legislating to change the IPSA structure. The important thing is for it to be getting on with its work.
	The right hon. Gentleman acknowledged that the important thing is not to take the proposals piecemeal and for the House not to pick out any one proposal, but that we should simply send the whole package to IPSA. However, he commented on the employment of relatives and accommodation. It is right to recognise, as Sir Christopher Kelly did, that a great deal of hard work is done by the spouses employed by Members of Parliament, which is much valued by constituents. Sir Christopher's proposal for a change in the system should absolutely not cause a cloud to hang over the heads of those who have done, and continue to do, good work in the public interest, and of course IPSA will not want to fall foul of employment law.
	On accommodation, it is of course right that IPSA will need to look at the detailed implementation issues that will arise in moving from mortgages to rents or hotels. As the right hon. Gentleman said, we will need to look at how IPSA gets it right. It will of course need to keep an eye on cost, and cost will depend on implementation.

David Heath: Sir Christopher Kelly deserves our congratulations and thanks. The report is comprehensive and thorough. There will of course be issues of detailed implementation, but does the Leader of the House agree that we would not expect IPSA to disregard any part of what Sir Christopher calls
	"a package, not...a menu of options"?
	Should not those colleagues who have expressed difficulties with some parts of the report recognise that we have a unique and privileged position-a position that we apply for every four or five years? The terms of that contract have changed. Those who do not like it have a choice as to whether they reapply.
	The Leader of the House has rightly pointed out what has been done recently. It is only fair also to set out the criticism in Sir Christopher's report of what he describes as
	"a series of piecemeal attempts at reform, some of which were announced while we were deliberating. These attempts have, at best, lacked coherence."
	We have made some progress, but we should recognise that criticism.
	Some of the recommendations cannot be implemented without changes in either Standing Orders or primary legislation. Despite what the Leader of the House said in response to the right hon. Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir George Young), can she assure me that those will be considered as a matter of urgency?
	It is clear that IPSA will deal with the detailed arrangements. Nobody doubts that, but may I renew the call for an opportunity for all right hon. and hon. Members-not just the lucky few who catch your eye this afternoon, Mr. Speaker-not to vote or amend the recommendations, but to debate them? When I called for such a debate last week, the Leader of the House said that
	"the hon. Gentleman should make up his mind: does he really think it right that this House should pick over the question of our allowances when we have already decided to make that the responsibility of an independent authority? He cannot be on both sides of the argument".-[ Official Report, 29 October 2009; Vol. 498, c. 446.]
	I am clear: Sir Christopher Kelly's proposals should be implemented in full without equivocation. In the light of her widely reported comments over the weekend, can she say the same, or is she trying, for whatever reason, to be on both sides?
	After a disastrous and shaming year for Parliament, Sir Christopher Kelly has taken us back to where we should have been in the beginning when he says:
	"Members of Parliament have the right to be reimbursed for unavoidable costs where they are incurred wholly, exclusively, and necessarily in the performance of their parliamentary duties, but not otherwise."
	Is that not precisely correct?

Harriet Harman: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the report should be seen as a package, not a menu of options, as Sir Christopher Kelly recommends. I also agree that Sir Christopher Kelly himself acknowledges the progress that the House has already made to improve the system, but nonetheless says that taking a piecemeal approach has meant that this progress has lacked coherence. That is why it is important that the Christopher Kelly proposals go to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority as a whole, rather than being dealt with piecemeal.
	Obviously the further issues that Sir Christopher Kelly deals with-for example, the structure of the Standards and Privileges Committee and various structural issues to do with IPSA, which are not to do with the allowances regime package, which needs to be dealt with as a whole-are ones that we will need to consider.
	On allowances, we should all be on the side of ensuring that the House can do its job. It will help the House to be able to do its job when Sir Christopher Kelly's proposals go to IPSA. It is not a question of our returning to the work that we need to do; the truth is that we have never stopped scrutinising legislation, holding the Government to account and doing the work of the House. We need to return to a situation in which the public have confidence that that is the case.

Stuart Bell: On a day when we mourn the loss of five of our servicemen, with many others seriously wounded, does that not put into perspective the question of allowances in our time? Is it not a fact that Sir Christopher Kelly is trying to end not just one year of frustration about allowances, but 30 years in which they have bedevilled the House? May I draw the Leader of the House's attention to Sir Christopher Kelly's suggestion that IPSA and the Senior Salaries Review Body look at the pay structures of Members of Parliament, so that in the longer term we can marry pay structures with allowances in such a way that the dreadful allowances system is abolished for all time and we can get back to discussing Afghanistan, the middle east, violence in Northern Ireland, the peace process, Iran and all the other issues, including the economy? Those are the matters that should occupy the House's attention.

Harriet Harman: My hon. Friend is absolutely right: that is the paramount role of the House. We should be dealing with issues of concern to our constituents and the country as a whole, as well as international issues, not spending a huge amount of time dealing with our allowances, important though they are to enable us to discharge our obligations on behalf of our constituents.
	The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority will administer our pay and pensions, which will be decided by the Senior Salaries Review Body. We have already decided not to vote on our pay in future. Sir Christopher Kelly suggests that perhaps that role too should be co-ordinated with the responsibility of IPSA, which is certainly something that we can consider for the future. However, the fundamental point is that we will no longer be voting on our allowances, just as we already no longer vote on our pay.

Peter Robinson: First, may I welcome the publication of Sir Christopher's report and the statement by the Leader of the House? I very much approve of the approach that she is taking to this matter. If any parliamentary procedures are required to implement what she laid out in her statement, she can be assured that my colleagues will be happy to support her.
	As the fundamental systemic problem has arisen from the fact that Members of Parliament have been setting both their pay and conditions, and the standards of their expenses and allowances, it would be entirely wrong for Members of Parliament to attempt in any way to unpick Sir Christopher's report. In that context, will the Leader of the House ensure that there will be Government support for all of Sir Christopher's recommendations?
	There was one issue on which Sir Christopher did not feel it appropriate to make a comment-namely the pay, expenses and allowances of Members who do not take their seats in this House. In the new circumstances, will the Leader of the House ensure that the House has the opportunity to vote on that issue?

Harriet Harman: I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's comments and the support that he has given to the efforts that the House has taken as a whole to sort the situation out. He is right to recognise that, fundamentally, the problems have arisen because we have attempted self-regulation. Even with the best will in the world, the public do not have confidence that we should regulate our own affairs in that respect any more.
	I know that there is discussion about the situation in Northern Ireland. That will have to be a discussion across all the parties, and I know that the right hon. Gentleman will be engaged in it.

Tony Lloyd: My right hon. and learned Friend should know that the majority of people throughout the country would endorse her remarks, as well as those of the Kelly report, about family members of MPs, whose work and dedication has been very much in the interests of the taxpayer and our constituents. In that context, does she recognise that those employees have rights too? Will she ensure that their particular circumstances are drawn to the attention of the new standards authority, so that it can look properly at what the employment package involves for those who now face uncertainty about their employment prospects?

Harriet Harman: Under the Parliamentary Standards Act, that issue will be the responsibility of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, which will of course have to comply with and respect employment rights. I should like to draw the attention of the House to what Sir Christopher Kelly said about family members who work for Members of Parliament. He said:
	"Despite the publicity that a small number of cases have received, the Committee has no evidence of abuse occurring on a significant scale through the employment of family members. On the contrary, the Committee has heard evidence that many MPs' family members work hard and offer good value for money for taxpayers".

Patrick Cormack: If the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority is to be truly independent, is it not important that it regards Kelly as its agenda, and not its prescription? Before the authority considers these matters, would it not be right for the House to have a "take note" debate on Kelly?

Harriet Harman: No, I do not think that we should have a "take note" debate. It might be possible in the future to keep under consideration whether there should be a further debate, but I do not think that we want to get into a situation where we have a vote on the different aspects of Kelly. We have had an opportunity for Members to try to catch the Speaker's eye today. If there is a need for further discussions about this, we will have to consider that. The fact of the matter is that we are trying to move away from the House's preoccupation with our own allowances. Many hon. Members-more than 80, I think; myself included-gave evidence to the Kelly inquiry, and he drew up his recommendations and report with that in mind. The matter will now go to IPSA, which, under the Act, has the responsibility to consult Members of this House as well as others.
	It has been the habit of a lifetime for us to spend a lot of time in the House debating our pay. We have now broken ourselves of that habit, and it was important that we did so. It has also been the habit of a lifetime for us to discuss our allowances, but we know that, every time we do that, we adopt a piecemeal approach and it causes dismay among our constituents, who, as my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Sir Stuart Bell) said, are asking why we are not discussing their jobs and their prospects. We have now set this independent system up, and that is how the matter is to be taken forward. I do not rule out the prospect of a debate in the future, but I hope that-in so far as it is in my power to do so-I may rule out the idea that the House will take Kelly and have a series of votes on all the different bits of it. That would be very undesirable.

Tony Wright: We have all made a speech saying that we want nothing to do with the setting of our own pay and allowances, and that we would like those things to be determined by an independent body. When that independent body comes along and determines them, we will logically have no alternative but to accept that. If we do so, that and the other changes that we are making will finally give us a realistic chance of digging ourselves out of the dreadful mess into which the House has got itself.

Harriet Harman: I strongly agree with my hon. Friend's comments.

Angus Robertson: I very much welcome the Kelly recommendations-moving Westminster, as they do, towards the higher standard now operating in the Scottish Parliament. At the all-party talks on these issues, much hope was invested by everyone in all the parties that IPSA would deal with pay, allowances and expenses, so it must surely be for IPSA to take the Kelly report forward, and not for MPs to cherry-pick what they like from what they do not like.

Harriet Harman: Indeed. When we set up IPSA, and when we were discussing the Parliamentary Standards Act, our imperative was expeditiously to set up an authority with the specific remit of dealing with parliamentary allowances. The Justice Secretary, who took the legislation through the House of Commons, acknowledged at the time that, once IPSA was up and running, it might be able to take on a further remit-for example, that of pay. We are already safeguarded to some extent on pay, however, in that we have already decided not to vote on it. That matter could become statutorily embodied in IPSA in the future, but the most important thing is that the whole Kelly package on allowances falls to be considered by the authority and implemented for the next Parliament.

Gordon Prentice: Does Kelly say anything about the generous pay-offs to MPs who leave, then subsequently rejoin, the Government?

Harriet Harman: Is the hon. Member talking about the ministerial code and the ministerial payments?

Gordon Prentice: indicated assent.

Harriet Harman: There have already been changes in that, so that when a Minister leaves and subsequently rejoins the Government, the payment that they received on leaving is abated proportionately. That has therefore already been dealt with, which I am sure will meet with his approval.

Peter Bone: I would like to thank the Leader of the House for her statement today, and also for her comments before today's statement. In relation to what Sir Christopher has said about the employment of spouses, was she surprised by his recommendation? In particular, was she surprised that, on page 58, he is in fact encouraging wife-swapping?

Harriet Harman: Sir Christopher Kelly sets out his argument in full in relation to the employment of those working for Members of Parliament. He takes up a debate that was already running strongly in the public domain, and it is not a question of our being surprised. This is a question of the whole package going to IPSA.

Mark Durkan: Does the Leader of the House recognise that, while many of us say that we must fully accept the Kelly recommendations, not all of us believe that they are as comprehensive or thorough as some have said? Indeed, they will invite the creation of some new anomalies and discrepancies that the new Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority will certainly have to address. Does she recognise that some of us are concerned that five years is too long a period for last orders in respect of certain classes of claims for certain classes of MP? There is a serious risk that the next Parliament will end up being a Parliament of double standards, because different standards will apply to the claims and expenses of different MPs. That is a very bad precedent for a legislative assembly to set.

Harriet Harman: I do not think that it is unusual, when changing from an old system to a new one, to have transitional arrangements, when hon. Members-or anyone else-have already entered into arrangements. The transitional arrangements should therefore apply. There is nothing unusual about that, and I think that people will understand it.

John Barrett: The Leader of the House said in her statement that the House of Commons had to "fully resolve this damaging episode", but does she agree that it cannot be fully resolved until the issue of flipping homes for the avoidance of capital gains tax has been investigated?

Harriet Harman: The avoidance of capital gains tax is a matter for the Revenue and Customs; it is its responsibility. As for the designation between main and second homes, that has already been addressed at the meeting, chaired by the Speaker, that was attended by all the party leaders, the Members Estimate Committee and the Chair of the Committee on Members' Allowances. At that meeting, it was agreed-and subsequently taken through by the Members Estimate Committee and put into effect-that there was to be no change in designation between a main and second home. Since May, there has been no possibility of that change being made. Even before then, if a proper, accurate description was not given to the Revenue about a second home, that would be a matter for the Revenue to look into so that it could deal with the tax issues.

Peter Bottomley: In joining hon. Members in thanking Sir Christopher and his colleagues, may I ask the Leader of the House please to reconsider her answer to the question on a "take note" debate? There are various issues that many people would like to discuss. Two that I can think of are, first, whether allowances could be set for a Parliament and not changed each year, as the report has recommended, and, secondly, whether Sir Christopher and his colleagues have given sufficient attention to the needs of MPs who have young children, because it seems to me that their lives might not be quite so easy under his recommendations as they should be.

Harriet Harman: I will listen to, and reflect on, what hon. Members say about wanting a debate, but we all need to ask what the purpose of such a debate would be. We have all agreed that, if it was a "take note" debate, there would be no vote on it. Would its purpose be for hon. Members to make comments in the Chamber to IPSA, to enable it to understand hon. Members' position in the way that they want? If that is the purpose, that can be done either on the Floor of the House in a debate or by writing to IPSA. Bearing in mind the point we are at now, we must reflect quite carefully: we have had the Kelly report and IPSA is going to do its work. We should perhaps try to work according to an element of self-denying ordinance-as soon as I say it, I realise it might be beyond our ability-whereby having legislated for an independent authority, we actually allow it to get on with its work.

Food Labelling (Nutrition and Health)

Motion for leave to introduce a Bill (Standing Order No. 23)

Helen Southworth: I beg to move,
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to require simple, uniform nutritional labelling on the front of packaged foods; and for connected purposes.
	A very broad coalition of support for action is forming, following the extensive research commissioned by the Food Standards Agency and published earlier this year, which found that consumers were confused by the various different labelling formats on the front of packaging and wanted a single simplified system. The labelling approach found to be easiest for customers to understand is a combination of traffic light colours, high, medium, low text and percentage guideline daily amount-GDA-information. The FSA is now formally consulting stakeholders on its findings.
	A wide range of retailers have already acted in response to consumer demand for simple at-a-glance information to help busy people to choose to be healthy. The Co-op, Sainsbury's, Waitrose, Budgens and Londis, Booths and Boots are all using traffic light labelling on their products. The Co-op says:
	"The health and wellbeing of our customers is important to us, which is why we use traffic lights as a way to convey information and help customers to make choices about the food that they eat".
	ASDA and Marks & Spencer use a combination system. ASDA says:
	"An overwhelming majority of our shoppers have told us this is the style of labelling they want to see, so that's exactly what we're going to give them".
	Marks & Spencer said:
	"We aim to provide our customers with clear information-any details you might want or need to be able to make an informed choice about what you're eating".
	An increasing number of manufacturers are using traffic lights in response to customer demand for simple information. It is very clear from their public statements about labelling that they see a benefit in the marketplace from listening and responding to customers' requirements.
	The traffic light system came under fire from some sources when it was first being considered because of fears that it would mislead customers rather than allow them to distinguish between products, but as the system matures, many manufacturers are using clear, simple labelling to address the fat, sugar and salt content of their food, knowing that customers are finding it easy to make a choice based on quantifiable and easily comparable information.
	There is also a clear awareness that customers want to be able to control the contents of what they eat, and that giving them the information is essential to allow them to do that. If retailers want customers to buy their goods, they have to give customers what they want. McCain, for example, has redesigned its packaging to include both the FSA traffic light and the GDA, as recently recommended, saying:
	"Product reformation... means that most of our products are green and amber. McCain Rustic Oven chips have four green lights and have attracted younger users to the category."
	The company is working to ensure that its products meet customers' needs. Sainsbury's uses the multiple traffic lights as a tool for redevelopment of its products, with whole categories reformulated to reduce the number of red traffic lights on the front of packs-giving customers what customers want. Marks & Spencer are promoting its improvements to its recipes with banners across the shops, announcing on its website that
	"in the past two years we've removed over 400 tonnes of salt from our food."
	It is saying that because that is what its customers want.
	Yo Sushi, East Midlands Trains, National Express, Virgin Trains and Mysupermarket.co.uk are all using the FSA traffic light labelling system. The news might look good for customers, with such a wide range of suppliers responding to the need for a simple front-of-package labelling, but, unfortunately, we still have a long way to go before customers-busy people, shopping in a busy environment-can make quick decisions about what is best for them.
	The Which? "Hungry for change" healthier choices progress report 2009 comments that
	"the retailers and manufacturers who are already using the traffic light scheme have reported that it is having a positive impact, both in terms of enabling consumers to make more informed choices, but also by encouraging reformulation of recipes to produce more products with fewer reds, increasing the range of healthier food products on offer to consumers."
	It continues:
	"It is positive that a lot of products now carry nutrition information on front-of-pack as well as back-of-pack, and that many retailers and manufacturers are using the FSA's multiple traffic light labelling scheme. However, many are still not using the scheme, including two of the major retailers... and some of the main manufacturers despite research showing that it is the best approach. Until there is a consistent UK-wide scheme used across all products based on what works best, there will continue to be confusion".
	It is really crucial that we get this right.
	Experts reckon that about a quarter of all cancer deaths are caused by unhealthy diets and obesity. Strokes could drop by 13 per cent. if people reduced their daily salt intake by 3 grams. Heart disease is the UK's biggest killer, accounting for more than 200,000 deaths every year. Poor diets contribute significantly to the onset of heart disease, with diets that are high in fat, salt and sugar and low in fruit and vegetables accounting for 30 per cent. of all coronary heart disease deaths.
	The British Heart Foundation has a very good example that supports the necessity to provide dietary information at point of sale. It reports that the snacks most often found in vending machines in leisure centres have an average caloric content of 203; it would take a seven-year-old 88 minutes of swimming in the leisure centre pool to burn off that many calories. It has been estimated that 20,000 premature deaths each year could be avoided by reducing daily salt intake to 6 grams; 3,500 more by reduction of fat in foods; and a further 3,500 by reduction of sugar to the recommended guideline daily amounts. So it is not surprising that people want to be in control of what they eat.
	Over the summer, I carried out an extensive consultation with my constituents on the issue of front-of-package labelling and what they wanted to see. Overwhelmingly, people wanted simple at-a-glance information that was standard across all manufacturers so that they could choose easily between products-wherever and whatever they were buying.
	The FSA has identified the single simple system that is best understood by consumers and it has some really heavyweight backers. The British Medical Association says that
	"improved consistent labelling will help customers buy healthy food and will help them follow their doctor's advice".
	The British Heart Foundation supports the FSA's approach to front-of-package signpost labelling as it offers instant help to customers at the point of sale. The British Dietetic Association says that
	"it is important that one clear front-of-pack scheme is adopted so that manufacturers can enable consumers to make choices with confidence."
	Diabetes UK says that
	"it is vital that people with diabetes and those seeking to reduce the risk of developing the condition get information about foods to help make the right choices about what to eat. Providing information in different formats is likely to be a little better than giving no information at all, so it's really important that the food industry is consistent."
	The National Heart Forum says:
	"We know that consumers want a single authoritative nutritional labelling scheme they can rely on, whatever brand and wherever they shop".
	The Royal College of General Practitioners
	"strongly supports this easily understandable and usable tool to identify which foods constitute healthy choices".
	The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, the Royal College of Physicians, the UK Public Health Association, the National Consumer Council, Netmums, the National Federation of Women's Institutes, the Stroke Association and Which?, together with huge numbers of our constituents, want simple uniform nutritional labelling on the front of packaged foods.
	We in the House should do everything in our power to make it happen.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Ordered,
	That Helen Southworth, Shona McIsaac, Mrs. Janet Dean, Joan Walley, Mr. Ian Cawsey, Christine Russell, Mr. Mike Hall, Ms Sally Keeble, Charlotte Atkins, Mr. Kevin Barron, Ann Coffey and Derek Twigg present the Bill.
	Helen Southworth accordingly presented the Bill.
	 Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time  tomorrow  and to be printed (Bill 158).

Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

[Relevant d ocuments:  Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, Session  2007-08, on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, HC 551-I and-II, and the  Government response, Cm 7690.  Tenth Report from the Public Administration Select Committee, Session 2007-08,  on Constitutional Renewal: Draft Bill and White Paper, HC 499, and the  Government response, Cm 7688.  The letter from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to the  Secretary of State for Justice dated 26 October 2009. ]
	[2nd Allotted Day]
	 Further considered in Committee

[Sir Michael Lord  in the Chair]

Clause 33
	 — 
	Time limit for human rights actions against Northern Ireland Ministers etc

Michael Wills: I beg to move amendment 90, page 16, line 28, leave out lines 28 to 30 and insert-
	'(2F) In subsection (2D) "rule" has the same meaning as it has in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998.".'.

Michael Lord: I remind the Committee that with this we are considering the following: Government amendment 91.
	Government new clause 43- Time limit for human rights actions against Scottish Ministers etc.

Michael Wills: May I say what a pleasure it is be here, Sir Michael, and to speak to amendments 90 and 91 and new clause 43 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary?
	Clause 33 deals with human rights claims brought against Northern Ireland Ministers and Departments. Clause 34 deals with claims brought against Welsh Ministers. The original clauses 33 and 34 define the rules that could impose a stricter limit of less than a year by reference to section 7(9) of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, after further discussion with the devolved Administrations and further consideration of the issue, we now think that it would be better to adopt a different approach to the definition and to link the meaning of "rule" more directly to section 7(5). That will make it clear that the rules under which a case can be brought will be identical as between the two regimes, and there is a direct reference to the specific provision in the Human Rights Act that gives rise to the time limit.
	We have therefore tabled amendments 90 and 91 to clauses 33 and 34 to provide that "rule" should have the same meaning as is given to the same word in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act, thereby providing a link with the rules, which, for the purpose of that section, also impose a stricter time limit, and ensuring that the relevant time limits under the Human Rights Act and the devolution settlements keep pace with each other.
	New clause 43 deals with human rights claims brought against Scottish Ministers. I will now explain why that did not form part of the Bill. As Members will be aware, the provision arises out of the consequences of the House of Lords judgment in the Somerville case, which were more pressing in Scotland as Scottish Ministers are responsible for prisons-unlike Ministers in other devolved Administrations. Unlike other jurisdictions in the UK, there is no time limit in judicial review proceedings to act as an alternative, shorter, time limit to the one year. The Somerville case prompted a large number of claims concerning the segregation of prisoners in Scotland, so it was important to achieve clarity on the matter as rapidly as possible.
	As part of the agreement reached, after full discussion, with the Scottish Executive, an order was approved by this Parliament before the recess under section 30(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 to provide the Scottish Parliament with the competence to amend the Scotland Act to insert a one-year time bar for claims against Scottish Ministers. That was subject to the same power to extend the time limit in the interests of fairness and to any rule that might impose a shorter time limit. It was agreed that once the Scottish Parliament had amended the Scotland Act, the provisions of that legislation would be remade in UK legislation and the previous position on legislative competence would be restored to provide for a consistent approach across the United Kingdom.
	When the order under section 30 of the Scotland Act was debated, there was cross-party agreement that that was a necessary measure. The views of the Calman commission were formally sought in advance, and it agreed with our approach. It should also be noted that the section 30(2) order, which was the first piece of the legislative solution, was passed unopposed in both the UK and Scottish Parliaments. Emergency legislation was passed in the Scottish Parliament, but it did not receive Royal Assent until 23 July, after the Bill had been introduced. It therefore was not possible to include provision for Scotland on the Bill's introduction.
	New clause 43 imports the provision made in the Act of the Scottish Parliament, which inserted a one-year time limit to convention-based claims brought against Scottish Ministers under the Scotland Act. It also extends that provision to such claims brought anywhere in the United Kingdom, ensuring that the protection afforded in all three clauses is United Kingdom-wide. As in the amended clauses 33 and 34, the time limit is subject to a power available to the courts to extend it on equitable grounds, and it is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in the proceedings in question. As in clauses 33 and 34, the Scottish amendment provides that that "rule" should have the same meaning as is given to the same word in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act.
	The amendment dealing with claims against Scottish Ministers will, in line with the terms of the agreement made with Scottish Ministers, preserve the effect of the provisions of the Act of the Scottish Parliament, but repeal that Act and the provision that gave the Scottish Parliament the power to make it, thereby restoring the previous position on legislative competence and maintaining a consistent approach across the United Kingdom.
	The amendments are part of an important package of measures to bring actions against the devolved Administrations under the devolution Acts broadly in line with the time limit set out in the Human Rights Act. I hope therefore that the Committee will accept amendments 90 and 91 and new clause 43.

Pete Wishart: I support Government new clause 43 and hope that this is the end of a protracted and difficult saga for Scottish Ministers in respect of human rights legislation.
	The Minister's account of the history of the saga is right: it is based on the House of Lords judgment back in 2007, commonly referred to as the Somerville case, which meant that there was no one-year time bar for human rights claims against Scottish Ministers under the Scotland Act. The judgment resulted in a number of claims for compensation and legal fees against Scottish Ministers, who were frustrated that they could not legislate to reverse the position, given that the Scotland Act was reserved to this House.
	The Scottish public faced the prospect of millions upon millions of pounds going into the pockets of Scottish criminals and convicts instead of into front-line services and improving the Scottish prison stock. The judgment would probably have meant that 20,000 prisoners previously thought to have been time-barred would have been eligible to claim under the anomaly. Therefore, it was important to put the matter right.
	Unfortunately, progress was not as speedy as the Minister suggests: it took many lengthy negotiations and protracted conversations before we got to the happy stage where we could get the legislation through. The Minister is again right that an order was passed in the House that allowed the Scottish Parliament to legislate on the Scotland Act. As soon as that was decreed, the Scottish Parliament moved quickly to enact emergency legislation.

David Heath: The order passed in this House enabled the Scottish Parliament to pass amendments to the Scotland Act to introduce a bar of one year or less. Will the hon. Gentleman advise the Committee on whether the Scottish Parliament has in fact legislated for a bar of one year, or for a bar of less than a year?

Pete Wishart: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. In fact, the House passed an order through delegated legislation that allowed the Scottish Parliament, under section 100 of the Scotland Act, competence to legislate on the issue. Following that, the Scottish Parliament enacted emergency legislation, which amended the Scotland Act by imposing a one-year ban. As the Minister has said, on 23 July the legislation received Royal Assent as the Convention Rights Proceedings (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2009. Under the Act, the one-year time limit will apply to all proceedings raised on or after 2 November this year. The amendment supersedes all current legislation passed by both the House of Commons and the Scottish Parliament, and it has parity across the United Kingdom.
	I also welcome the other Government amendments, which will introduce parity across all the devolved institutions throughout the United Kingdom. My only hope is that, now that we have reached the happy stage at which everything seems to have been resolved, we shall see an end to this whole sorry saga.

Michael Wills: Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that this is an immensely complex legal issue? Does he also recognise that both sides, the Scottish Government and Whitehall, have gone to great trouble to try to reach a consensus? These things are not always quick and easy, but we have moved with all due speed.
	May I remind the hon. Gentleman that all Executives are sometimes subject to delays? As I speak, we have still not received from the Scottish Government a crucial document-the legislative consent motion-which we have been expecting. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that delays on all sides are inevitable in this process?

Pete Wishart: Perhaps I have been a little less generous than I should have been. Of course I understand that a protracted process has been necessary to take us to our present position. Nevertheless, this has been going on since devolution started back in 1999. It has been going on for a long, long time, and it is not beyond the realms of possibility to suggest that things might have been done a little more quickly.
	We accept that there are problems with the legislative consent motion, but I know that my colleagues in the Scottish Government are trying to deal with them. Perhaps, again, I have been a little unfair to the Minister. I think that we are all grateful for the fact that the matter has now been resolved, and I am aware of his involvement in its resolution. I know that there have been lengthy, fruitful and productive discussions with our Scottish Government colleagues. I am glad that, regardless of the history, the background and the pain and grief that have been suffered, we have reached the happy stage at which a solution has been found, and in that respect I am happy with the amendment.

David Heath: I do not intend to oppose the amendments and new clause. I entirely understand the route by which they have been arrived at. It is good news that, albeit following a bit of delay, an agreement has been reached between the Scottish Parliament and the Government in fairly short order. However, I want to enter a few words of caution.
	The decision of the House of Lords in Somerville etc.  v. Scottish Ministers correctly stated that there were two alternative statutory routes for the vindication of convention rights in Scotland, the Human Rights Act and the Scotland Act, and that there was a discrepancy between the two. That discrepancy has now been dealt with.
	My first concern is whether there may yet be any challenge to the compatibility of the new provision in the Scotland Act with convention rights. I suspect that there will not be, but it is a possibility none the less. My second concern is that the arguments that may have been used to add weight to the claim for compatibility between the two statutory routes are based on some fairly crude assessments of the potential liability under human rights legislation in respect of prisons in Scotland. I do not believe that the liability that was described was a real liability, and it worries me that far too often criticism of human rights legislation is couched in terms of the claims that might be made rather than the outcome of cases that are actually heard. There is, I think, an important distinction between the two.

Michael Wills: The hon. Gentleman has made an extremely important point about human rights legislation. I agree that we must be very careful about demonising the impact and consequences of such legislation. The facts are often entirely different from the way in which they are portrayed in the media, and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for drawing that to our attention. The mischief in this case, however, was caused not so much by the size of the potential liability as by its uncertainty. All Administrations need certainty and clarity. If there is a mischief in regard to which people have a legitimate claim against the state, it is important for that mischief to be identified and dealt with as quickly as possible, rather than being left uncertain for long periods. The Human Rights Act provides a clearly specified time limit, as indeed does judicial review. Those times are relatively short in comparison with the apparently lengthy processes that were opened up by Somerville.
	I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who has made a valuable point.

David Heath: And I am grateful to the Minister for his intervention. Such arguments often go without adequate rebuttal, but those of us with an interest in ensuring that human rights are properly upheld in this country believe that there is a huge mythology that it right for us occasionally to address and, where appropriate, argue against. Having looked at some of publicity surrounding the case and some of the claims made in support of the need for compatibility, I am not sure whether I entirely recognise the contingencies being described. Perhaps I should be more explicit. I am concerned about whether the retrospectivity in the new arrangements will find favour if challenged under human rights legislation. That aside, however, I think it sensible for there to be a clear co-ordination between the two statutory routes, and I see no reason not to support the amendments and new clause.

Nigel Dodds: I welcome the Government's approach to the introduction of time limits for human rights action against Northern Ireland, Welsh and Scottish Ministers. I will not rehearse all the arguments, but I think that this is a sensible provision, and, as the Minister will know, it has been welcomed by the Northern Ireland Executive. Although the Somerville judgment did not deal with claims under the legislation governing the devolved arrangements in Northern Ireland-or, indeed, legislation relating to Wales-the problems that arose in Scotland could arise there.

Eleanor Laing: We also welcome these provisions. I welcome the provisions already in the Bill, and I was pleased to see that, albeit belatedly, the Government had tabled the new clause. I do not blame the Minister for the delay; I appreciate what he said about the complexity of the issue, and I agree that it is not surprising that it has taken some time to present measures to deal with it.
	I must tell the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) once again-I am making a habit of this, and I shall have to be careful about it-that he was absolutely right in all that he said. The potential cost to the taxpayer-and the actual cost so far-of the mistake that was made in allowing an anomaly to arise have been considerable, but let us hope that that flow of taxpayers' money will now be stemmed.
	I am still concerned about one thing, however. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to answer my question, and the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire may wish to intervene It appears that there is now a different time limit for the bringing of an action where there is potential delictual liability-or, indeed, an action in a personal injury case-to that for bringing an action under human rights legislation.
	The following situation could therefore arise under the terms of the Bill. Somebody who has been injured would have a right to bring a case under human rights legislation on which there would be a time limit of one year, but they would also have a right to bring a normal personal injury case or a case under the normal Scots law of delict-which is when someone has had an injury caused to them by someone else-and that would have a normal time limit of three years, or in some cases six or seven years. A person could therefore bring an action under the normal law of delict but by the time they discovered they were not going to succeed in that action it would be too late to bring an action under human rights legislation. The opposite situation could also arise: they might bring forward a human rights case and then discover that they had run out of time under the normal law of delict or personal injury law. I am taking a long time to explain this in order for the Minister to have a chance to consider the matter.

Michael Wills: I just want to see if I can set the hon. Lady's mind at rest on this. This measure affects all convention-based claims, not other claims; the Scottish law of delict, for example, is a matter for Scots law. This relates to convention-based claims, which is why this House is dealing with it; it is a matter of UK law and our compatibility with the convention.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the Minister for that answer, which is perfectly in order, and I appreciate that that is as far as he can go in discussing this Bill and his responsibilities. I am merely putting down a marker that there could be a further anomaly here which somebody somewhere within the Scottish or UK Governments might wish to look at before an injustice occurs as a result of it-let me put it no more strongly than that. I am glad that the Minister has taken the point on board, and I am sure his colleagues will look into it. As the Minister has said, this matter is complex and addressing it has taken quite some time, and I do not blame him for that. Not for the first time, however, these mistakes and injustices have arisen because of the way in which devolution has been implemented and as a result of matters not having been properly thought through in advance.

Michael Wills: I do not wish to interrupt the hon. Lady in the middle of her flow, but she is straying into very dangerous territory and I want to help her protect herself from herself. May I remind her that this came about as a result of a judgment in the House of Lords? Courts sometimes interpret laws in ways that parliamentarians wish they had not, but that is a crucial part of the separation of powers in this country. It is a crucial protection for the people of this country that sometimes courts take decisions that are awkward or difficult for Governments and politicians of all classes, and when they do so, we have to respond, which is precisely what we are doing. This is not a result of a flaw in the legislation; it is a result of an interpretation of the courts. This happens, and it will go on happening regardless of what the hon. Lady may think.

Eleanor Laing: I am grateful for the Minister's protection, and I fully appreciate, and agree with, what he says about decisions taken by the courts as, of course, I also support the doctrine of the separation of powers. Let me explain what is of concern to me, however. I acknowledge that the Minister had nothing to do with the discussions a decade ago on the legislation that became the Scotland Act 1998 and other devolution measures, but those of us who were sitting on the Conservative Benches warned time and again that these anomalies would arise. In this case, it has cost the taxpayer several million pounds. Let us hope that further anomalies do not arise as a result of devolution not having been properly thought through in these areas. We warned about this a decade ago, and I am still warning now.

Pete Wishart: The hon. Lady was articulating a powerful point before she was interrupted in full flow by the Minister. She is entirely correct that this is all to do with an anomaly. The Somerville case was successful because it identified that anomaly and was able to progress and make a case on the basis of flawed work in respect of the Scotland Act. Like me, the hon. Lady spends many hours in Delegated Legislation Committees trying to clear up some of the mess caused by that Act, so it is disingenuous to try to suggest that it was a perfect document.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the hon. Gentleman for agreeing with my point. Like me, he spends many hours in Delegated Legislation Committees correcting the anomalies of the devolution legislation, and I and many of my colleagues-and many of his colleagues, and also many of the Minister's colleagues-spent weeks and months in this Chamber raising these matters when we dealt with the Scotland Act. I am merely saying that we were right then and the Government were too complacent.

Michael Wills: I shall be brief, as I do not want to protract proceedings unduly. I am sure the whole House has noted that a curious alliance and amity is developing between the two parties that opposed devolution, and that did so for completely different reasons, in reliving those old arguments. Most of the people of the United Kingdom, including most of the people in Scotland, think devolution has been a great success. It is just worth the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire reflecting on the fact that the House of Lords decided on Somerville by the narrowest of majorities-by three to two. Therefore, the suggestion that this was somehow inherent in the legislation is manifestly nonsense.

Eleanor Laing: The Minister shows great faith in his Government, but neither the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire nor I share it. The Minister is right that there is an alliance of sorts; it is an alliance of those who care about the Scottish legal system and the protection of Scots law and its principles. I have not said anything different from what I said when we discussed these matters and the Scotland Act was passed a decade ago; I have not changed my position at all. I have always argued that the United Kingdom can work perfectly well and properly with different legal systems, as it has done for centuries.
	I declare an interest: I am a Scots lawyer by profession. Because of that and the fact that I am also conversant in the practice of English law, I have always argued that it is perfectly possible to have a United Kingdom that functions properly for all its citizens throughout our entire country under different legal systems-indeed, as the Minister has said, under a devolved system, which we now have and which we all want to work properly. In order for it to work properly, however, it is incumbent on the Government to consider the pitfalls that might lie ahead and to consider possible anomalies that might arise, and to protect the legal system, the people, the principles of justice and, indeed, the taxpayer from the consequences of those anomalies.
	I appreciate that the Minister has today brought forward the right legislation to do that. I still agree with the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire that it is unfortunate that it has taken so long, but at least we have it today and we welcome it.
	 A mendment 90 agreed to.
	 Clause 33, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34
	 — 
	Time limit for human rights actions against Welsh Ministers etc

Amendment made: 91, page 17, line 12, leave out lines 12 to 14 and insert-
	'(3C) In subsection (3A) "rule" has the same meaning as it has in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998.".'.- ( Mr. W ill s.)
	 Clause 34, as amended, order ed to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 43
	 — 
	Time limit for human rights actions against Scottish Ministers etc

'(1) In section 100 of the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46) the following (as inserted by the Convention Rights Proceedings (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2009 (asp 11)) are omitted-
	(a) subsections (3A) to (3E);
	(b) in subsection (4), the words "Subject to subsection (3D),".
	(2) The Convention Rights Proceedings (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2009 (asp 11) is repealed.
	(3) Omit paragraph 4A of Schedule 4 to the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46).
	(4) The Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 4) Order 2009 is revoked.
	(5) Subsections (1) to (4) above do not apply to any proceedings brought before this section comes into force.
	(6) After subsection (3) of section 100 of the Scotland Act 1998 (c. 46) insert-
	"(3A) Subsection (3B) applies to any proceedings brought by virtue of this Act against the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive in a court or tribunal on the ground that an act of the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive is incompatible with the Convention rights.
	(3B) Proceedings to which this subsection applies must be brought before the end of-
	(a) the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place, or
	(b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,
	but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question.
	(3C) Subsection (3B) does not apply to proceedings brought by the Lord Advocate, the Advocate General, the Attorney General, the Attorney General for Northern Ireland or the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
	(3D) In subsections (3A) and (3B) "act" does not include the making of any legislation but it does include any other act or failure to act (including a failure to make legislation).
	(3E) In subsection (3B) "rule" has the same meaning as it has in section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998."
	(7) In subsection (4) of that section at the beginning insert "Subject to subsection (3D),".
	(8) Subsections (6) and (7) above apply to any proceedings brought after this section comes into force (including proceedings in respect of an act taking place before this section comes into force).'.- ( Mr. W ill s.)
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 35
	 — 
	Judicial appointments etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: I wish to ask the Minister exactly what the words "pared down" mean. That was the Government's description of what they have done to the proposals included in the draft Bill in this respect. In this instance, "pared down" appears to mean omitted in their entirety, rather than anything that could satisfactorily be described using that term. I am curious to learn exactly why the Government have thought again.
	In 2007, a clear commitment was given that the Government would surrender some Executive power, and judicial appointments was one of the 12 areas explicitly mentioned. The 2008 draft Bill made some explicit proposals in this area: it proposed that the Lord Chancellor's role be reduced by removing his power to reject or require reconsideration of selections made by the Judicial Appointments Commission for all judicial offices below the High Court; it proposed to remove the requirements for the Lord Chief Justice to consult the Lord Chancellor or obtain his agreement before exercising functions such as deploying judiciary to certain leadership posts; it proposed to place new duties on the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the JAC and the selection panels to ensure that selection processes are fair, transparent, efficient, flexible, proportionate and effective and to have regard to the JAC's need to act independently; and it proposed to place new duties on the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice to encourage diversity in judicial appointments.
	The only thing that has remained from that list is the removal of the Prime Minister from the process, but as I suspect the Prime Minister has never actively intervened in this process, other than on the express advice of the Lord Chancellor, that is, in effect, a cosmetic change. The only argument that I could advance that the Government may have for dropping these changes is the opposition from the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, which expressed a view that to introduce reforms at this stage might create an imbalance in the proposals contained in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
	That might be an argument, were it not for the fact that the Government have already rejected the Joint Committee's views. The Government response to the Committee's report clearly stated that they do
	"not accept the overall view of the Committee".
	However, the response also stated that the Government
	"remains committed to nearly all the proposals seen by the Joint Committee".
	That commitment seems to have lasted barely a year before this paring down, which is, in effect, the removal of most of the changes to the Executive power of the Government in this area of judicial appointments. I simply seek an explanation from the Government as to why they have changed their view. Why have they decided not to proceed with that which they promised?

Michael Wills: I will come to the burden of what the hon. Gentleman has been saying, but it may help the Committee if I briefly set out the purpose of this clause and, if I may, discuss the substance of it, which is schedule 5.

The Second Deputy Chairman: Order. The Minister is correct. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) was moving his discussion from the clause into the schedule. As long as we all understand that we are discussing the two things at the same time, that is fine.

Michael Wills: Thank you very much, Sir Michael. If the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome wants to ask individual questions on schedule 5, I hope that he will intervene on me as we go.

David Heath: I just want to be clear, Sir Michael, whether we are dealing with schedule 5 stand part at the same time, in which case I have one other point to make. I am in your hands, Sir.

The Second Deputy Chairman: It was the hon. Gentleman who led us astray in the first place by moving his discussion from the clause into the schedule. He could deal with any other points he has to make through interventions on the Minister, but in fact we are dealing with the two things together, if he is happy with that.

Michael Wills: rose-

David Heath: rose-

The Second Deputy Chairman: Order. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could make the final point that he wishes to make and the Minister could reply after that.

David Heath: Thank you for getting us out of a procedural conundrum in respect of exactly who should be speaking, Sir Michael. The point that I wish to raise on schedule 5-this may assist the Minister in collecting his thoughts-relates to the Government's response on the order-making power to exempt positions from the JAC's remit. In response to the Joint Committee's report, the Government said:
	"The Government remains convinced that the most appropriate way to resolve this issue is an order making power",
	but they went on to say that the Government
	"no longer believes this Bill is the appropriate vehicle for such a change, and in the meantime will explore further non-statutory options available."
	I would like to know precisely what that means. What are those "non-statutory options" that the Minister is exploring? When does he expect to bring forward more detailed proposals? What will they encompass?
	Schedule 5 removes magistrates from the JAC's remit by deleting them from schedule 14 to the 2005 Act. Presumably there is a good reason for that. The 2008 draft Bill also proposed an extremely broad order-making power allowing the Lord Chancellor to amend any part of schedule 14 to the 2005 Act to exempt candidates to certain offices from being selected by the JAC. I think that procedure was intended to allow redeployment, rather than appointment, and to facilitate matters within the field of judicial appointments. It would have been a sweeping power and, as such, it was not entirely surprising that it met with opposition from the JAC itself, the Lord Chief Justice, the House of Lords Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee. Although that proposal has now been dropped, we face the threat or promise of arriving at the same result by alternative means. We are entitled to know from the Minister exactly what those alternative means are and what the Government's intention is.

Michael Wills: As has been discussed, clause 35 gives effect to schedule 5, which makes amendments relating to judicial appointments and other matters. I hope that my brief run through what the schedule contains will help the Committee in deciding on this matter.
	What the Government have sought to do throughout their constitutional reform agenda is to recalibrate to ensure that we have the right relationships between the citizen, the Executive, the legislature-Parliament-and the judiciary. So, for example, the founding of a Supreme Court was a profound constitutional change, which symbolises and entrenches legally, the separation of powers between the state and the judiciary. However, there are also smaller steps that we must take to achieve the goals of this reform programme, and although they are smaller, they are not necessarily nugatory.
	Clause 35, and the provisions in schedule 5, to which it gives effect, both help to limit the role of the Executive and reinforce the independence of the judiciary. They also make a number of other minor changes to streamline the judicial appointments process. The Government remain committed to nearly all the proposals seen by the Joint Committee on the draft Constitutional Renewal Bill and we will continue to review and develop them separately from the forthcoming Bill, along with its judicial partners.

Edward Timpson: The Minister has mentioned that some minor amendments to this Bill are being proposed to try to streamline the judicial appointments process. Can he tell the Committee what assessment is being made of the effect that these streamlining measures will have on attempts to reduce the unfortunate delay that there still is in the appointment of judges, which is causing such problems in our court system?

Michael Wills: I am happy to set out our thinking. It would give me a little more help in addressing the hon. Gentleman's particular concerns if he could be a little more specific about the problems to which he is referring. If he could list them, I will be happy to address them.

Edward Timpson: As the Minister might recall, this was an issue that I raised with the Lord Chancellor on Second Reading. I have in fact written to him to set out specific examples of where there are some holes in the number of judges in certain circuits across the country. Clause 35 and schedule 5 will, on the face of it, reduce the time that the medical assessment of a potential candidate will take, but they do not set out in any practical terms how that will affect the time from application to appointment. Can the Minister give us some idea of how much of an effect that process will have?

Michael Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and if he will bear with me, I shall come to that point as I proceed through all the advantages of the schedule. Obviously, if he has written to the Lord Chancellor, I am sure that he will receive a full and completely adequate reply in a timely fashion.
	Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 9 of schedule 5 remove the Prime Minister from the appointment process of the president, deputy president and judges of the Supreme Court. Paragraph 2 amends section 26 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, with the effect that when presented with a candidate chosen by a selection commission recommendations for appointment will now be made by the Lord Chancellor instead of by the Prime Minister. Instead of notifying a selection to the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor is to make a recommendation for appointment. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 9 make various consequential amendments to the 2005 Act.
	Although we accept that the Executive need to retain a limited role in the appointment of the justices of the Supreme Court, so that there is a direct line of accountability to Parliament for such appointments, the Government believe that, as with all other judicial appointments, the Lord Chancellor has the necessary authority to fulfil this role. Involving the Prime Minister in addition to the Lord Chancellor at a point twice removed from the work done by the independent selection commission that is convened to recommend appointments to the Lord Chancellor in the first place only serves to perpetuate an erroneous perception that the appointment process is not as independent from the Executive as it should be. For that reason, the Government believe that even though the Prime Minister's role in recommending the final nomination to the Queen is a limited one, removing that role is very much in line with the Government's long-standing reform agenda of reducing the role of the Executive, where appropriate, wherever possible.
	Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the schedule transfer responsibility for obtaining medical assessments of selected candidates for judicial office from the Judicial Appointments Commission to the Lord Chancellor. That is supported by the commission because it sees the process of medical assessment as part of the final appointment process, rather than the initial selection process. In addition, there was consensus in consultation that this aspect of the appointment process should be quicker-and so there is general agreement with the burden of the appraisal made by the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson), which is that it has taken too long.

Edward Timpson: indicated assent.

Michael Wills: The hon. Gentleman is nodding. There is general agreement that this needs to be quicker, and the proposal helps to streamline the process by reinforcing an administrative move to a system of self-certification rather than a medical assessment by a doctor in every case-only in those cases where the self-certification reveals a cause for concern will candidates be asked to undergo a medical assessment. The proposal should speed up and streamline the process. No systems are perfect and obviously if further problems remain, we will address them. I hope that provides some reassurance to the hon. Gentleman.
	The Joint Committee was in favour of the proposal, but questioned whether it could be achieved without the need for legislation. The Government view is that legislation is needed to provide absolute clarity. Sections 96 and 97 of the 2005 Act provide for medical assessments of those who have been selected for appointments to be conducted by the Judicial Appointments Commission. Paragraph 5 of the schedule makes amendments to the provisions in section 96 of that Act relating to medical assessments. Sub-paragraph (3) adds new subsections (2A) and (2B) to section 96 to enable the Lord Chancellor to request a person who has been selected for appointment by the Judicial Appointments Commission to provide information about his or her physical or mental condition. The Lord Chancellor may specify a period in which the information has to be supplied.
	Sub-paragraph (4) amends section 96(3). The amendment made to that section provides that the Lord Chancellor may also request a candidate to undergo a medical assessment and for a report of that assessment to be made available to the Lord Chancellor. The provisions replace section 96(3) under which the Lord Chancellor may direct the Judicial Appointments Commission to make arrangements for any assessment of the health of those who have been selected for appointment.
	Sub-paragraph (5) modifies section 94(4) and sub-paragraph (6) inserts new subsections (4A) and (4B). These provide that the Lord Chancellor may, after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, notify the Judicial Appointments Commission that he or she is not proceeding with an appointment if the circumstances specified in new subsection (4A) apply. These circumstances are if the candidate does not comply with a request to provide information under the new subsection (2B) or to undergo a medical assessment under proposed new subsection (3)(a), or if the Lord Chancellor is not satisfied on the basis of a medical report under proposed new subsection (3)(b) that it would be appropriate to proceed with the appointment.
	Sub-paragraph (7) amends section 96(5) to make it clear that if a candidate is rejected, any other selection for the same appointment or recommendation is to be disregarded and that the candidate must not be selected again pursuant to that request for the same appointment or recommendation. Sub-paragraphs 8 and 9 are transitional provisions that ensure that the new procedures apply only to requests to undergo medical assessments made after the relevant provisions of the Bill have come into force.
	Paragraph 6 is a consequential amendment in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It ensures that where reference was made in section 97(1)(e) to the duty to consult the relevant head of judiciary under section 96(4)(a), the reference in section 97(1)(e) now refers to the duty to consult the relevant head of judiciary set out in section 96(4B).
	Paragraphs 7 and 10 provide for the removal of magistrates from schedule 14 to the 2005 Act. Schedule 14 to that Act lists the offices that comprise the statutory recruitment and selection remit of the Judicial Appointments Commission. Magistrates were included in schedule 14 under the title of justices of the peace as it was originally intended that recruiting and selecting for the role should be a part of the Judicial Appointments Commission's remit.
	The current system has the considerable advantage of providing invaluable local input into the process of recruiting and selecting local people to deliver local justice. Advisory committees are composed of local magistrates and at least one third of local lay persons. This helps to ensure that the recruitment and selection of magistrates is firmly grounded in the communities in which they serve. I hope that the whole House will agree that that is a desirable outcome. Agreement has been reached between the Lord Chancellor, the Judicial Appointments Commission, the Lord Chief Justice and the Magistrates' Association that the Judicial Appointments Commission will not in future take responsibility for the recruitment and selection of magistrates.
	Paragraph 10 of schedule 5 to the Bill removes magistrates from schedule 14 of the 2005 Act. The recruitment and selection function will therefore remain for the foreseeable future with local advisory committees, where it is performed effectively and with a high degree of independence by dedicated volunteers drawn from among magistrates and members of the local community.
	Paragraph 7 of schedule 5 amends section 118 of the 2005 Act to ensure that even though magistrates have been removed from schedule 14, they will remain within the scope of the disciplinary powers exercised by the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor. This could have been done by making an order under section 118, but in this instance the Government feel that primary legislation is the most efficient way to make the necessary changes. It most closely reflects the current arrangements, under which the disciplinary scheme applies to magistrates by means of primary legislation.
	Paragraph 8 of schedule 5 clarifies that confidential information obtained during the appointment or disciplinary process can be shared with the police for specified purposes relating to the prevention or investigation of crime, including for the purposes of criminal proceedings. Current sections of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 covering the disclosure of confidential information do not explicitly allow such information to be provided. We do not consider the proposal to be controversial: it is considered that any indication that a criminal offence had been committed could be disclosed to the police without the need for an explicit gateway, but without a legislative change the Ministry of Justice could be left open to the possibility of litigation that would be costly in terms of both time and money. We therefore want to make it completely clear that confidential information could be disclosed to the police.
	We are confident that sharing confidential information for the purpose of preventing a crime, or for the purposes of a criminal investigation or procedures, will be compatible with the principles of data protection. The Data Protection Act does not stand in the way of such disclosures, so they would either be compatible with data protection principles or fall under the exemption to the Act that relates to the prevention or detection of crime, or the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.
	The proposal was raised in the White Paper, welcomed by the Joint Committee, and also supported by the JAC. It will bring the judicial appointments process into line with the process in other organisations.
	Paragraph 1 of schedule 5 corrects a typographical error. I was perhaps harsh with the hon. Members for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) for alleging that the Government had allowed an anomaly to creep into the devolution legislation. They were wrong about that, but I hold my hand up to the typographical error.
	The error came about because the original section 21(4) was substituted by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which also inserted section 21(4A). The amendments came into force on 3 April 2006, and this has been the first legislative opportunity to correct the error. The correction is uncontroversial and has no adverse impact, but I apologise to the Committee for the fact that it was allowed to creep in in the way that it did.
	I turn now to the question asked by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) about why we dropped certain provisions. We did not drop them: the way that I would phrase it-and I hope that he will agree that this is an accurate reflection of what happened-is that we listened. We consulted extensively on this Bill, and we listened carefully to what hon. Members, the Joint Committee and other people said.
	We took to heart what the Joint Committee said about making changes to a process that in effect has been in operation for only a short period. We remain committed to nearly all the proposals put to the Joint Committee, but we take the point that it might be sensible to allow the changes already in place to bed down before we decide exactly how to take them forward.
	We will continue to develop the entire judicial appointments process in partnership with our judicial partners separately from the Bill. We recognise that there is more work to do, and I think that the judiciary agree. We do not regard this as a closed chapter, but merely as an onward step in the process.

David Heath: I think that we can take it from what the Minister has said that, when the Government told the Joint Committee that they did not accept the recommendation, what they meant was that they did accept it and that they would remove the promises to remove certain areas of judicial appointments from Executive control. Are those promises are now shelved sine die, or does he have firm proposals to bring them back at an early date?

Michael Wills: I think that the hon. Gentleman is using the very wide margin of appreciation afforded to Opposition Members to interpret what I said. That is not what I said: I said that we listened to the concerns and agreed that the right thing to do was to allow time to see how the proposals already in place bedded down.
	I also said that we are committed to nearly all the proposals originally put forward. To that extent, we do not accept the Committee's recommendation that we should not proceed with the changes. We think that they have merit, but also that we should allow more time to see precisely how we should take them forward.
	The promises are not postponed sine die. The Government have shown that we are serious about constitutional reform in all areas. Many people consider that we have achieved a quite revolution in bringing about a programme of constitutional reform. I am completely confident that it will stand the test of time. We will continue with the reform programme; nothing is postponed sine die.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 36
	 — 
	Salary protection for members of tribunals

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Heath: I have a couple of very brief questions about clause 36. They also relate to Government new clause 23, which is a very similar provision relating to Northern Ireland. I therefore hope, Sir Michael, that it will not disturb our proceedings too greatly if we do not repeat these questions later.
	First, why have the specific offices mentioned in the clause been chosen? Do any similar offices exist for which the Government have not felt it necessary to provide this protection?
	Secondly, what is the position of the lay members of tribunals? Chairmen have salaried posts, but do lay members have the same protection? I was approached over the summer by a lay member of an employment tribunal who was extremely concerned that there appeared to be arbitrary changes in what he was expected to do as a tribunal member, the conditions under which he was expected to work and the remuneration that he could expect in terms of appropriate expenses. To what extent does the protection offered to what are quasi-judicial tribunal appointments extend to the lay members who sit alongside them? Lay members provide a very important resource to the country in helping to arbitrate sometimes extremely difficult issues.

Michael Wills: I think that it partially answers the hon. Gentleman's question if I say that we are seeking to correct a legislative anomaly. Every hon. Member agrees with the principle that we should have an independent judiciary in this country, and that that independence should be robustly protected in all ways.
	We have talked about the appointments process, in which we are trying to entrench that fundamental principle of independence. Another crucial aspect of judicial independence is salary protection for judicial office holders, and that is what clause 36 is designed to advance. There is a legislative anomaly, and we are trying to remedy it by providing a statutory prohibition preventing the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor from determining reductions in the salaries of judicial office holders in tribunal services.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked why only these members of the judiciary are mentioned in the clause, and the answer is that most other judicial office holders are already protected in primary legislation from the Executive determining reductions in their salaries. That statutory salary protection is widely regarded as an important safeguard of judicial independence against Executive interference, but currently there are no equivalent provisions for tribunal judges. This change is designed to harmonise the statutory safeguards of judicial independence across the judiciary, and it was welcomed by the Joint Committee.
	Lay members of tribunals will not have the same protection, precisely because of the principle of judicial independence. Lay members do valuable and crucial work, but none the less they are not part of the judiciary in quite the same way.
	It might be worth informing the Committee that there are a relatively small number of judicial office holders who will still not receive salary protection in the way set out in clause 36. The judge advocate general and the deputy and assistant judge advocates general are not covered by primary legislation because they fall outside the mainstream judiciary.
	I hope the Committee will feel able to support the clause.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause 36 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New clause 23
	 — 
	Salary protection for office holders in Northern Ireland

'(1) A person's salary determined under any of the following provisions may be increased, but not reduced, by further determinations.
	(2) The provisions are-
	(a) section 106(1) of the County Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 (c. 25 (N.I.));
	(b) section 12(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 1964 (c. 21 (N.I.)) as it applies in relation to persons appointed under section 9(1) of that Act.
	(3) Subsection (5) applies if, in accordance with the terms of a person's appointment, the person is to be paid a salary (as opposed to fees) under any of the following provisions.
	(4) The provisions are-
	(a) section 2(1) of the Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 (c. 15 (N.I.)) as it applies in relation to the remuneration of coroners (but not deputy coroners);
	(b) section 70 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (c. 23);
	(c) paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 to the Child Support Act 1991 (c. 48) as it applies in relation to persons appointed under section 23(1) of that Act;
	(d) paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 to the Social Security Administration (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 (c. 8) as it applies in relation to persons appointed under section 50(1) of that Act.
	(5) Under the provision in question the person's salary-
	(a) must be determined and paid accordingly;
	(b) may be increased, but not reduced, by further determinations.'.- (Mr. Wills.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Michael Wills: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
	In speaking to the new clause, I hope I will address the final part of the remarks of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). The new clause provides a guarantee that the salaries of certain judicial office holders in Northern Ireland may not be reduced. As I said, the statutory salary protection is a crucial part of judicial independence. We have just passed clause 36, which provides it for tribunal office holders. With the inclusion of the provisions concerning England and Wales giving statutory protection for tribunal judges, we saw an opportunity to bring salary protection for the judiciary in Northern Ireland into line with that in England and Wales. That is what the new clause will do.

Nigel Dodds: I welcome the Minister's comments on new clause 23. I have a couple of brief questions. I should be grateful if he could outline the extent to which there was consultation with the Northern Ireland Court Service and others in the Northern Ireland Office on the matter, given the current debate on the devolution of justice powers in respect of Northern Ireland.
	Further to the questions posed earlier by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), can the Minister outline what the measure will mean in relation to those judicial and tribunal officers in Northern Ireland who are not covered? There is an extensive list in new clause 23 but what about the officers not covered? Are any posts in Northern Ireland specifically related to the Province not covered by salary protection provisions?

Michael Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his welcome for the new clause and for his questions. We consulted everyone appropriate in Northern Ireland, including the Court Service, so I can reassure him on that.
	On the question who is covered and who is not, the provision covers the salaried judiciary in the courts as well as social security and child support commissioners, but as I think the hon. Gentleman was suggesting, there are a number of other tribunal judiciary in Northern Ireland who are not included. That is because this is a matter for the devolved Administration. As I said, we have made the relevant Departments aware of our plans to introduce these changes. It is a matter for them whether they choose to follow suit.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 20
	 — 
	Lords Justices of Appeal

'(1) The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) Omit sections 76 to 84.'.- (Mr. Bellingham.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Second Deputy Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 22- Written tests by the Judicial Appointments Commission-
	'(1) Section 88 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (5) insert-
	"(6) At no stage during any selection procedure may the Commission apply any written tests."'.

Henry Bellingham: I should declare an interest as a barrister. I should also point out that I am not at present seeking any judicial appointments. I did at one stage have serious ambitions to become a high-flying QC who might go on to one of the highest judicial appointments in the land, but I suspect that what I am going to say in a few minutes will probably not endear me to the Judicial Appointments Commission.
	New clause 20 removes from the scope of the JAC the appointment of Court of Appeal judges, the Lord Justices of Appeal. It does this by removing the relevant sections of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. New clause 22 clarifies section 88 of that Act by stating clearly in the legislation that the JAC will not be able to continue with its unpopular and, I would suggest, discredited written tests.
	Why are we proposing these two new clauses? We need to have a quick look at the JAC and the background to it. It was set up by section 61 of the 2005 Act. It was a completely new system and represented a significant departure from the previous system, which was based on recommendations to the Lord Chancellor. This was part of a much wider package of constitutional changes involving the position of the Lord Chancellor, the new Supreme Court, which we shall discuss later this afternoon if new clause 21 is reached, and judicial appointments in Northern Ireland. Another important part of that package of constitutional changes was the creation of the Ministry of Justice, which took over the former Department for Constitutional Affairs and took over from the Home Office responsibility for prisons and the probation service.
	When the proposals were announced, they were notorious for the lack of proper consultation. There was no Green Paper and no White Paper. As I understand it, there was no consultation even with Her Majesty. There was no consultation with the judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice or the senior Law Lords. The then Lord Chancellor, the noble Lord Irvine of Lairg, was not consulted. He was told about the changes only after the decisions had been taken. He was told that, as part of the original package, his own post was to be abolished.
	As the noble Lord Neuberger recently commented, all this was completely unprofessional and seemed like the product of late night whiskeys and back of an envelope calculations by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and some of his sofa government cronies. He did not look carefully at what would be required in getting rid of the post of Lord Chancellor. He did not appreciate at the time that it would require primary legislation, and he did not realise that there are 5,000 references to the post of Lord Chancellor in our law.
	Lord Irvine of Lairg has now broken his silence and accused the then Prime Minister of blocking his ideas, botching the reforms and humiliating him. Perhaps we should not worry too much about the latter point. He spoke about
	"the chaotic, even cavalier way"
	in which the business was conducted, with the then Prime Minister
	"winging it on hunches, using inadequate advice"
	and having
	"scant regard for procedure."
	It is indicative in many ways.

Oliver Heald: Is my recollection correct, and does my hon. Friend remember, that the Lord Chief Justice was told five minutes before the press release went out from No. 10? That was the extent of consultation for our most senior judge.

Henry Bellingham: My hon. Friend is right about that. It indicates the Government's cavalier attitude to parts of the constitution that we regard as precious. They cannot look at those parts of the constitution without wanting to kick them hard.

Michael Wills: I intervene with great hesitancy because I am interested in the word picture that he is painting of the Government. Can he tell me what all this has to do with new clause 20?

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to the Minister for taking over the role of the Chair. It is important to understand the background to the JAC because that is the context of the constitutional reforms.
	I should now like to consider the system of judicial appointments and consider whether the old system worked, because we need to look at the previous system before we can reach a considered opinion on how the new system is working.

Oliver Heald: Does my hon. Friend agree that the JAC is an important part of the patchwork of compromises and decisions that had to be made following the decision to abolish the position of Lord Chancellor? For example, there was also the concordat, a very lengthy document agreed with Lord Woolf, which had to be produced because the Government had no idea of the complexity of what they were trying to do during the ministerial reshuffle.

Henry Bellingham: Again, my hon. Friend, who followed the issue carefully at the time, is absolutely spot-on. Indeed, many of us took the view that the JAC, which was established by the relevant sections of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, was created on the basis that the position of Lord Chancellor would be abolished. But of course the position was not abolished, because it was discovered that, as part of the reform of our constitution, it would be almost impossible to do that without introducing a much lengthier Bill.

Jeremy Wright: Does my hon. Friend agree that this issue is part and parcel of the problem with the Government's overall approach to constitutional reform, whereby they start down a road with no clear idea of their destination? The later provisions of the Bill will show that the same thing is happening to the House of Lords as happened to judicial appointments.

Henry Bellingham: My hon. Friend is 100 per cent. correct, because we have seen a hotchpotch of different reforms. Indeed, they were initially predicated on getting rid of the post of Lord Chancellor and moving the Law Lords out of the House of Lords and into the new Supreme Court. But, as my hon. Friend rightly points out, a decision was taken at the time without any clear idea of how the legislation would be framed, and as a consequence we are picking up different bits of it.
	Did the previous system of judicial appointments work? Did it deliver an exceptionally high calibre of judges? The answer is undoubtedly yes, and the system cost virtually nothing. One issue that has been raised at the Bar for as long as I can remember is diversity, but we are looking at it from the wrong direction in terms of judicial appointments. The key point is to look at it from the point of view of access to the professions, because if the most able and competent people, from all backgrounds, are attracted to them and do well at the Bar, for example, as solicitors or in other, linked professions, they will be appointed to the Bench and, I hope, secure judicial appointments.
	At the Bar, for example, which is the part of the profession I know most about, the percentage of ethnic minority students at law school and in paid pupillages is far greater than the percentage of ethnic minorities in the population as a whole. The Bar has reached out to schools throughout the country, and explained to schools and universities what a career at the Bar is all about. My hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) and I virtually had to pay for our pupillages, but now one has paid pupillages.
	I pay tribute to those former chairmen of the Bar Council, Geoffrey Voss and Timothy Dutton, who worked incredibly hard on ensuring that the Bar made sterling efforts to reach out to schools throughout the country, and on widening access to the Bar. That work has been continued by Desmond Browne QC, the current chairman of the Bar Council, and he has stated time and again that he is passionate about the issue and feels strongly that the Bar must ensure that access is widened as much as possible. I am sure that the Minister agrees that, on this issue, the Bar sets a glowing example. Law schools are full of overseas students, students from Commonwealth countries, Dominion countries and people who will undoubtedly go on to great success in their own countries.
	I remember that when I was at law school, I had a number of fellow pupils from Commonwealth countries, and they have since gone on to high judicial appointments and, indeed, to high political office. In fact, one contemporary has even gone on to become king of a country.

Oliver Heald: Does my hon. Friend agree that one great thing about ethnic minority solicitors is that they have been able to set up small firms that cater for the interests and needs of a particular community? One damaging aspect of the Carter review has been the attempt to force all firms to conform to a particular size and way of working. It has impacted, and will impact, badly on many ethnic minority solicitors, who until now have been able to become the senior partner in a firm and move on to judicial office later. Does my hon. Friend agree that the reforms, though well intentioned, may establish a glass ceiling?

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that observation, because it illustrates the Government's complete lack of joined-up thinking. They have made various changes to legal aid, and, as a result, their absolute obsession with consolidation and "big is best" will drive out of business many small firms, particularly small minority ethnic businesses in city centres. They are often the launch pad for members of the ethnic minorities to go into law. With the loss of that launch pad, those people may not go into the legal profession, and they will not be available to take up judicial appointments later.

Michael Wills: Again, may I just say how much I am enjoying this paean of praise to equality and diversity? It is particularly bracing, coming as it does from the Conservative Front Bencher. However, will the hon. Gentleman tell me how it is relevant to the provisions that affect the Judicial Appointments Commission?

Henry Bellingham: The Minister is obviously desperate to join the Chairmen's Panel, whereupon he will be able to control debates in that way. It is up to a Committee's Chairman to say whether I am in order, however, and it is important that we look at the background to the JAC. If we do, we will be able to see whether the clauses make sense.
	The issue is also about judicial appointments and what our constituents expect from the judiciary. When our constituents appear before a court, be it a magistrates court, county court, Crown court or the High Court, above all else they want to encounter a level of expertise, wisdom, fairness and professionalism. After all, at that juncture in their lives, they may be facing the loss of their liberty, property or finances, or the removal of a child from their custody, so they are not interested in the gender, race or able-bodiedness of the judge. All they are interested in is competence, expertise, wisdom and the judge's ability to deliberate upon the case and reach the right conclusion.

David Heath: I am listening intently to the preamble to the subject of the hon. Gentleman's new clauses. I understand that he has concerns about the way in which the JAC works, but why is he exclusively concerned about the way it selects Lords Justices of Appeal and not, apparently, about the way it appoints Lords Chief Justice, heads of division or puisne judges?

Henry Bellingham: If the hon. Gentleman waits a little while, he will hear the answer, because I am about to come to it and he will be all the wiser, I hope.

Michael Wills: The hon. Gentleman is now getting to the guts of his argument, but will he clarify something, as much for his own interest as for anyone else's? He quite rightly set out what our constituents expect when they appear in front of the judiciary. From memory, the JAC has appointed 12 Court of Appeal judges. The casual listener may think that he implies that those 12 appointments did not meet the criteria that he just set out. Would he like to clarify his view on that? Does he think that those 12 appointments meet the criteria?

Henry Bellingham: I think that they are excellent appointments, but they could have taken place under the old system anyway without the need for this extremely costly bureaucracy.
	Section 64 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005-my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire spoke eloquently on it at the time-is headed, "Encouragement of diversity". It states:
	"The Commission, in performing its functions under this Part, must have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments."
	It then says in subsection (2):
	"This section is subject to section 63",
	which stresses that the appointment
	"must be solely on merit."
	That is meaningless window-dressing and tokenism. We need to get coming into the professions, from an early stage, more people from ethnic minorities, more women, and more people who are enthused by the idea of a career in the law, either as solicitors or as barristers. We will do that by widening access to those professions. The chairman of the Bar Council feels incredibly strongly about that, as do I.
	The JAC is incredibly bureaucratic, and it is growing in size. I think that its annual running costs are £8.5 million; the Minister may well correct me, as he probably has the figures directly to hand. That may not seem a vast amount of money. However, we should look at it in the context of the changes that his Department is making to the legal aid budget, or the changes being made to the family law advocacy scheme, which has caused a huge amount of anger among barristers. The initiative to introduce best-value tendering for police station work will have a significant impact on several smaller firms. Yet the savings that will be made through those changes to the legal aid budget involve sums that are sub-£10 million. That is why the £8.5 million cost of the JAC, an organisation that is doing work that cost virtually nothing before, is significant.

Michael Wills: Can the hon. Gentleman remind the Committee of the Conservative plans to increase the legal aid budget?

Henry Bellingham: We have no plans to increase the amount of money for the legal aid budget. That budget is £2.1 billion, and we feel that far better value for money can be got from it. We feel strongly that we need to bear down on some of the drivers of costs, particularly the very high-cost cases, and that there is ample scope for bringing in new money to the legal aid budget from outside the MOJ. If the Minister is saying that he expects me to make a pledge to increase that expenditure, he knows the answer to that, unfortunately, as well as I do: whoever wins the next election, the Treasury will say that there will be no increase to that £2.1 billion. I hope that when the economy improves there will be more money for legal aid, because the legal aid budget is a vital part of the welfare state. Access to justice is something that all Conservative Members feel strongly about.

Jeremy Wright: In the context that my hon. Friend is correctly describing, is it not all the more important to ensure that money already being spent within the legal system is being spent wisely, which is why we are interested in the specific workings of the JAC?

Henry Bellingham: If my hon. Friend asked me, "Is the JAC working?", I would say that it is not doing a bad job. However, we should put our hands on our hearts and think to ourselves that this is a time when this country's public finances are in an horrendously vulnerable state. The country will probably be spending about 10 per cent. of gross domestic product on the interest on our national debt. Bearing in mind that the figure in 1976, when the then Chancellor went off to the IMF, was 9.5 per cent., we are moving into Argentine or Guatemalan territory. That is why we must look at every single item of expenditure and ask ourselves, "Is this organisation doing a good job?" The answer is that it is not doing a bad job. If we ask, "Is it necessary? Was the previous system inadequate and not delivering?", the answer is that it certainly was delivering. That is why we must look at how much money it costs.
	Going back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson), one of the problems with the JAC is that because it is so bureaucratic, incredibly cumbersome, very costly and an empire that is growing the whole time, it is moving very slowly. I have heard similar stories to him about judicial appointments that are not being filled. The JAC is not conducting its affairs as efficiently as it should be. The competitions for different types of judicial appointment are not being run as speedily or efficiently as they should be. I have been round several combined courts over the past year or so, and I have had compelling stories put to me by presiding judges who are concerned about the speed at which these appointments are being made and the impact that that is having on their ability to conduct justice and to deliver the services that Ministers rightly expect presiding judges to deliver in their combined courts. The JAC must look into that.
	We realise that the JAC cannot be changed overnight, and if we win the next election we are not going to take an axe to it. However, we could certainly make some important initial changes and thereby reduce its cost and make it more efficient and streamlined. The Minister talked about these constitutional reforms having to be more streamlined. Well, we have a good idea in our new clause; let us see the Government support it.
	Why do we want to put new clause 20 on to the statute book? The answer is simple. Sections 76 to 84 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which relate to the appointment of Lord Justices of Appeal, are unbelievably cumbersome and bureaucratic. Section 78(1) states:
	"The Lord Chancellor may make a request to the Commission for a person to be selected for a recommendation for appointment as a Lord Justice of Appeal."
	Subsection (2) says that the Lord Chancellor
	"must consult the Lord Chief Justice";
	of course, he would have done that anyway. Section 79 states that
	"the Commission must appoint a selection panel"
	and says what the panel must do. It goes on to say that the
	"selection panel is a committee of the Commission".
	Section 80 states that the "first member" of the panel
	"is the Lord Chief Justice"-
	well, he would have been anyway-"or his nominee." Under section 81, the selection panel has to report and
	"state who has been selected".
	For goodness' sake, it would have done that anyway; it does not have to be specified in legislation. The report must
	"contain any other information required by the Lord Chancellor."
	Section 82 gives a number of options for the Lord Chancellor. That system is incredibly bureaucratic, ridiculously prescriptive, absurdly cumbersome, and very expensive. It requires a number of bureaucrats who are putting together a huge amount of paperwork, looking at that legislation and having to pinpoint each particular subsection.
	Let me return to the Minister's point about the appointment of Lord Justices of Appeal. I agree that they are excellent appointments, but they probably would have been made under the old system anyway. The key point is that all those appointments to the Court of Appeal came from the High Court. I may be wrong about that; if so perhaps the Minister will correct me. Any High Court judge or senior judge is, in any event, going to be someone who has gone through a major threshold in terms of his qualifying period in his career, and there will have been intense oversight and analysis of how he has done on the High Court bench. Of course, from time to time those High Court judges will make judgments that are taken to the Court of Appeal. So who better to analyse and assess the ability of those High Court judges as a possible Court of Appeal judge than the Court of Appeal judges who, time and again, are sitting in judgment, on appeal, on the judgments made by the High Court judges? We do not need a bureaucratic system of appointments under the JAC to appoint this particular type of judge. I put it to the Minister that for the sake of obsession with the new process and with constitutional reforms, a cumbersome operation is being put in place that is costing a great deal and is totally unnecessary.

Edward Timpson: Does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister should welcome new clauses 20 and 22, as they would contribute to his stated aim of bringing about the maintenance of good-quality, high-calibre candidates for the bench? They would provide a system that does not have in-built delay, is efficient and brings candidates as good as those that we have had in the past without unnecessary costs. In the process, they would ensure that more judges are sitting in the courts, hearing more cases, and they would therefore reduce the cost of the courts system. We could then use that money to ensure that we continue the process of increasing access to justice for all those people who are currently denied it.

Henry Bellingham: I thank my hon. Friend, who until his spectacular by-election victory was active in the courts day in, day out, as a family law barrister, appearing before judges at different levels of the judiciary and developing an in-depth understanding of what was going on. He is far better qualified than me, and probably than the Minister, to tell the Committee what is happening.
	I have a letter from a well known judge, who will, of course, remain nameless. After we had a discussion the other day, he wrote to me:
	"There is an arrogance about the JAC which refuses to recognise that the persons most able to judge are those before whom the applicant appears on a regular basis. Instead the task is assigned to persons who have no experience whatsoever of this work. No private company would tolerate such a procedure."
	He is right, because the people who are best able to assess the ability of applicants to the Court of Appeal are the judges before whom their decisions and judgments are assessed and appealed against. They know very well the ability of the applicants, and they are best placed to advise the Lord Chancellor. New clause 20 represents a small step, and as part of our reforms of the JAC, we will consider a number of ideas, but it is an important first step to remove judges in the Court of Appeal from the JAC's scope. I urge Ministers and other Members to support that modest proposal and thus reduce the costs of that body. We have ideas for the future, but this is a modest first step forward.
	New clause 22 is about written tests. I shall explain for hon. Members who may not know what they are that very often someone applying for a judicial appointment, particularly a more minor one such as that of recorder, district judge or county court judge, is asked to take a written test. Those tests are extremely unpopular and incredibly controversial, and they are very public.
	In the past, top QCs, leading solicitors and academics-and patent or trademark attorneys, whom we should not overlook because they can now qualify for judicial appointments-would make their application in confidence. It was kept confidential, because it might well have been turned down, and there is a certain amount of humiliation if a top QC or a managing partner of Allen & Overy applies for an appointment on the High Court bench and is turned down. In the past, no one ever knew that they had applied. Now, they have to take a written test in a public place, and everyone knows that they have done it.
	A large number of solicitors and leading QCs tell us that that is having an impact on their practice. They obviously want to keep their clients in place and keep their practice going, and they want to ensure that their partners in their firms and the junior members of their chambers have confidence in them as senior QCs or managing partners. Yet when they apply for a judicial appointment, which in the past would have been kept totally confidential, everyone hears that they have done a test. I am less concerned about whether they fail the test, because I am not saying that it is necessarily unfair, but it is completely unnecessary because it puts the fact of the application into the public domain.

Jeremy Wright: Given that the Government's intention in setting up the JAC was to encourage those who would not otherwise come forward to seek judicial office, does my hon. Friend share my view that any obstacle to those potential applicants is to be regretted? Is it not at least possible that the written test is one of those obstacles?

Henry Bellingham: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, because it leads me on to a briefing that I have received from the Law Society. I was staggered by what it said:
	"The written tests are proving to be an invaluable method of screening applicants. According to the JAC they are...a good indicator".
	Of course the JAC would say that. It continued:
	"Another beneficial result of the use of written tests is that more women, ethnic minority and solicitor candidates are progressing through to interview and eventual appointment."
	I put it to the Law Society and my hon. Friend that most top QCs and senior solicitors are used to dealing with complex paperwork day in, day out. Most of them have top degrees from top universities, and they have the self-confidence and ability to flourish in a written test. However, we are trying to encourage people to apply who are not as fortunate in their background but have ample ability and may well be ideal people to be considered for a judicial appointment, and they may well fall at that first hurdle. As he has said, that puts an unnecessary obstacle in the way of such candidates and may well put them off applying in the first place.
	I do not know whether the Minister has had a chance to look at the JAC's website or examine some of the tests, but some of them are Alice in Wonderland scenarios. We are asking senior people of his type of age, maturity and ability to take a written test in which they have to devise some imaginary legislative scenario and then work out cases based on it and deliberate upon them. They are not law students; they are top QCs, barristers and academics. The test is demeaning and completely unnecessary, and I have not yet met a single person who thinks it a good idea, apart from a few people on the JAC and the Law Society, which appears to regurgitate exactly what the JAC has said. If one speaks to any barrister or anyone who has been through the test, they say that it is completely unnecessary.
	Will the Minister tell the Committee what percentage of the £8.5 million a year costs of the JAC go into the running the tests? It must be expensive to devise the papers, put together the panels that write them, bring in outside consultants and expertise, book the halls where the tests take place, supervise the tests and put in place the necessary security. It is an incredibly expensive and bureaucratic exercise. The Minister talks about streamlining the system and making it simpler and easier. We have an idea for him: get rid of those tests, which are completely unnecessary.
	It seems to me that the JAC has found itself in new, uncharted territory, and of course any new organisation or commission will want to build an empire. The JAC is building its own little empire and wants to embed it, and what better way than to put in place something as bureaucratic as the written test procedure, which obviously means more work for people and more jobs?
	As I said to the Minister a moment ago, his budget is under huge pressure. Looking at the Red Book and the roll-forward of the Ministry of Justice budget, we see that he will be looking for cuts across the piece. There will be substantial cost cuts in prisons, in the Courts Service, maybe in legal aid, in the administration of the Legal Services Commission and in every other part of the MOJ because of what the Treasury has done to his Budget. Well, we are giving him a very good suggestion for reducing costs. At the same time, we are proposing the measures not just to reduce costs, but because we want a better system for judicial appointments. On that basis, I hope new clauses 20 and 22 will command the support not only of Opposition Members, but of the Minister and Labour Members.

Oliver Heald: May I start by talking about the quality of judiciary that we want to attract in this country? We have an honourable tradition and a high standard, which has been set by giants such as Lord Devlin, Lord Denning and Lord Reid. There is a history of legal figures who have commanded respect not only for their wisdom, but for their great intellect, their ability to interpret the law, and through the common law, their ability to make the law.
	That proud tradition brings me to the point the Minister made when he intervened on my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham). He asked my hon. Friend whether he could criticise any of the 12 appointments to the Court of Appeal. I would turn the question round to the Minister and ask him, "Look, you are spending £8.5 million extra; can you criticise any of those who went before?" I think the history of our appointment of judges, particularly at that level, is a marvellous one. I do not think that anyone could point to a Court of Appeal judge in England who was not of a high quality of intellect and wisdom. Some perhaps occasionally made judicial mistakes that were overturned in the highest court, but I do not think it could be said that they had no reasons for their decisions or for putting their decisions in the way they did.
	The problem of how to choose our judges for the higher courts all comes down to having a system that allows the best minds and the most wise to emerge. That is what happens. In the High Court, or dealing with tier 1 work in the Crown court, it becomes clear over a period which judges are doing an impeccable job. That happens not only by word of mouth, but because of decisions that go to appeal. Often when appeals are upheld, the judgment of a particular judge-his summing-up in a criminal case or his judgment in a High Court case-will be praised, and it will become the law in due course as the higher courts adopt his reasoning. Those legal minds and those people have emerged in the past and continue to emerge.
	Not only the lords justices of appeal sit in the Court of Appeal and the divisional court, but High Court judges sit there as flankers, helping the court as part of the court. Therefore, the lords justices of appeal get to see the High Court judges. They not only see their decisions, but see them in action. The High Court judges give judgments in cases and are often very highly regarded, particularly in specialist areas, so the idea that we need to have laymen in the JAC deciding who should be in the Court of Appeal is really a nonsense. The fact is that the people who should be there emerge through their talents, wisdom and intellect. That has always been the case, and we cannot point to a time when that did not happen.
	Why have we got the JAC? The commission has a worthy role-I am not against the idea that we should try to improve diversity-but I think merit should be the first and foremost criterion. In relation to the debate that my hon. Friend mentioned, my point was that it is all very well to have a two-track approach, but when it comes down to it, merit must be the greatest thing, because that will guarantee the rule of law and a system that holds water.
	Historically, it is true that the reason why we have a JAC is that Tony Blair, in the course of a reshuffle, decided he was going to abolish the Lord Chancellor. He wanted to do that not for any high and worthy reason-as far as one can tell-but because he had had enough of Lord Irvine. Lord Irvine says so, and I am sure that is the history. I thought it sad that our Prime Minister made a decision for that reason without even consulting the top judge in the country, Lord Woolf, who was told five minutes before the press release went out. It is said that his remark was, "What?" but that may be completely untrue.
	However, it is certainly the case that the concordat, which is a very substantial document, had to be agreed between the Government and the Lord Chief Justice before the new approach-retaining a Lord Chancellor but without many of the powers of before-was able to go ahead. At that time, various things were done to replicate the traditional role of the Lord Chancellor, such as his role in appointing judges. One thing that came out of that was the JAC.
	The Conservatives did not oppose the setting up of the JAC, but we made two important points on the matter. First, we said that merit should be the main reason for appointing a person, and secondly, we said that the higher courts should be treated slightly differently.
	If we look at what has been happening, we will see some encouraging signs in the law. When I first qualified as a lawyer, I think about 25 per cent. of solicitors were women; now the numbers coming through university law courses are roughly equal, so we can see improvement on that. There are greater numbers of ethnic minority solicitors and barristers coming through. The trend of ethnic minority solicitors setting up practices that cater to particular communities and their needs has been beneficial and we have seen some role models come through. It has enabled some pioneers to set the way.
	With that in mind, and on the subject of diversity and the role of the JAC, Lord Carter's suggestion-it is now being implemented-of making solicitors' firms larger so that they are more substantial entities that can undertake particular legal aid work, is not very helpful. The ethnic minority senior partners whom I have met have criticised that. They make the point that it creates something of a glass ceiling. If senior partners in small firms that cater to a particular community have to amalgamate with a larger firm, they will no longer be senior partners. Not allowing a member of an ethnic minority community member to be the senior partner in a small firm creates the glass ceiling, which worries me.
	The other point that is worth mentioning is that, as my hon. Friend said, the Bar Council has a very honourable tradition of trying to widen access to the profession. Geoffrey Vos, whom my hon. Friend mentioned, made that the keynote of his year's chairmanship. Through that period, he worked with a lot of schools and other institutions to encourage people from poorer backgrounds to come into the law and encourage barristers' chambers to offer proper scholarships, so that individuals had the money to train or undertake a pupillage. When I started-I went from a state education to the Bar-we had to find money from anywhere to survive during pupillage. I worked in an inner-city settlement in south London. In fact, I got to know the hon. Member for Eltham (Clive Efford) at that time-we used to run a youth football team together. However, it was not easy to become a barrister in those days. What Geoffrey Vos and others have done has been a good thing for the legal world.
	New clause 20 has a lot of merit, but I have mixed feelings about whether the written tests are a good idea. When they were first suggested, I worried that they would be about being a contemporary, modern kind of judge. We all know the story of the judge who famously asked, "Who are the Beatles?" during a case years ago, and there was the famous case in which a judge made an ill-judged remark about a soap star. I worried that the tests would be very politically correct, but my understanding is that they have not been about knowing who is in "The X-Factor" or who Simon Cowell is, or who Dannii Minogue is sitting next to-

David Howarth: Who?

Oliver Heald: The hon. Gentleman obviously has all the necessary trappings to become a judge, as he is asking who Dannii Minogue is- [ Interruption. ] Perhaps he prefers another member of the panel or perhaps he does not know what the panel is.
	It is a good idea, in some ways, to ensure that candidates have an appropriate level of knowledge. My hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk said that the top barrister or solicitor who wants to be a judge will be bound to know the basic information about how the legislature works and how to apply cases, but if we are trying to widen the ambit for the lower judicial appointments, it may be that having a written test that anyone can take will bring in a few more people. Does the Minister think that it is worth the cost of what is potentially quite a bureaucratic exercise? Historically, one would have said that the sort of people who would be able to apply to become a judge-after years of experience in the law-would not need to do a written test. What is the aim of the test? Is it about modernity, or some basic level of knowledge? Is it about encouraging new applicants but ensuring that they can read and write?
	In summary, I have great sympathy for new clause 20 and will be interested to hear the Minister's answers on new clause 22.

David Heath: I listened carefully to the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) and I heard much background history of the events that led to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, but I did not hear a convincing argument in favour of his new clauses. I will address the issues that he raised, but I am not yet convinced that I should advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to support his new clauses- [ Interruption. ] It is indeed sad that he was unable to persuade me, but perhaps I can demonstrate the holes in his argument.
	I start from the basis that the constitutional reforms to which the hon. Gentleman referred were, as he correctly said, a hurried and, in many ways, botched job. I was part of the Committee that dealt with those legislative changes and it was clear that, to a large extent, they had been written on the back of an envelope and were not subject to prior consultation. Indeed, they appeared as a complete surprise to most practitioners in the law, who quickly had to respond to what was being proposed and insist-properly-on certain conditions that were eventually part of the protocol that was decided with the Lord Chief Justice.

Oliver Heald: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that a combination of Lord Woolf and the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties saved the day by improving the Constitutional Reform Act considerably and, in Lord Woolf's case, agreeing the concordat? Without that, the changes would have been a disaster.

David Heath: I agree entirely, and it showed good co-operation between the two ends of Parliament and with the senior judiciary, who played an important role in achieving a good outcome from inauspicious beginnings. That is not to say that I object to the vast bulk of the proposals as they ended up, because I felt that they were right. They were changes that many of us had advocated for some time, but their genesis was more predicated-as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said-on the needs of political management than on the need for reform in good order.
	We now have these proposed changes to the proposals that were agreed then. I intervened on the hon. Gentleman to ask him why he felt that it was so important to remove the Judicial Appointments Commission process for the lords justices of appeal but to leave it in place for the other appointments, such as the Lord Chief Justice, the Heads of Division, the puisne judges and other office holders. I am not sure that I received a convincing answer. The argument was that the lords justices of appeal are senior judges, so the process was less appropriate. I would have thought that the Lord Chief Justice and Heads of Division were also fairly senior members of the judiciary, and if the argument held for one it would hold for the other. However, apparently that is not the case.
	The principal argument seemed to be that the process was bureaucratic, long and less than efficacious. I do not think there is any evidence that the latter is the case. There has been no serious objection to those who have been appointed lords justices of appeal since the process has been in place, nor has there been any criticism of their performance. So that is not a justified complaint.
	In terms of the length of the process, the hon. Gentleman made great play of what the Constitutional Reform Act says. It is a fact that when any sort of process is set out in statutory form, it necessarily sounds more complicated than it actually is. That is how the law works and how statutes look. In fact, it is a very simple process. The Lord Chancellor requests the JAC to fill a vacancy. The JAC appoints a selection panel, which submits a report to the Lord Chancellor about the person it has chosen, and the Lord Chancellor may reject the selection, require it to be reconsidered or accept it. Of course, once he has exhausted the other options, he must accept the JAC's decision. That is not a difficult process. It is the sort of process that any appointment procedure, other than the most archaic or rudimentary, would follow. It is a simple system of setting up a shortlisting process and then accepting the recommendation of the shortlisting committee in due course. I do not accept that it is an unnecessarily prolonged process.

Edward Timpson: Why does the hon. Gentleman think that the Joint Committee came to the position that the JAC was being criticised for inefficiencies and delays in the judicial appointments process?

David Heath: Obviously, a process, however simple, can be delayed in its execution. It might well be that those criticisms were entirely justified, and if so, I hope the JAC takes them into account and addresses the cause of the delay. I hope, too, that the Ministry of Justice is equally engaged in the process. However, I do not think that we can criticise a process for delay if the cause of the delay is not inherent in the process. That seems to be the crux of the argument. The hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson) might have a justifiable complaint-I do not have the information to agree or disagree with him-but I do not see that the cause of the delay is inherent in the process set out in statute. There should be no substantial delay other than that necessary to do a good job in appointments.

Oliver Heald: Does the hon. Gentleman think there would be any difficulties with a system in which the Lord Chancellor asks the Lord Chief Justice for the runners and riders for the Court of Appeal and produces a shortlist? Would that produce a different list? If so, why?

David Heath: In the case of the current Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice, the difference would probably not be very great. However, the hon. Gentleman knows his history, and he knows that the history of judicial appointments has not always been a good one. He knows that, in the past, some Lords Chancellor have blatantly abused their position in respect of judicial appointments. He might recall Lord Halsbury, who had a fearsome reputation for advancing the careers of those who shared his friendship or political persuasion. There are many other examples.
	The House should identify with-and it has done so in the process proposed in the Bill-a system that moves us away from the old-school club, from the magic circle and from decisions made between chums in fine dining rooms about who to put forward. That touches on one of my great criticisms of new clause 22: it does not propose an alternative process for the appointment of Court of Appeal judges; the suggestion is simply that they will "emerge"-I have heard that expression used several times in this debate. Well, we know what emerges from such a process: people who are male, who are educated in certain institutions, who share a commonality of background, but who do not necessarily represent those with the greatest merit for judicial appointments and who certainly do not represent the diversity that is beginning to develop, quite rightly, among the judicial, and indeed lawyer, populations in this country.
	The hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) makes an important point about how the situation has now developed-he applauded it, and I know he is genuine. However, he cannot then have a process that, at the end of the day, depends on who someone knows, rather than on a proper, transparent appointment process.

Oliver Heald: It is one thing to hark back to the Victorian period, but the ladies justices of appeal, who have been so successful in recent years, were all appointed under the old system.

David Heath: But not enough of them. And look at the Supreme Court-there are not enough there! We cannot hold up the current population in the higher levels of the judiciary and say that it reflects modern Britain. However, it is not because of a paucity of candidates that we cannot address that situation, which is why I think it is important to have the judicial appointments system as it currently is.
	I agree with the Law Society, which rejects the proposal from the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk. It says:
	"The fear must be that there would be a reversion to the old system of secret soundings and appointment by the Lord Chancellor. That would be a wholly retrograde step."
	I, too, believe that it would be. I am surprised that the proposal has been put forward, not just because it is so partial-it would abolish the process for only one class of judicial appointment-but because of the effect that it would have in terms of reversion.
	On the written test, I am clear that there might be arguments on both sides. Criticisms have been voiced in legal circles about the tests, although some of them sound rather precious-as if there is some indignity involved in taking part in a proper appointments process. Senior appointments in other fields involving written tests, or something similar-presentations and so on-are made every day of the week. Nobody else sees it as an affront to their dignity to apply for a job and go through a proper selection process. Nobody else, whether a head of human resources or of a finance department, when they apply for a job as a chief executive, feels it an indignity to be known to be applying for a job and going through a selection process that might involve tests of some kind.

Henry Bellingham: Ministers don't!

David Heath: There is an awful lot wrong with ministerial appointments, but let us not divert ourselves by discussing what is wrong with those. The hon. Gentleman might well be right-but there we are!
	In any case, the sort of person who will be put off by the process is the sort of person whom I am not sure I want as a judge, because it suggests that they have such high regard for their own dignity that they perhaps could not do the job as I, and many others-I think-would want them to do it. I note again the partiality of the new clause. In this case, it deals only with the selection procedure for puisne judges, and not other selections that the JAC makes. They alone would not have the written test.
	There is another point here, and it is the exact opposite of what the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said. He argued, I think, that the written tests will present an obstacle to diversity in the appointment of judges. That is the reverse, of course, of what the Law Society thinks. It says that they will be an assistance, and I think that they probably will be too. They will be an assistance to people who do not fit what has been-and I hope is no longer-the conventional view of what a judge ought to look like, because they provide an objective way for candidates to demonstrate that, whatever the preconceptions of those making the appointment, they have the technical ability, the level of judgment and the facility to perform in the way required of a judicial appointment. There is clear evidence that that process is helping well qualified, able and meritorious candidates to make progress in this area when otherwise they would not.
	But does that mean that the procedures cannot be improved? I am sure that if I had the ability, I could look at the written tests and see areas where they could be improved. Indeed, it would be remarkable if they could not be. However, I cannot see it as an affront to a well qualified barrister to ask them to go through a simple process before appointment or candidacy as a judge. I do not see engaging in such a process as below their self-esteem; indeed, for some candidates it is a benefit and helps to assess people who might otherwise not be considered as suitable for judicial appointment.
	On the basis of both those arguments, I am not persuaded by the case put forward by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk. I fear that he seeks to take us backwards, to an era when the magic circle did everything, when everything was decided by nudges and winks, and when what emerged was the same old type of person, who conformed in every way to the same old image of a judge. That is exactly what this House has been trying to avoid in the legislation that it has put in place over recent years.

Michael Wills: May I start by welcoming you to the Chair, Mrs. Anderson? You have assumed it since we began this debate, and although that might seem like a long time ago, I would still like to take this opportunity to welcome you to it.
	I congratulate the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) on his marathon tour of the horizon, as I think the translation goes. He ranged very widely indeed. I congratulate him in particular on his accomplishment of spending 30 minutes advocating what he described as a modest step. If I take it rightly, the reason he spent so much time on it is that he was treating the issue as a microcosm of what he and some of his colleagues who intervened on him see as wrong with the Government's constitutional reforms. He was right to treat the issue as a microcosm of different attitudes towards constitutional reform, because his approach, as seen in his colleagues' interventions on him too, reflects precisely the problems with the Conservatives' approach to constitutional reforms: a mistrust of the British people, a mistrust of change and a misunderstanding of the consequences of their own advocacy.
	The hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright), who has now wafted off somewhere- [ Interruption. ] No, he is still here, on the Front Bench. He said that he thought that the issue was a microcosm of how the Government did not know where we were going. He is wrong, because we know precisely where we are going in all the areas covered by new clauses 20 and 22. What lies at the heart of the arrangements that the new clauses seek to alter is the principle of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary from the Government, which is fundamental.
	The hon. Gentleman may not recognise those principles; he may not think them important. But we recognise them and we think that they are fundamental to the health of our constitution. They are particularly important now, in what many commentators have described as a constitutional crisis. People have lost trust in the processes of their democracy, including those in this House, and in Members of this House. We know that, and every Member knows that we have to change that.
	One of the key things, as we take forward a programme of constitutional reform that all parts of the House recognise has to be undertaken, is that power should never be concentrated in one place. The best protection against the arbitrary or absolute use of power is the separation of powers-in other words, the diffusion of powers.

Oliver Heald: Is not the fault in the Minister's thinking the fact that, in Britain, that has never been our way of doing things? In Britain, all the power in the country is focused in the Cabinet, where we had the Lord Chancellor, a judge who spoke up for the judiciary, the Leader of the House, who spoke up for the Back Bencher, and the Attorney-General, who spoke up for the legal profession. That is an odd way of doing things, but it was our way, and now the Minister has broken it.

Michael Wills: With all respect for the hon. Gentleman, his understanding of our constitutional history is flawed. He is right that in this country we have always evolved, rather than had revolutions, although there have been great disjunctions in our political history-far more than we perhaps realise-and there has been a certain fuzzy logic about our arrangements. Nevertheless, there has always been a logic. Montesquieu, the great proponent of the separation of powers, took his inspiration from the way this country operated. I am proud to say that this country has always followed the principle that healthy societies are democracies in which power is diffused as widely as possible. All parts of the House can agree on that.
	That is fundamental, and it is precisely the area at which the measures that the proposed new clauses would overturn are directed-that is, the independence of the judiciary. It is profoundly important that we do nothing to harm that principle and that, as far as possible, we pursue the principle of the separation of powers. It is important not only that powers should be separated in practice, but crucially that they are perceived and believed to be so by the people we all serve.

Oliver Heald: I agree with the Minister that there are elements of separated powers in Britain, because each of the institutions has fought for its rights. The judges fought for theirs, Parliament fought for its right over the King, and so on. However, the compromise was that we had to have representatives of all the main interests right at the heart of power, at the Cabinet table, because the Executive are not separate from our Parliament. The Government fell into error by breaking the role of the Lord Chancellor, and that is why we have to have a massive concordat and a great big Bill to deal with this. I still worry that Ministers do not understand that we do not have a true separation of powers, as they do in America; that is not our system.

Michael Wills: Of course the hon. Gentleman is right. We do not have a written constitution in which these things are formally codified, although we have elements of codification in our constitution. He is right to say that this is a complex issue. Inevitably, the patterns shift over time. The courts arrogate powers to themselves, for example, and Parliament tries to get power back from the Executive. Under this Government, the Executive are giving power away to Parliament. This is a constant process that ebbs and flows and, in among the inevitable conflicts and tensions that arise, I believe that we have a healthy democracy. We have to prove that in the months and years ahead. We have to reinvent our democracy for ourselves collectively, and we must ensure that the people we serve know that that is what we are here to do.
	We broadly agree that, as we do not have a written constitution, these matters are flexible. However, the goal of diffusing power as widely as possible and, in this context, maintaining the robust independence of the judiciary is fundamentally important to the liberties of the British people.

Jeremy Wright: Is not the central thesis of the argument put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) that if it ain't broke, don't fix it? The problem here is that the Government have embarked on a programme of constitutional reform with regard to the judiciary that they did not need to start and that they have no idea how to finish. The Minister cannot possibly argue that the independence of the judiciary was weak before these reforms and is stronger now. The judiciary challenged Executives of both political colours in a robust way well before the Judicial Appointments Commission was thought of.

Michael Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, because I was about to come to precisely that point. I would just say that clichés are not really a maxim for constitutional reform, but I shall rephrase that, and say that we should not approach constitutional reform in this country as engineers with a blueprint into which everything has to be shoehorned. If that is what he is saying, I agree with him. He is nodding. We should approach it as physicians, healing what needs to be healed and encouraging preventive medicine. We need to be fit, and constantly to respond to the needs of the people we serve.
	The gist of the arguments in favour of the new clauses is that the system was good before, so let's not change it. I agree with the point made by the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk, for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) and for Rugby and Kenilworth that our judiciary has comprised many individuals of surpassing excellence. The hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire listed many luminaries of the bench, and we look back on their judgments and see their wisdom, their command of the law and the way in which they developed the common law. Of course, no one could possibly be anything other than full of admiration for the work that they have done over decades and generations. The hon. Gentleman is right about that. So, too, is the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) when he says that we should not be complacent about these things, however. Just because we have a list of luminaries, that does not mean that the system is perfect. Of course it is not, and we should always strive to do better. That is my response to the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth. The fact that the system was good does not mean that it cannot be better.
	I urge hon. Members to focus on this point: the system should not only work but be seen and believed to work in accordance with the fundamental principles of the British people. We have to give the British people confidence in the system. It is not enough that the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire thinks that those judges have been brilliant; the people we serve have to believe it as well.

David Howarth: May I support the Minister even further? It is clear to those who have studied the judiciary over long periods that the quality of judicial appointments under the old system was highly dependent on the quality of the Lord Chancellor of the day. There were some immensely good Lord Chancellors, but, to be frank, others were not so good.

Michael Wills: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman who, as always, brings a great deal of learning and knowledge to our proceedings. He is right. We have to be clear about the purpose of new clause 20: it is to return to the old system. Various points are made about the role of the Judicial Appointments Commission, but even in its own terms-and the terms of the argument made by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk-the provision is flawed. The hon. Gentleman quoted a letter from an anonymous judge, although I am not quite sure whether this was a High Court judge. The hon. Gentleman does not want to clarify that, so let us call him the anonymous judge of whatever level. He said that these appointments would be made by people with no experience of these matters, so let me remind the hon. Gentleman what happened before our reforms were put in place-the position to which he wants to return-and what happens now.
	Previously, these judges were appointed by the Queen-that remains-on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. According to our anonymous judge, the Prime Minister presumably has no experience relating to the people being appointed. The advice of the Lord Chancellor was also relevant, and he may well have had some experience before the reforms. The Lord Chancellor consulted the various heads of division; that was the role-they were consulted, and that was it. What happens now is that the Lord Chief Justice takes part in the proceedings and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 establishes the selection panel-this is what the new clause would abolish-chaired by the Lord Chief Justice who I think all Conservative Members would accept has had day-to-day experience throughout his working life.  [Interruption.] The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk might want to listen to this, as he seemed to have forgotten it in his remarks.
	As I say, the Lord Chief Justice chairs the selection panel, so I assume that the anonymous judge whom the hon. Gentleman quoted would be content with that. The Lord Chief Justice or his nominee chooses another judge-again, I hope our anonymous judge would be happy with that-and another lay member of the JAC. This system therefore puts two judges, with all the experience that the hon. Gentleman wanted to see deployed in the appointment of lords justices of appeal, in the driving seat in the selection of those judges. That is precisely what the new clause would remove. Even in terms of the hon. Gentleman's own argument, it does not fly.
	There are enormous benefits from having the Judicial Appointments Commission, but the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson) has made various complaints about it. I would like to reinforce what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said to him when he pointed out that the fact that a system may not work perfectly does not mean that we have to ditch the whole system; we simply have to improve it. We have to decide first whether the system we have is better than the one we had before-and I think that it is, unarguably. It is unarguably better because it ensures greater levels of independence and transparency in the appointment process. I do not understand, particularly nowadays, how anyone-even those on the Conservative Benches-can argue against having greater independence and transparency in an appointments process.
	To clarify, the JAC appoints candidates solely on merit, so the various innuendos we heard floating around that judges were appointed on criteria other than merit are not right. This system works and continues to work well; of course it can work better; that is what we all want it to do.
	I could go through various arguments for and against the written tests. As hon. Members have said, there are arguments both for and against them, but it is worth bearing in mind that some recent selection processes had up to 1,000 candidates applying. We need a sifting process to deal with that. As to the comments about costs and all the rest of it, I ask hon. Members to reflect on how they would carry out the sift. Having a personal system of interviews is likely, as a first sift, to be considerably more expensive than a written test. Every business has to do this and the civil service adopts similar processes for its fast-stream.
	The key point is that I am deliberately not going to comment on the efficacy of the written tests. I invite hon. Members to reflect on it for themselves. The reason I am not going to do that is that doing so would be another instance of the Executive trampling into terrain that should properly be the preserve of the independent Judicial Appointments Commission.
	On Second Reading of the Constitutional Reform Bill, the Lord Chancellor said:
	"I will ensure that the definition of merit should be for the commission itself and not for Ministers."-[ Official Report, House of Lords, 8 March 2004; Vol. 658, c. 984.]
	The Act went on to recognise that, and the importance of the JAC and the judiciary, by providing that the JAC should determine its own selection processes. That is right and proper. That is our position, too. The JAC should determine its own processes. There are arguments for and against, which we could have until 7 o'clock, but I do not intend to do so.
	When I began my remarks, I referred to the traditional Conservative attitude towards constitutional reform. There is another tradition of Conservatism, which I invite the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk to discover: the tradition of progressive Conservatism of Disraeli and Lord Randolph Churchill. They would never have pressed such a new clause, so I invite the hon. Gentleman to rediscover that tradition and withdraw his new clause.

Henry Bellingham: I will be brief. The Minister has been his normal charming self. I do not agree with everything he said, but I listened carefully to his comments on our new clause 20, and to the compelling points of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). Although we in no way resile from the arguments we put forward, I accept what the Minister has said. On that basis, I will not press new clause 20, but I would nevertheless like to put new clause 22 to the vote at the appropriate stage.
	I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
	 Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 21
	 — 
	Chief executive of the Supreme Court

'(1) The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) Omit section 48.
	(3) Omit subsection (2) of section 49.
	(4) In subsection (1) of section 51, for "chief executive" substitute "President".
	(5) In subsection (1) of section 54, for "chief executive" substitute "President".'.- (Mr. Bellingham.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Henry Bellingham: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
	New clause 21 relates to the Supreme Court. Again, I declare an interest as a barrister. The background to the establishment of the new Supreme Court was due entirely to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the relevant section of which made it clear that the Supreme Court would be set up. Section 48 refers to appointing a chief executive.
	This reform was part of a wider package, which we discussed in detail on earlier new clauses, and I do not want to repeat those discussions. It is worth pointing out, however, that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords-the Law Lords, as they were known-did a first-class job. No one complained that they were not doing a good job. No one complained that their location in any way inhibited or restricted their professionalism or their work. They started off, many years ago, in the main Chamber of the House of Lords, but as pressure on business increased they were exiled to a Committee room on Committee corridor.

Janet Anderson: Order. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we are discussing whether to have a chief executive of the Supreme Court. I would be grateful if he restricted his remarks to that.

Henry Bellingham: I will come on to that quickly, and I am grateful to you, Mrs. Anderson, for that reminder. Obviously, it is difficult to explain what the chief executive is about without looking at what the chief executive does, which is preside over the Supreme Court on which the former Law Lords are judges.
	Although one might well have taken the view that it was quaint, quirky, anachronistic and so on to have Law Lords sitting in a small Committee room, the arrangement worked very well. However, it was decided that they should be moved across to the new Supreme Court. Obviously, that decision was taken at a time when the economy was booming, and no one worried too much about the costs. The original estimated cost was £30 million, which then went up. As we know, the ultimate capital cost of the Supreme Court came in at £58.9 million: a vast amount of money to locate those judges in a new building when they had a perfectly good place to sit already. I believe that only one Law Lord agreed, and publicly stated, that it was a good idea to move across to the Supreme Court. The other Law Lords were all opposed to the move. They felt that the existing arrangements worked extremely well.
	I will not dwell on the capital costs, however, because I want to consider the current costs of running the new Supreme Court. Let us consider the previous arrangements that were in place in the House of Lords. Of course, it is difficult to work out exactly what the costs were, but the cost of the Clerks, the Librarian and the other officials who serviced the Law Lords amounted to roughly £600,000. That was not a huge sum, and I think that it represented very good value for money. Back in July it was announced in a written parliamentary answer that the running costs of the new Supreme Court would be £12.3 million. That is a pretty staggering figure compared with £600,000. The new chief executive, who is the subject of new clause 21 -

Michael Wills: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but is he absolutely confident that he is comparing like with like? I think it important for the Committee to know the answer to that question.

Henry Bellingham: I am certainly confident that I am comparing like with like. The actual costs of running the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords amounted to £600,000.

Michael Wills: I am sorry to intervene on the hon. Gentleman again, but I want to be absolutely clear about this. He knows for a fact, does he, that the costs have escalated twentyfold as a result of the move from the House of Lords?

Henry Bellingham: Yes-the actual administrative costs: the running costs. As  Hansard shows, in 2005 the Minister replying to the debate in the House of Lords agreed that the actual costs amounted to £600,000. Obviously the costs of the salaries and pensions of the Law Lords were additional to that. The original figure given for the running costs of the Supreme Court back in July was £12.3 million, to which must be added the salaries and pensions of the Law Lords. Between July and September, that figure rose to £13.5 million. May I ask the Minister who is in charge of these costs? Who is controlling them?
	Six full-time staff serviced the Law Lords, and I think that they did a very good job in looking after their interests. There are 39 people in the new Supreme Court. The other day I tabled a parliamentary question asking
	"how many employees of the new Supreme Court earn more than  (a) £50,000,  (b) £75,000 and  (c) £100,000 a year."
	The reply was as follows:
	"The Supreme Court has 39 employees. Of those 39 employees, four earn between £50,000 and £75,000, one earns between £75,000 and £100,000, and one earns more than £100,000."-[ Official Report, 2 November 2009; Vol. 498, c. 747W.]
	The employee who earns more than £100,000 is the chief executive.
	I take on board what the Minister has said about the separation of powers, but I disagree with it profoundly. I have always taken the view that we do not have an American-style separation of powers in this country. Our judiciary has always been entwined with the legislature: that is one of the great strengths that our constitution has had for many years. Do we really need 39 employees to run the Supreme Court in that fantastic building across the way? Do we really need a chief executive who is paid a salary of more than £100,000? Perhaps it is £140,000; I do not know. Certainly it is far more than the Minister earns. Why do we need a chief executive?
	The new clause seeks to make a start-a small start-on reducing the costs of the Supreme Court. I do not think that there is any justification for increasing the number of staff from six to 39, or for appointing a chief executive. What will the chief executive do? What will the director of finance do? What will the director of communications and the other directors do? Why cannot the Supreme Court be run with a senior Clerk, perhaps a few caretakers and a couple of librarians? Let us get the cost down to a sensible level.
	As the Minister well knows, the Conservatives would not have gone down the Supreme Court route. On the other hand, we are pragmatic politicians. We are not going to simply scrap the arrangement and spend a lot of money on reversing these changes. What we do want to do, if we win the election, is ensure that the court works more efficiently and gives better value for money. We do not believe that a cost of more than £13.5 million, and probably rising, represents good value for money.

David Howarth: I am now a little concerned by the hon. Gentleman's argument, because it seems to me that it means that, whatever the current tasks of the chief executive, under the new clause those tasks will be transferred to the president of the court. Has the hon. Gentleman made any estimate of the increase in the president's work load arising from his proposal, or is he assuming there would be none?

Henry Bellingham: The hon. Gentleman is a distinguished academic and we have debated such issues many times. He will remember that when he and I started out on our legal careers, judges ran their own courts. Long before Her Majesty's Courts Service-employing 20,000-plus people-judges ran their courts, and they exercised control of all aspects of their administration. Those judges would run large combined courts, employing substantial numbers of people and manage a very complex case load-and they would also manage large numbers of litigants, solicitors and barristers who came before the court on a daily basis.
	On the Supreme Court, I entirely accept what the hon. Gentleman says. We do not want its president to be bogged down with a huge amount of administration and a lot of minor detail. That is why he needs to have a staff, but does he need a staff of 39, and does he need a chief executive? I suggest that this modest proposal of removing the post of chief executive would be a very good start, because it would send a signal to the Supreme Court that it must deliver value for money and be run efficiently.
	Furthermore, let us take another look at the Department's budget, which is under immense pressure. There are court buildings that need to be repaired, the legal aid budget is in crisis, there is a crisis over access to justice, law centres and advice centres are closing by the dozen, legal aid deserts are appearing, and young lawyers are forsaking publicly funded work, and all because tiny amounts of money are being taken out of the legal aid budget. Yet here we are looking at the running costs of the ultimate appeal court in the land going up from about £600,000 to almost £14 million, employing a chief executive on a very large salary in a post that my party thinks is superfluous to requirements. The new clause has been proposed in the spirit of trying to get better value for money and making sure that the delivery of justice in this country is more streamlined and efficient-which is exactly what the Minister said that he wants too.

David Heath: I was expecting a totally different argument from the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham). I thought he was going to present an argument with which I have a degree of sympathy. Indeed, given the words on the amendment paper, I can still make his new clause fit my aspirations-but for the wrong reasons, it would appear. I thought he was trying to make sure that the role of the chief executive and the running of the Supreme Court were transferred solely to the authority of the president of the Supreme Court, thus cutting out the middleman, the Lord High Chancellor, who is responsible at present for the staffing levels the hon. Gentleman has described and for the salary enjoyed by the chief executive. At present, the whole shebang is nothing to do with the president, other than in a consultative capacity. It is all down to the Lord High Chancellor, who has made his decisions about the proposals.
	I thought the hon. Gentleman would express support for the ongoing process of separating out the legislature and the Executive from the courts by giving the courts proper responsibility for running their own affairs in this discrete aspect. I have heard the arguments, however, and I now understand that he wants to do exactly the opposite. He wants this House to interfere with the running of the Supreme Court and its president to undertake a new raft of functions that involve making sure the lights are switched off and the boiler is mended. I am not sure that that is a sensible use of the time of the president of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk believes that it is, but his argument in favour is based on costs that sounded rather speculative to me. He cited some figures-I shall be interested in what the Minister has to say about those-but the comparison being made did not seem to be exactly like for like; I did not note, for example, any property costs in terms of housing the Law Lords in the House of Lords. That apparently costs nothing at all and is, thus, not to be used as a comparator, and I suspect that some of the hon. Gentleman's other arguments are not entirely accurate.
	However, the hon. Gentleman has a point, in that having the building across the road and running two buildings, rather than one, entails an increased cost. I think that that cost is justified. I was one of those who always argued for a supreme court and who always argued that it was an extraordinary anomaly that the Law Lords sat within our legislature, thus making it very difficult for us to defend our position compared with most modern political and judicial systems. I was one of the first to suggest the Middlesex Guildhall as a suitable venue -[Interruption.] Yes, it was my fault; I accept responsibility. I thought it was a good building to put the Supreme Court in and, having seen it, I remain of that view. With the exception of the carpets, it is a marvellous adaptation of a very suitable building for its purpose.

Henry Bellingham: rose-

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene on the subject of carpets.

Henry Bellingham: The hon. Gentleman obviously never appeared before a Crown court judge in that building when it was a Crown court. It was a lugubrious, grotty building then, but I agree that the work has been done to a very high standard, and the architects need congratulating. Obviously, as £60 million has been spent, one would expect a Rolls-Royce building, and that is what we have got.

David Heath: We have got an excellent building. Those who represent the top of this country's judicial processes deserve an appropriate building. Far from being lugubrious, I suspect that it is now a rather good place to work. It has retained the best features of the Middlesex Guildhall intact; I am particularly pleased that the building contains a very prominent portrait-there might be two in the building-of John Fielding of Somersetshire, who did so much to establish our modern judiciary and the role of modern courts.
	I am a great supporter of the Supreme Court and of how it has developed. Should it be for the Lord Chancellor now to have any involvement in the day-to-day running of that court? My answer to that is no. However, although I thought that I could have couched the hon. Gentleman's new clause in more felicitous terms, it would achieve a result that I could support. That leaves me in a great dilemma were he to call a Division, because were I to support him it would be for reasons almost diametrically opposed to those for which he believes his proposal is necessary. I would be tainted by association with his arguments and I do not want that, nor do I want my hon. and right hon. Friends to be so tainted.
	I hope that the Minister will advance such a strong argument in rebuttal that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his new clause. I also hope that on another occasion we will look at properly strengthening the role of the president of the Supreme Court, not by making him empty the dustbins, but by allowing him to appoint his own staff. He should make the dispositions on staffing and any other arrangements of the Supreme Court that he thinks best, rather than come back to the Lord Chancellor to ask for permission. I would support amendments along those lines, because having set up this new body, with which we should be very pleased, now is the time for the Lord Chancellor to let go.
	That takes us back to the debates that we had earlier this afternoon and the reluctance, it would seem, of the Executive entirely to let go of matters that are within their power. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us that in the long term that is precisely what the Government intend to do.

Michael Wills: Again, we have had a very interesting debate. The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) is an adornment to this House, and I hope that he will preserve that status by withdrawing this amendment.
	I shall set out my reasons. The hon. Gentleman quite rightly raises the point that all public institutions have to be efficient and cost-effective, and they do, but he has to be careful that he does not take Oscar Wilde's definition of modern people as people who know the value of nothing and the price of everything and attach it to the modern Conservative party.
	These institutions have great value and tribute has been paid to the building. This is the apex of our judicial system and one of the cornerstones of our constitution. No one would have said that the Palace of Westminster should never have been built with its wonderful decoration. It is a Palace of Westminster that belongs to the British people in the same way, ultimately, as the Supreme Court does. However, the hon. Gentleman is quite right to raise the question of cost-effectiveness, although, of course, public institutions never waste money.
	My problem is that it is very difficult to compare costs. I intervened on the hon. Gentleman and, perhaps rashly, he insisted that he was comparing like with like. I ask him to think again. It is very difficult to make reliable comparisons for exactly the reason that has been given by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). There is no like-for-like comparison that we have been able to find.
	If the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk can produce such a comparison for me, line by line, in a way that a chartered accountant would recognise, I would be happy to consider it and, if we can find savings, I would be happy to make them on that basis. However, the increase in the number of staff, for example, includes security, the library and catering, all of which were previously provided by the House of Lords infrastructure. There was no space to expand, even though sometimes it was needed. It is very difficult. Anyone who has tried to find out the true cost of catering in the Houses of Parliament runs up against the same problems of how we cost the building and its running costs. There are all kinds of intricacies that I have never been able to get to the bottom of. If he can, and if he can produce genuine like-for-like comparisons between the two buildings, I will happily look at them.

Henry Bellingham: The Minister has challenged me, and I shall investigate this fully, but surely the point is that the Law Lords shared our security, which was in place anyway to protect the many thousands of people who use this Palace, and our facilities. One would often see Law Lords going down to the Terrace cafeteria for a snack. The cost was obviously heavily subsidised, because they were one-or 12-of a large number of people using the facilities. Now they have their own dedicated facilities, and of course it costs much more.

Michael Wills: When I say like for like, I know that the running costs are not exactly the same and that of course there will be savings in both cases. The Supreme Court is a new building and will almost certainly be far more energy-efficient than this building. Of course, capital costs go into that and they have to be amortised over a certain period of time. These calculations are highly complex but for a relatively small institution the difference in the running costs-it is just a matter of common sense-is unlikely to be that great. There would be savings in some areas if it were to remain here and savings in others if it were transferred to a more modern building with all the efficiencies that come with such buildings, as compared with largely unrefurbished great historic buildings, such as this one, where it is a patch and mend job all the time. I urge the hon. Gentleman to use some common sense, because the actual differences are unlikely to be very significant.

Edward Timpson: I take the Minister's point about the Supreme Court's being the apex of our judicial system, but most members of the public who have to access our judicial system tend to do so at the lower end-in the magistrates courts and family proceedings courts. When they see their magistrates courts in a poor state of repair and, on occasions, see them closing, it makes it even more important that the cost of the Supreme Court-every penny-is justified. When we hear sums for running costs in the region of £13 million, compared with what it would cost to run a local magistrates court, it is important that that case is made clearly and forensically. I suspect that that is the point that my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) is trying to make, to ensure that we are getting value for money.

Michael Wills: Of course we must get value for money, which is exactly what I said. As I shall describe in a moment, that is one of the functions of the chief executive.
	The Supreme Court has been established in a proper and effective way, with the staff that it needs to discharge its essential function in our constitution. All the rest of the judicial system depends on it, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk well knows. It is not a question of either/or: we continue to invest in the court service, and it is well known that magistrates courts close for whole complexes of reasons. The needs of the justice system change, and that is a key reason why magistrates courts change. Magistrates courts are not having to close because of the establishment of the Supreme Court, but of course there has to be value for money.
	If the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk can justify his claim that costs have increased twentyfold, of course I will look at it, but I confidently assure him that they have not. The equation is complex, and I do not want to mislead the Committee. We have to give the figures out in accordance with the highest standards of accountancy, and the way that costs have been amortised in this building renders that difficult.
	I am not sure whether it is worth going to the effort of translating the entire argument down into the costs equation, as in the end this is a political debating point. I believe that the difference in running costs is unlikely to be large, and I suspect that the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk thinks so, too.
	The new clause is technically defective-

Oliver Heald: Will the Minister give way?

Michael Wills: No, as I want to come to the real burden of my remarks. We have spent quite a lot of time on what even the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said was a modest proposal, so I would like to make the main points of my argument against it. If the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) still wants to intervene after I have made some progress, I will of course give way to him.
	The main problem with new clause 22 is that it still fails the separation of powers test. The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said-although I am not sure that he really meant it-that he welcomes how the legislature has become tangled up with the higher reaches of the judiciary. I accept that there has been a certain entanglement, but I certainly do not welcome it, and I think that the British people do not want it. One of the greatest protections of their liberties is that the legislature and the judiciary are not entangled. We are continuing the process of disentangling them as far as we possibly can, and that is the purpose of the establishment of the Supreme Court. I do not want to rehearse all the arguments again, but it is very important that we set out exactly what the chief executive does, as that is the core of the problem.
	The statute says that it is for the chief executive to manage the non-judicial functions of the Supreme Court, so that its resources are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support it in carrying out its business. I think that everyone should accept that there is a function there to be performed. The chief executive works under the President of the Supreme Court, and again I hope that everyone accepts that, if there is to be a chief executive, that is the correct way for the arrangement to operate.
	The new clause would increase substantially the time that the President of the Supreme Court must spend managing the non-judicial aspects of the court's functions, thereby reducing the time that this individual-ex officio, they will be talented, skilled and experienced-has to spend on the crucial judicial work that is the court's core role.
	The new clause also would undermine the very independence that the Supreme Court was founded on. I believe that it is very important that we have a Supreme Court, and that its independence is protected. In the first Constitutional Affairs Committee report of the 2003-04 Session, the Law Lords made it clear that they unanimously regarded it as essential that the court enjoyed corporate independence. They said that
	"the independence of the judges requires not only that they be free of extraneous pressure but also that the court be institutionally free of administrative pressure".
	To that end, the court has been established as a non-ministerial department with its own chief executive, who is also the court's accounting officer, to ensure that there can be no question of interference by the Executive in its day-to-day running. The chief executive, which the new clause would abolish, plays a key role in managing appropriate relationships between the court and branches of Government throughout the UK and assuring proper accountability for the use of public resources-of course, there must be such accountability.
	If the function were abolished, the Lord Chancellor would have to provide support along the lines of sections 1 and 2 of the Courts Act 2003, which set out the general duty on the Lord Chancellor to ensure that there is an efficient and effective system to support the business of the senior courts, county courts and magistrates courts, and that appropriate services are provided for those courts.
	Since the new clause does not remove other related provisions of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, such as section 50, which requires the Lord Chancellor to provide accommodation and other resources, the removal of the chief executive role would bring all those financial accountability responsibilities back to the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice, compromising the independence of the Supreme Court, cutting right across the justices' own requirements for managerial and financial independence, and re-entangling the legislature and the Executive with the judiciary in precisely the way that we think it is right that they should be disentangled.
	Finally, the amendment is defective as it leaves intact section 51 of the Act under which the chief executive is responsible for ensuring that
	"the Court's resources are used to provide an efficient and effective system to support the Court's business".
	For all those reasons, I hope the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) will withdraw the new clause.

Henry Bellingham: The Minister, in his usual charming way, has been extremely persuasive. Although he made some good points, we do not in any way resile from the arguments that we advanced. Our point is simple: the chief executive post at such expense is a huge luxury. What is wrong with a senior clerk or a manager on a much lower salary carrying out those admin roles? That is what we would like to see, but because of the Minister's charm and persuasion, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
	 Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22
	 — 
	Written tests by the Judicial Appointments Commission

'(1) Section 88 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (5) insert-
	"(6) At no stage during any selection procedure may the Commission apply any written tests."'.- (Mr. Bellingham.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.
	 Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
	 The Committee divided: Ayes 150, Noes 329.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 37
	 — 
	The Comptroller and Auditor General

Kelvin Hopkins: I beg to move amendment 68, page 18, line 19, at end add-
	'(9) The principal function of the Comptroller and Auditor General is to further the purposes of national audit set out in section [Purpose of Part 7] by way of investigation and report.'.

Alan Haselhurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 78, in clause 38, page 19, line 2, at end insert-
	'(6A) The Comptroller and Auditor General shall also have discretion to examine the accounts of any organisation supplying goods or services paid for out of public funds, which within any one contract, or any one financial year, exceed a sum to be determined from time to time by statutory instrument.'.
	New clause 41- Purpose of Part 7-
	'The purpose of the following provisions is to further strengthen Parliamentary control and supervision of the expenditure of public money, and for promoting economy, efficiently, effectiveness and probity in the use of such money by government departments and other authorities and organisations.'.

Kelvin Hopkins: It gives me great pleasure to speak to these amendments, if briefly.
	In a major piece of legislation it is important that its purposes should be clear, but the Bill nowhere specifies the purposes and aims of national audit, although the National Audit Act 1983 does so. The amendments are intended to remedy that omission.

Alan Williams: That is not the purpose of the Bill. The statutory powers are already in place, and the purpose of this part of the Bill is to bring better governance into the processes of the National Audit Office.

Kelvin Hopkins: I accept entirely what my right hon. Friend says, but I hope that one purpose of the Bill is to restate the objectives of audit.

Alan Williams: indicated dissent.

Kelvin Hopkins: Clearly my right hon. Friend and I disagree, but I hope it will be accepted that the restatement of the 1983 Act would not go amiss in the Bill.
	New clause 41 is intended to be inserted at the head of part 7. It repeats the opening of the 1983 Act, with the addition of the word "probity", which seems appropriate in current terms. Amendment 68 is intended to make clear the function of the Comptroller and Auditor General in relation to the purposes of national audit, and amendment 78 takes account of the modern circumstances in which private firms and third-sector organisations can receive a significant proportion of their funds-up to 80 per cent. in some cases-from the public purse. When the services that they provide were provided directly by public authorities, they were subject to the Comptroller and Auditor General or to local government audit. Modern suppliers of services receiving public money should be subject to the CAG, as plcs will be under clause 50.
	It is important to reassert the importance of the CAG and national audit. In the last Parliament, there was a brief, surreptitious attempt by the Government to insert a degree of Treasury control over national audit. That was seen off by a combination of Labour Members, Opposition Members and the House of Lords, and the Bill never proceeded, but it is important that we now reaffirm our commitment to national audit. After all, our primary purpose is to vote moneys for government on behalf of the people. We must ensure that what moneys we vote are spent appropriately. That is what national audit and the CAG are all about.

David Gauke: I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling these amendments and the new clause. I suspect that the question whether it is necessary to reassert such objectives in this Bill given that the 1983 Act, which also states them, is not being repealed, will be addressed in a moment, but the CAG's objective of carrying out examinations of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public bodies is, as the hon. Gentleman says, very important. Perhaps it is more important now than ever, at a time when we will see spending restraint. The Government are spending more than ever before and, indeed, borrowing more than ever before in peacetime, so the focus must clearly be on achieving more for less. The NAO and the CAG have an important role in achieving that. Taxpayer value for money should unite us all-it should not be a partisan point-whether we are left or right. I do not think the hon. Gentleman will take it as a criticism if I say that it does not get more left wing than him. We must all ensure that public spending achieves good value and it is worth paying tribute to the work that the NAO and various CAGs have performed to achieve that.
	We may differ on how to achieve greater economy, efficiency and effectiveness in public bodies, and in many ways, this is a matter for great political debate-I am sure the hon. Gentleman would not necessarily share the Conservatives' views about the importance of choice, competition and contestability in achieving better value for money. However, there is a less political role, and the NAO performs it very well, in conjunction with the Public Accounts Committee. The new clause refers to Parliament's important role. As I said, we could question whether the amendments are necessary, but the objective of the NAO and the CAG is important.
	I have one or two points to make on clause 37. If there is a stand part debate on it, I will do so then.

The Chairman: Order. I was hoping not to have a stand part debate in view of the fact that, with the new clause, this is a fairly wide grouping.

David Gauke: In which case, Sir Alan, I shall make those points now.
	This part of the Bill, as the Father of the House has said, is predominantly to do with the governance of the NAO and the CAG, and there is a combination of continuity and change in the new arrangements. I think it would be fair to provide a little background on how we got into this situation and why there was a need to look again at the governance of the CAG-doubtless the Chairman of the PAC, my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), and the Father of the House will say things to the same effect.
	We cannot ignore the fact that there was some adverse publicity regarding the expenses of Sir John Bourn, who was CAG for some 20 years or so. It is a great pity that there was a cloud over the last few months of his service, because he was a distinguished Comptroller and Auditor General. He did much to enhance the reputation of the National Audit Office and worked very effectively with the Public Accounts Committee. Nevertheless, there was some concern and adverse publicity over his expenses, which in many respects led to the commissioning of the Tiner review and various recommendations made as to the governance of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the NAO.
	I wish to make various points about corporate governance at a later stage, but two points are appropriate to address in the context of clause 37. The first is the length of term of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the second is the appointment process. Clause 37(7) provides that the length of term should be 10 years and subsection (8) provides that it should be non-renewable. We welcome those provisions. The tension that exists in the Government's arrangements in this area relates to independence and accountability, and that is a point to which we may return later. However, a non-renewable term of a reasonable length gives the CAG a degree of independence. The Tiner review initially suggested eight years, and we now have 10 years in the Bill. No doubt others will explain the reason for that change, but it is not enormously significant. We welcome those provisions.
	The issue of the appointment process has been touched on recently in a couple of debates when new Comptrollers and Auditors General have been appointed. I have had the opportunity to speak in both debates-first, on the temporary appointment of Mr. Tim Burr in January 2008, and secondly, on the appointment of Mr. Amyas Morse as the permanent CAG. The debate has centred on whether the existing structure, which has been in place since 1983-by which time the appointment was made by a combination of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee and the Prime Minister-is appropriate or whether Parliament should have a wider role, and remove the Prime Minister and the Executive from the process, either altogether or with a diminished role.
	Another issue is whether pre-appointment hearings should be introduced. This is not a new debate. In the debate that took place when Sir John Bourn was appointed, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, East and Wallsend (Mr. Brown), then the Opposition spokesman, said, on the question of a greater role for Parliament:
	"The Labour party intends to give effect to this principle when in government."-[ Official Report, 16 December 1987; Vol. 124, c. 1201.]
	The argument for that approach is that we should have greater parliamentary involvement in public appointments. It is an argument that the Prime Minister espoused in his very first statement to this House as Prime Minister. It is one with which I have some sympathy, as it seems to be a more democratic approach, but there are specific arguments that apply in this context that suggest that the continuation of the present system may be a sensible approach.
	The first argument is that the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee is a Member of the Opposition. That is a long-standing convention, and one that I am sure will continue. The Chairman has a substantial role in determining an appointment. In fact, by and large, as I understand it, in practice the Chairman essentially makes the selection, which is then approved by the Prime Minister.
	It is important that the CAG is seen as independent of the Executive, and an appointment made by a senior Opposition Member demonstrates an important degree of independence.

Oliver Heald: I have been wondering whether the CAG would be the right person to be in charge of the office for budget responsibility that the Conservative party has proposed. I wonder that for exactly the reasons that my hon. Friend has outlined: the independent nature of the CAG appointment process.

David Gauke: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's intervention. That would be an interesting structure, although I would be reluctant for the CAG to perform that role. Although the CAG and whoever would be in charge of the office for budget responsibility would play an important role in budget responsibility, I would not want to complicate the role of the CAG because it is a substantial job in itself. Furthermore, the skills required of the CAG-being able to identify waste in specific programmes-involve performing a role at a micro level in identifying particular problems, whereas we envisage the office for budget responsibility working at much more of a macro level. It would be a role for an economist to assess the needs of the Government in reducing the deficit, and the progress-or lack of-made by the Government in achieving those objectives. The parallel is strong in that both roles require a high degree of independence to have the credibility required to perform successfully.

Oliver Heald: My first thought was that, to assess the sustainability of public finances, we need expert economists, as my hon. Friend just said. However, there would be two other aspects of the role of the new office: to audit fully the national debt-or debts-and to enforce a long-term strategy of value for money in public spending. Those fit in well with the role of the CAG. Would there be any logic to giving him that role? I simply cast out that thought to him.

David Gauke: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I am sure that his points will be noted. Both roles would be important. It is helpful to the Committee highlight the significance of the office for budget responsibility, and I think that we agree on the significant role that it would play-I hope-in addressing the current huge levels of borrowing. I hope that it would be important, just as the CAG has been important.
	On clause 37, we think, on balance, that the result that we have got to, which is largely a continuation of the previous process, is an important one. We are pleased that it remains a requirement for the Prime Minister to move the motion for the appointment of the CAG. As I said, I have had the pleasure of responding to the Prime Minister twice when he has performed that role-I am sure that he was delighted to have that opportunity too. All being well, however, such a motion should not happen very often-once in 10 years, as the Bill envisages-although it is always possible that things will not go entirely to plan. Because of the independence provided by the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, there is a danger that the existing independence might be diminished in those circumstances by a straight vote in Parliament-whether a vote in Committee or a vote by the whole House-given that the Government will always be the majority party. Consequently, we welcome clause 37.

Edward Leigh: I rise to speak in favour of clause 37, which covers the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and to oppose amendments 68 and 78, and new clause 41.
	A number of provisions already protect the independence of the post holder, including the appointment process, the length of tenure and the terms of the appointment. Let me start with some context, so that we can understand the significance of the legislation, why it is important to be clear about the purpose of the Bill and why we must tread carefully in this territory.
	The Comptroller and Auditor General is an Officer of the House of Commons. He is not a civil servant and is completely independent of the Government. Uniquely, he is selected by the Government and the Opposition. He reports to Parliament on the activities of the Government and his work is overseen largely by the Public Accounts Committee-the oldest Committee in Parliament, which was set up 150 years ago-which is always chaired by a member of the Opposition. Therefore, there are a number of locks throughout the process to ensure the independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
	All those arrangements are supported by complex legislative structures and significant parliamentary conventions, many of which have existed for a long time. The result of all those conventions and laws, as well as what we are talking about in clause 37, is to enable the Comptroller and Auditor General to function absolutely independently of the Government. That is what they all do. He must have complete discretion in how he carries out his functions.
	I worked closely with the Father of the House, after the retirement of Sir John Bourn. We were clear at all times that we must not mess with the traditional independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General. There may be an opportunity later to discuss the corporate structure and all the rest of it, but the fundamental point is that the Comptroller and Auditor General is completely independent of the Government and that he alone and nobody else-not the Public Accounts Committee and not the board of the National Audit Office-signs off the reports. Nobody else can affect his judgments. He is completely independent, and that is vital.
	That statutory independence, which is underpinned by the new Bill, is not a notional phenomenon, shrouded in cobwebs and dating back centuries, or at least back to Gladstone. Rather, it is real, it is current and it forms a key plank of our constitutional fabric. One only has to look around the world at what has happened in other countries to know how important it is-indeed, vital-to have an independent supreme audit office. Every country has a supreme audit office, but not all of them are as independent or effective as ours. Indeed, ours is arguably the best in the world.
	I am therefore pleased that the current arrangements, whereby the Comptroller and Auditor General's appointment is proposed by the Prime Minister following consultation with the Chairman of the PAC, have endured-I say "consultation", but it goes much further than that. Frankly, they both have a veto. This gentleman-Amyas Morse, although the Comptroller and Auditor General may be a lady in the future; we do not know-can be appointed only if the Prime Minister, who is obviously a member of the Government by definition, and the Chairman of the PAC, who by convention is a member of the Opposition, both agree.
	In fact, in appointing the current Comptroller and Auditor General we improved the process further. Last time, when Sir John Bourn was appointed, my predecessor, Bob Sheldon-now Lord Sheldon-was given a list by the civil service and he interviewed the candidates in his flat. It was a closed process. We now have an open competition, and this time there were a number of advertisements, and anyone could apply. The interviews were carried out at length by myself and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, who represented the Prime Minister. I would like to thank the permanent secretary for the many hours of work that he put into this. By that stage, we had already appointed the new chairman of the National Audit Office, Sir Andrew Likierman, and he was also involved in the latter part of the process. We had an open competition with a number of good candidates, and I believe that we came out with the best.

Philip Dunne: My hon. Friend has just referred to the chairman of the National Audit Office having some involvement in the selection of the current Comptroller and Auditor General. Will he elaborate a little further on the relationships involved, in the context of the appointment of a Comptroller and Auditor General? The Prime Minister is involved, as is the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, but what is the role of the chair of the National Audit Office in the appointment of its chief executive?

Edward Leigh: The chairman's role was simply to advise. He is a very distinguished gentleman-he is the dean of the London Business School, and he was head of the Government resources office in the Treasury-and he simply gave me advice. Obviously, I am not going to reveal who was on the shortlist or what happened in the discussions, but I can say that, ultimately, the decision was mine and no one else's. I listened to his advice and that of Tim Burr, the then Comptroller and Auditor General, who was also on the selection panel as he was not a candidate himself. Nick Macpherson, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, also gave me his advice. I chaired the meeting, and I made the decision: I appointed the new Comptroller and Auditor General.
	Then, however, my decision had to go to the Prime Minister, and I give him credit for acting promptly, because, within a week, he had approved the appointment. So he, too, had a lock on the process. Of course, it is not surprising that he approved the appointment, because Nick Macpherson was part of the process. If I had insisted on appointing someone who was obviously not qualified, the Prime Minister would have vetoed it. So we each had a lock on it, and that is a very good process.
	It might sound democratic to suggest that the House as a whole should vote for the Comptroller and Auditor General, but that would go against everything that I have been arguing for-namely, that the Opposition and the Government should both have a lock on the process. If the House as a whole voted on the appointment, the Government party would effectively appoint him.

Alan Williams: Does the hon. Gentleman recollect that the one proposal that we turned down from Tiner was his suggestion that the chair should be selected by the Prime Minister and the chair of the Commission? We unanimously rejected that, because the chair of the Commission is chosen by the Prime Minister, or by the Government party, and is of the same party. For that reason, we insisted on reverting to the situation that the hon. Gentleman enjoyed.

Edward Leigh: It was the same process. I am grateful to the Father of the House for his generous offer to surrender his right to appoint the chairman of the National Audit Office, along with the Prime Minister; that was what was originally proposed. We immediately spotted the problem that he has just alluded to-namely, that that would effectively mean that the Government party would appoint the chairman. The right hon. Gentleman therefore immediately, and very generously, surrendered that right. Just as there was an appointment panel for the Comptroller and Auditor General, there was also one previously for the chairman. Again, the Prime Minister, as a member of the Government, and I, as a member of the Opposition, had a lock on that process. So I think that we have the right structure.
	The independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General is guaranteed by a jigsaw of measures that hang together as a whole, and we should be very wary of unpicking any one part of it without careful consideration. We do not know what is going to happen in the future. There could be some kind of appalling financial scandal at the heart of the Government, for example, and it is absolutely essential that this man-or lady-is completely independent.
	Central to this has always been the fact that the Comptroller and Auditor General also has tenure of appointment and, like a judge, cannot be removed from office except on a vote of the entire House of Commons. The Public Accounts Commission, which I also sit on-it is, of course, separate from the Public Accounts Committee-has concluded that the current unlimited appointment was "anachronistic". I do not think that when Sir John Bourn was appointed anyone spotted that the civil service retirement age at the time was 60: it was rigidly enforced; all senior civil servants had to retire at 60.

Alan Williams: Will the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee bear in mind that there is an important extra safeguard even there? If a vote of only this House were required, the Government could use their majority, which is why a vote of both Houses is required to dispose of the Comptroller and Auditor General.

Edward Leigh: I should have made that clear; it is a very important point. In other words, it is virtually impossible to get rid of him. That is absolutely right.
	I was saying that the previous appointment was anachronistic and that no one spotted at the time Sir John Bourn was appointed that even though the civil service retirement age was 60, he could basically go on. I had a very good relationship with Sir John Bourn, who was outstanding public servant. Frankly, however, let us be honest about it, 20 years is perhaps too long. The equivalent office in the United States has a fixed single term of 15 years, which we also thought was too long. The Public Accounts Commission thus concluded that a fixed term of 10 years was appropriate. There was some argument over whether it should be eight or 10 years. I think that the Government probably favoured eight years and I would have been happy with eight years, but 10 years is a real good length of time to make one's mark-it could span three, certainly two, Governments.
	It is very important that this appointment be non-renewable. We do not want the CAG to suffer the fate of all US Presidents and most new Prime Ministers where the first term is overshadowed by the need to be re-elected. This chap owes nothing to anybody. Nobody can sack him-short of he or she having a hand in the till-and nobody can get rid of him; he is there for 10 years and then he retires.
	We need to take great care before tampering with any of the founding legislation, which was carefully drawn to provide broad rights of access and reporting and to safeguard the independence of the CAG as an Officer of the House and the external auditor of the Government. That is not to say that no aspect of the arrangements can be improved upon. I am in favour of the changes proposed in the Bill. I think that the arrangement is being improved, but we need to take great care and to be alert to our old friends-the unintended consequences.
	The Public Accounts Commission has worked very closely with the Government to ensure that the clauses improve the governance arrangements of the National Audit Office. I pay tribute to the Government for adopting all that the commission proposed; there was complete agreement within it, as well. We should also pay tribute to the fact that the Government, working with the commission, have ensured that we are not going to undermine the audit independence of the CAG.
	The commission agreed that it was possible to separate the internal governance-this is a very important point-of the NAO from the responsibility for making audit judgments, but we recognised that to do so required arrangements that were unique among the panoply of organisational models used in 21st century Britain. What the Father of the House and myself were absolutely determined to avoid was some kind of new corporate structure in which a board could affect the independence and audit judgments of the CAG. I know that there has been some debate about this, and some worries that we were creating something like the Audit Commission-we are not. The CAG is completely independent. This board will deal only with the organisational structure of the body.
	The Bill thus proposes no changes that will affect the work-the real and important work-of the CAG in the audit of Government accounts or in the 60 reports on value for money that he makes to the Public Accounts Committee every year. He remains independent. He alone will be responsible for all audit judgments; he alone will maintain complete discretion in the discharge of his office. His access rights are not affected and the results of his work will continue to be reported in full to Parliament through the Public Accounts Committee.

Philip Dunne: I am grateful to the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee for clarifying the important tenets of independence that the Comptroller and Auditor General will continue to have in carrying out his day job, if I can put it that way. Will he elaborate a little further on the distinction he made a few moments ago about the role of the board and the chairman in so far as they relate to the CAG? In a conventional sense, a chairman would normally have some authority over the CAG, but it appears from what my hon. Friend said that that is not intended.

Edward Leigh: I hope that I am not giving away any confidences by saying that Amyas Morse told me this week that it can be a very lonely job-and, as I have described it, a very important one-and he welcomes the advice of the chairman of the board, Sir Andrew Likierman. The Comptroller and Auditor General can go to him in confidence at any time and ask for his support and advice. However, the arrangement is unique: although Sir Andrew Likierman can give his advice, the buck ultimately stops with the Comptroller and Auditor General.
	The Comptroller and Auditor General has a large staff of 800 people who help him to write reports, but he puts his signature on the document, and it is his document and his alone. The board will be involved, for instance, in appointments, such as deciding who should be deputy Comptroller and Auditor General, what the travel arrangements of the Comptroller and Auditor General should be, and what should be the size of the staff. It was wrong that, under the previous incarnation of Sir John Bourn, who was a fine public servant, the Comptroller and Auditor General was a complete dictator-that was always the case; Sir John did not change anything in that regard. He not only had complete independence on his audit judgment, which is right, but appointed all the deputy Comptroller and Auditor Generals, decided the travel arrangements and everything else. In the modern world, one cannot go down that route. One must have a modern corporate structure, involving a board, as long as the board does not tell the Comptroller and Auditor General what to do in relation to his audit judgments.

Andrew Tyrie: Does the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee agree that, taking all things into account, we now have a structure that deals to some degree with the loneliness problem, and creates a relationship between the board chairman and the CAG that will enable the morale of the NAO to be not only sustained but strengthened? Does he also agree that the work of the Public Accounts Commission, and particularly of its chairman, was instrumental in enabling such significant changes to be made without damage to the morale of the NAO, at a time when the structure had a sense of fragility about it?

Edward Leigh: As I understand it, morale in the National Audit Office is now very high. It went through a sticky patch-there is no point denying it-and there was bad publicity, much of it unfair, but that is now past us. Morale is high and people feel that the structure is fair and open, that people are appointed entirely on ability, and that their career is judged by a number of people sitting on the board, the chairman and the non-executive directors. I believe that we have got it right, and for that reason, I oppose the amendments, as they serve to define the Comptroller and Auditor General's audit purpose and to open up discussion of his access rights, neither of which was covered by the review commissioned by the Public Accounts Commission that led to this part of the Bill.
	We do not need to define the Comptroller and Auditor General's access rights. He has all the access he needs. Make no mistake: the National Audit Office can interview any civil servant, open any filing cabinet, and report on anything it likes. Having been Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, I assure the House that no restraint or inhibition is placed on the Comptroller and Auditor General doing his job. Clause 37 is right, and gives him the power he needs.

David Howarth: May I say that I was immensely reassured by the speech of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee? It is vital that the Comptroller and Auditor General remains absolutely independent in judgment. Whatever the governance arrangements and administrative structure built up behind the Comptroller and Auditor General, his judgments-perhaps hers in the future-on reports must be independent. As the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee said, that is built into the entire structure, the cross-party nature of the appointment and the nature of the office.
	I shall not pursue the argument about the overall structure of the Bill. I fully accept that the commission and the Government have struck the right balance in relation to the NAO and its board, so I shall not detain the Committee for long. I intend simply to comment on the amendments and new clause, and to ask a question about the application of clause 37 which I hope the Minister will be able to answer.
	I agree with the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee that it would not be a good idea to define the functions of the Comptroller and Auditor General too closely. Any such definition might result in a restriction that we would not want to see. However, I think it worth asking about a particular aspect of new clause 41. The new clause states:
	"The purpose of the following provisions is to further strengthen Parliamentary control and supervision of the expenditure of public money".
	One of the problems that I see with the present structure, not in theory but in practice, is that it is far better at supervision than control. In other words, it is far better at looking back than looking forward. The Comptroller and Auditor General has two roles. The job of Comptroller is the forward-looking job of ensuring that the Government do not obtain the public's money for purposes that have not been authorised by the House, while the job of Auditor General is that of looking back to see whether that money has been properly spent. I think that, at some point, we must consider the important question whether the arrangements for the forward-looking role are as strong as they could be, and as strong as the arrangements for the backward-looking role.
	I disagree with the PAC Chairman about amendment 78. The hon. Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins) made clear that what concerned him was the problem of bodies which are not, in organisational form, public bodies at all but private trusts or companies of various sorts, but which are in reality carrying out public functions. That is the whole point of the discussion of contracting out. I think that the Chairman was referring to issues relating to non-departmental bodies, in respect of which the National Audit Act lays down clear guidelines on the Comptroller and Auditor General's powers. I understand that there is no power of the kind that the hon. Member for Luton, North is suggesting in the existing legislation. The point is that there should not be anything in the way in which we set up our audit arrangements that biases the entire system in favour of contracting out. Similarly, there should be no bias against contracting out.
	It seems to me-and I think the amendment raises this point-that an immensely effective audit system involving great powers, which successfully terrorises public officials into compliance with their duties but does not apply to private organisations that carry out state functions under contracting-out arrangements, effectively gives those organisations a huge advantage over the state.

Edward Leigh: I have taken advice on this. The Comptroller and Auditor General has statutory access to contractors for the purposes of examining the public body concerned, but the National Audit Office does not think it would be appropriate for him to have access to suppliers' commercial records further than is needed to audit public bodies. I think that we only need to secure access to the part of the contractors' work that directly affects his contract with the Government.

David Howarth: That is absolutely right. The purpose is thought to be only to audit the Government Department and not to have any access to the private body, but I think that is a problem under current arrangements. As I remember it-I might be wrong on this-if a Minister agrees and the body agrees, there is further possibility of an audit of a private body. I am, however, unsure whether that is often invoked.
	The problem that has been identified is worth thinking about, but I am unsure whether the proposed solution is the right way to deal with it, as that is a discretion at large, which might produce problems in itself.

Edward Leigh: The Bill is primarily about the governance of the National Audit Office; it is not about audit rights. We in the Public Accounts Commission thought it wise for the Bill to concentrate on the governance, as that is set in concrete and is permanent, whereas audit rights can change over time. Indeed, only last week the Government announced that the NAO was for the first time to be allowed to audit the Financial Services Authority. We have also got a long-running campaign to audit the BBC. If the Bill starts getting into the territory of contracts, suppliers and so forth, that could make things quite messy and difficult in terms of an Act of Parliament that we hope will last for many years.

David Howarth: I accept that point from the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. In fact, many of these considerations are themselves legislative, because they are all to do with issues such as, for instance, which bodies are listed in schedule 4 to the National Audit Act 1983. There has not been a long and organised debate that can advise the Committee on this issue, but I think the hon. Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins) has raised an important point, and although I do not expect him to press his amendment to a vote tonight, I would like the Government to accept that it is a matter that it worthy of further debate.

Philip Dunne: I do not intend to detain the Committee for long, but I would like to follow up the observation I made to the Chairman of the PAC, my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh). He has described the process governing the first appointment under this legislation-although it has not been enacted yet, of course. He said that the chairman of the NAO was able to offer his advice to both the Chairman of the PAC and the Prime Minister, which is proper. However, I would like the Minister to explain what would happen if the NAO chairman were unhappy about the appointment being made. There seems to be no provision in this clause for formal consultation; that just happened by way of practice rather than under statute. Does that not leave the NAO open to the possibility of having a fractious appointment imposed over the head of the chairman of the body?

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Sir Alan.
	This part of the Bill implements the recommendations of the 15th report of the Public Accounts Commission. I would like to begin by paying tribute to the work of the NAO and the Comptroller and Auditor General. Part 7 of the Bill modernises the governance arrangements for national audit and continues the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General as an independent officer of the House of Commons, but limits the term of office to a single appointment of 10 years.

David Howarth: At this point, will the Minister clear up one particular problem with the drafting of clause 37? Clause 37(1) says:
	"The office of the Comptroller and Auditor General is to continue",
	but it does not say that the person currently in office will continue to hold that position. Can the Minister confirm that that is the Government's intention, and that these arrangements will not apply until the next appointment?

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I can certainly confirm that that is the Government's intention. After all the work the Chair of the PAC has done on the appointment of the current Comptroller and Auditor General, he would be most unhappy if we had to go through the process all over again.
	The Bill provides for the establishment of a new corporate body-the new National Audit Office-whose functions will include providing resources for the Comptroller and Auditor General's functions, monitoring the execution of those functions and approving the provision of certain services. Importantly, the new NAO will be able to support and challenge constructively the CAG's decisions without, of course, preventing him from carrying out his statutory responsibilities.
	I come to the proposals made by my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins). As he was not feeling too well during the Second Reading debate, he did not get on to the points he wanted to make about the national audit provisions-I hope he is feeling better today. Amendment 68 would set out in statute that the principal function of the CAG is to further the purposes of national audit, which he set out in new clause 41. Amendment 78 would enable the CAG to have access to thousands of private sector companies that supply central Government. I thank the hon. Members for South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Gauke), for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), for Cambridge (David Howarth) and for Ludlow (Mr. Dunne) for their contributions to this debate. Most who spoke this afternoon are of the same opinion; we welcome the contribution that these proposals have made to the debate, but the consensus is that they are not necessary. I shall now discuss the detail, where we have been extremely fortunate that the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee was able to share his insight into the appointments process.
	On new clause 41, of course the CAG exists to assist Parliament in holding the Government to account for the use that they make of public funds and, in doing so, promotes the objectives that my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North mentions. I can assure him that the Government value that work as much as he does. I cannot dispute the fact that the effect of the arrangements in this part of the Bill will indirectly strengthen parliamentary scrutiny, but that is not their primary purpose.
	The Government are implementing the recommendations of the Public Accounts Commission's 15th report. In doing so, we are accepting the commission's two driving principles. The first is the need to ensure that the CAG has authority to form completely independent judgments about the audits and value-for-money studies conducted by the NAO. The second is the need for the NAO to maintain systems of governance and internal controls consistent with best practice. When we prepared the provisions in part 7, we took the utmost care not to jeopardise the CAG's independence in those areas.
	As now, the Public Accounts Commission will oversee the work of the CAG and the NAO-indeed, its role is increased by these reforms. However, it would be inaccurate to describe the main purpose of this part of the Bill as strengthening parliamentary control, because, as the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee said, its focus is rather on strengthening governance.
	I would add that the Government are doing a number of things to improve parliamentary scrutiny of government expenditure. Hon. Members will be aware that the Government provided a memorandum to the Liaison Committee in March containing formal proposals to Parliament for better alignment between budgets, estimates and accounts. The memorandum explained the plans to simplify the Government's financial reporting to Parliament, ensuring that they report in a more consistent, transparent and straightforward fashion on spending plans, estimates and expenditure outcomes. I hope to assure the hon. Member for Cambridge that further work on the way Parliament supervises expenditure continues in a number of ways, including through the work of the Select Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, which is expected to bring forward its proposals shortly.

David Gauke: Can the Minister explain, therefore, why the Government have, in recent years, refused to publish the whole of Government accounts? For the past two years the work has been done but the information has not been released-I believe that we are going to have to wait until 2010 for it.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I can only say to the hon. Gentleman that, as I said just now, further work is ongoing on what we can introduce. We want to be more transparent and to have a better way of ensuring that we can look at our spending plans, our estimates and the expenditure outcome.
	We all agree, of course, that it is important that Parliament should continue to play an active role in scrutinising the expenditure of public money, but we do not think that a declaratory provision of the type envisaged in the proposed new clause accurately reflects the purpose of the provisions.
	On amendment 68, the national audit responsibilities of the Comptroller and Auditor General are already set out in legislation, and within those responsibilities some matters are left to the Comptroller and Auditor General's judgment and discretion, such as whether to carry out a value-for-money examination into a particular subject. That is consistent with his independent role in holding the Government to account.
	Part 7 of and schedule 7 to the Bill already draw an important distinction between the services to be provided by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The resources available to the Comptroller and Auditor General fall into two categories, those whose allocation is at the sole discretion of the Comptroller and Auditor General and those for additional but important services, which require National Audit Office approval.
	We do not consider it to be necessary or desirable to impose any further restriction on the way in which the Comptroller and Auditor General and the NAO choose to exercise discretion on the use of resources by suggesting that one function should be elevated to the status of a principal function. We consider that, while all the work carried out by the Comptroller and Auditor General is important, the provisions relating to the use of resources give a clear indication of where the Comptroller and Auditor General's priorities lie.
	Beyond that, it is for the Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office, within the framework established by the Bill, to establish priorities. That is consistent with the independence of their roles.
	Before I move on to discuss amendment 78, the hon. Member for Ludlow asked me a direct question about what would happen if the NAO chair did not get on with the Comptroller and Auditor General. It is right that it is for the Prime Minister and the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee alone formally to make the appointment. The NAO chair would serve only in an advisory capacity and he would not be the one who was making the final decision.

Edward Leigh: Let us be practical about this. We worked as a team. I was sitting there with Nick Macpherson, the permanent secretary to the Treasury, with Andrew Likierman and with Tim Burr. Although the decision was ultimately mine, I would not have insisted on proposing somebody who was unacceptable to the permanent Secretary to the Treasury. What would have been the point of that? I do not think that I would have insisted on proposing somebody who was completely unacceptable to the chairman of the NAO. What would be the point? In the real world, those involved act together as a team but ultimately one person has to make the decision, and that is the Chairman of the Committee.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: That is absolutely true.

Alan Williams: To meet that situation, we built in a requirement that there should be a code to govern the relationship that they had to develop within the board and to govern the relationship between the CAG and the Chairman. That code has been agreed, as has a strategy, and both have already been approved by the commission.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I thank the Father of the House for that intervention, too. It is important that we have seen the practicalities of how these decisions are made and I do not think that it would be necessary to put anything on the face of the Bill.

Philip Dunne: The Minister referred a moment ago to the powers of the Public Accounts Commission being strengthened by the Bill. In the context of the exchange that we have just had on the point that I made earlier, will she reflect on how that will be achieved if the new board of the NAO is enhanced or enlarged with more non-executive members and a new chairman? Surely much of the advisory role that the commission has been able to play in the relationship with the Comptroller and Auditor General will now be supplanted by the board, in which case the powers of the commission will be reduced.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I do not agree. Although we are reforming it and making the NAO more accountable, there is still a very powerful role for the commission, which will be holding these people to account. We have demonstrated what the commission has done to enable us to get to this stage. I still envisage that it will play a powerful role in the future.
	May I move on to amendment 78? We all recognise that the Comptroller and Auditor General should have access to the information that he needs to be able to access documents. I think that we have heard that he already has a considerable power to get to the documents that he needs, but amendment 78 would result in a considerable extension of his reach that is not necessary or justified at this stage.
	The CAG already has a statutory right of access to documents held by, or under the control of, not only Government Departments but also a wide range of other public bodies and bodies that are in receipt of substantial Government funds. However, the purpose of this access is to allow him to audit effectively the accounts of Government Departments and to carry out value-for-money examinations with access to all relevant information. These powers allow him to ensure that public money has been used for the purposes approved by Parliament and report on whether it has been well used.
	Allowing the CAG access to the books of thousands of individual suppliers in the way proposed is another matter altogether, and would require very clear justification. Thousands of non-governmental organisations and private companies provide services to the Government. The amendment could harm the relationship between the Government and their suppliers.
	Many Government suppliers are small businesses or charities that are financed to fulfil Government policies. Others are larger accountancy and consultancy firms that are used to provide expertise that the Government do not have in-house. Suppliers of goods and services have already been through an extensive tendering process, not just to check whether the goods and services can be provided at best value for money but also to ensure that the suppliers are reputable and can fulfil the order. If public bodies are failing to achieve value for money in their dealings with the private sector, the CAG already has the powers to examine and report on the use that such bodies are making of public funds.
	I am always willing to listen to concerns that the powers of the CAG are inadequate, but I do not think that is the case in this instance. The amendment runs the risk of being an unwanted intrusion, without offering any clear improvement to the ability of the CAG to perform the task that Parliament has given him.
	I listened very carefully to the arguments presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, North, but I am not convinced that they are necessary and I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.

Kelvin Hopkins: I give notice that I shall seek leave to withdraw amendment 68, but I want to make a few remarks in response to the debate. First, I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for her kind remarks about my health: it is improving but it is not quite there yet.
	The amendment has provoked a debate, and that is important. I was particularly impressed by the speech from the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee. I thought it was clear, strong and impressive, and it is good to restate these matters. I know that many people in this Committee share his view; I certainly do, and my intention with the amendment was to maximise the strength of the CAG and the NAO-I did not want to restrict either of them in any way. That intention was most true of amendment 78, which the Minister said was impracticable and unnecessary. However, there was an argument to be had and a point to be made, and I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) for giving what I was saying a degree of support.
	I am absolutely passionate in my belief that we must make sure that the strength of the legislature in relation to the Executive is maintained-and, indeed, improved, as I do not think that it is strong enough now. The roles of the CAG and the NAO play a crucial part in that.
	I like to think that I have provoked a useful debate, and that I have made some points that needed to be made. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
	 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	 Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill .

Clause 38
	 — 
	Status of the Comptroller and Auditor General etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Gauke: Clause 38 deals with the status of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Subsection (8) highlights and signposts the provisions in clause 43 and schedule 6, and in clause 44 and schedule 7. It may be helpful to the Committee and reduce the time that we need to debate subsequent points if we address some concerns that have been expressed about the new governance structure. Those concerns have been raised in particular by Professor David Heald, who is a former adviser to the Public Accounts Commission. Perhaps, in the spirit of the hon. Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins), I can provoke a debate.
	Professor Heald's concern is that the role of Parliament may well be diminished by the creation of the NAO board. In an article he stated:
	"This insertion of the NAO Board between the Public Accounts Commission and the CaAG creates dangers. Governments might use the chair and board as a means of curtailing the activities of the comptroller, particularly in the more judgmental value for money sphere and in relation to the outsourcing of audit work."
	His concern is that that body will have some influence on the CAG. The Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee made it clear how important it is that there is independence for the CAG and how important, therefore, the appointment structure is. There is a role for the NAO in the approval of strategy and in the provision of resources. The concern is whether the Executive, through the chair of the NAO board, could influence the CAG.
	The other concern is that if the chairman of the NAO board is strong, there is a risk of interference. If he or she is weak, what is the point? Is this merely a distraction of management effort-of effort by the CAG-that could otherwise be focused on other things? I hope it is helpful to the Committee for me to put those concerns on the record and give the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee an opportunity to respond, although in some respects he addressed those concerns in his earlier remarks.

Alan Williams: Under the Bill, the CAG retains his absolute discretion in relation to his statutory duties. It cannot endanger his statutory duties at all.

David Gauke: Indeed. The Father of the House states the essence of that case. The alternative case, as advocated by Professor Heald, is that there is still a body that has influence with respect to the provision of resources in establishing the strategy for the NAO, and that that body could be used to influence. The Father of the House rightly makes the argument against that and I suspect that the Committee will be satisfied by that, but it is helpful to put it on the record and for him to put the counter-argument.
	As hon. Members have said, we are dealing with an important organisation. Other countries often look to what we do as an example of an effective means of scrutinising public expenditure. We must get it right, because it is important both in the UK and internationally. The concern is that the private sector corporate governance structure that we are putting place may not be appropriate for the very particular needs that exist in this area. I am not endorsing that line of argument, but it should be stated. I look forward to others addressing those concerns.

Philip Dunne: I endorse my hon. Friend's tentative concerns and shall start where he finished-on the extent to which international bodies look to the NAO as a beacon of light in the scrutiny of public expenditure. I have personal experience of the issue from my time on the Public Accounts Committee and, latterly, as a governor of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. We have entered the Westminster Consortium, a relationship with several other parties that are involved in parliamentary strengthening, and one of them is the NAO. Earlier today, we had an away-day to talk about how we can do more, working together, to spread best practice from this Parliament to other Parliaments throughout the world. It is very valuable work, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and Governments throughout the world recognise it as such. Although we may think that we are dealing with legislation in isolation, we should not forget that others will look at and, perhaps, imitate the structures that we are putting in place to provide for the NAO's corporate governance over, I hope, the next decades. In that context, it is right that we raise concerns about the proposal.
	I do not have concerns in principle, because they were well addressed earlier in the debate by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. However, we must recognise that, essentially, we are introducing a corporate governance structure to an entity that is not a corporate: it is an entity with a chief executive, in the form of the Comptroller and Auditor General, who quite rightly has enshrined in statute a degree of independence and autonomy in terms of his work on audit and value for money, as my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Swansea, West (Mr. Williams), the Chairman of the Public Accounts Commission clearly explained.

Alan Williams: May I clarify that it was in that very area of work, throughout the world and so on, that some of the trouble arose? It is non-statutory work. In that respect, it is true that the board can circumscribe the activities, because that is part of its role and duty; however, it must not and cannot interfere with the statutory duties.

Philip Dunne: I completely understand that point and am grateful for that clarification. Indeed, as the Father of the House has just made clear, the purpose of the proposals was to deal with deficiencies in the oversight and scrutiny of two simple things-the expenses and the duration of appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor General. To deal with those two relatively minor aspects, however, we have this substantial piece of legislation, and a new panoply of corporate governance that will be injected into the NAO.
	All I seek to do is point out to the Minister that we are establishing a panoply of corporate governance that could lead to confusion in the NAO, when all that is required is the scrutiny of those two aspects: the longevity of appointment, about which there is no disagreement at all; and, the board's oversight of expenses and NAO organisation, which may be rather more demanding than was intended of the organisation's time.

David Howarth: The hon. Gentleman must have covered the point by now, but will he clarify that he did not mean that there was any doubt, from the legislation's drafting, that the Comptroller and Auditor General's functions of audit, examination and inspection, which are central to his job, would be in any way compromised? They are specifically preserved by the drafting of schedule 7.

Philip Dunne: Indeed. If I have given the impression that I am concerned about that, I would like to correct it. The hon. Gentleman has made that clear, and I agree with him.

Alan Williams: The hon. Gentleman is right in what he said about expenses. We virtually dealt with that by having the CAG look at the expenses proposals and come to see me about them. However, the problem of governance was not just about expenses-it was about the staff of the organisation, who, as the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee indicated, were dependent on the good will of the CAG for their advancement, salary increases and so on. There was a much wider and more dangerous governance problem that could damage the organisation.

Philip Dunne: I am grateful for that clarification. I understand the need to put in place structures to help the internal career progression for senior people in the organisation, if that is what the right hon. Gentleman is seeking to achieve.
	I am not as concerned about what the role of the CAG will be in this new construct as about what the role of the chairman of the board will be. Of course, there is already a chairman in place; he was appointed before the Bill was drafted, so although he may have had some idea of what would be in the legislation, he took on the position without knowing for certain what was involved. My concern-this comes back to the definition in schedule 6 rather than clause 38-is about how the chairman is going to find a worthwhile function for himself in chairing a board where he has very little power other than to check the expenses of the chief executive.

Edward Leigh: Perhaps I can explain how the National Audit Office will work as a corporate entity. As such, it will be constituted as a board comprising five non-executive members, including its chair, and four executive members, including the Comptroller and Auditor General, who will also be its chief executive. The board's role, in essence, will be to develop a strategy for the office as a whole, not a strategy for audit judgments or to tell the CAG what to investigate: that is absolutely clear. The board's role will be to secure funding for the Public Accounts Commission, to monitor the delivery of the overall strategy and to report publicly on what is being achieved.
	As I have already said-but it is worth putting it on the record because Professor Heald has made these comments-the CAG's statutory audit responsibilities are completely ring-fenced; they are not transferred to the board. The board has nothing to say about or to do with his statutory audit functions. The Bill will merely ensure that in future these activities are carried out within the governance of the NAO as a whole, as a modern and robust organisation. The relationship with the CAG and the board will be regulated by code, which, under the terms of the Bill, will be approved by the Public Accounts Commission.
	I believe that the CAG-this is what he has told me-will benefit from the engagement of non-executives. Indeed, in so far as has been possible, the CAG has started to operate the new arrangements on a voluntary basis. The non-executives have already been appointed, and I understand from the CAG that they have already made a helpful contribution to the development of the strategy. In relation to the establishment of the NAO as a corporate entity, I am satisfied that sufficient safeguards are in place to reconcile sound governance with audit independence.
	I want to put on the record an important point made by Professor Heald. Let us think of the fantastical notion that the Government might put some sort of pressure on the chairman of the board to circumscribe the independence of the CAG. That is extremely unlikely. However, even if the Government attempted it, and even if the chairman listened to their advice, which is also extremely unlikely-why should he?-the CAG could ignore it. I do not know where Professor Heald is coming from.
	Even if there were a problem, the CAG would have the right of access straight to the commission. We are not circumventing the commission's powers. It, not the Government, sets the budget of the NAO. Say the CAG were to make critical remarks about the Government. Would the Government have any say over the budget of the NAO? No. Uniquely for a Government body, its budget is set by an independent Committee of this House, the Public Accounts Commission, which by the way is not the client of the NAO. The client of the NAO is the Public Accounts Committee, and that is why the commission sets the budget.
	I am afraid that I have to put it on record-it is very important-that Professor Heald is wrong. We are not in any way circumscribing the independence of the CAG, and I am glad that we have had this debate so that we can put that on the record.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: It is indeed important that we have had this debate and put that on record. Of course, the Public Accounts Commission took evidence from Professor Heald and disagreed with him. The CAG will continue to have complete independence. The recruitment of the chair is intended to enable the appointment of a strong adviser to support and challenge the CAG, but it will not be the job of the chair to hold the CAG to account. That, of course, is the job of the commission. The clause ensures that the CAG will continue to be independent of outside influence and interference, as is currently enshrined in the National Audit Act 1983, the relevant provisions of which the clause reproduces.
	As the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), mentioned, schedule 7 provides that the NAO and the CAG should jointly prepare a strategy for the approval of the commission. That strategy is to set out the national audit functions, a plan for the use of resources and a maximum amount of resources to be provided by the NAO in a particular financial year. It is for the CAG to decide what resources are needed for his core statutory functions, and the NAO has to provide him with those resources. The hon. Gentleman also mentioned the fact that the relationship between the NAO and the CAG will be set out in a code of practice, which must be approved by the commission.
	We have had a useful debate, and we have all managed to get on record the importance of the complete discretion and independence of the CAG.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause 38  accordingly  ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 39
	 — 
	Provision of services

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

David Howarth: I want to ask about the necessity of this clause. The Father of the House might correct me, but I do not remember its being referred to in the Public Accounts Commission's report.
	Whenever one sees a clause that creates powers to do something that has been done for a very long time, it sets alarm bells ringing. May I ask the Minister whether there is any doubt that the CAG has the power to enter into the type of agreement referred to in the clause, or any doubt about whether anything done in the past is valid?

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I am happy to respond to the hon. Gentleman. The clause does not set out a new power. In the past the CAG has relied on his legal powers as a natural person and corporation sole to enter into agreements and provide non-statutory services. The clause puts that on a statutory footing, and we do not consider that that will add to or restrict the current powers of the CAG, although some of the services provided under that power will now require the prior approval of the NAO. That is under a later provision of the Bill.

David Howarth: In a way that is a rather disturbing answer, because clause 38 already states:
	"The Comptroller and Auditor General continues by that name to be a corporation sole."
	I am still concerned about what the precise necessity is for the clause. It might be a belt-and-braces approach, but I still cannot see why it is necessary.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I think "belt and braces" is probably an appropriate description! The CAG carries out a huge range of important work in addition to statutory responsibilities: auditing international institutions; consultancy on public audit; and providing support to other Select Committees. The clause is just a general statutory power to carry out such work under the new arrangements.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 40
	 — 
	Remuneration package of the Comptroller and Auditor General

David Gauke: I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 40, page 20, line 20, at end insert-
	'(10) All remuneration, allowances and expenses in relation to P must be published monthly online.'.
	In relation to the clause and the amendment, P refers to the Comptroller and Auditor General. As we have heard, the reform of the governance of the CAG has largely been driven, or provoked, by the difficulties regarding Sir John Bourn's expenses. As the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee said, there was a sticky patch. The amendment would address that in perhaps the simplest way possible-by introducing much greater transparency.
	There is obviously a sensitivity with regard to the CAG's remuneration and other expenses, given that his role is to identify waste in public spending. Therefore, it seems right that he should be assessed with great scrutiny. He should lead the way in moves towards scrutiny of public spending, which should include spending relating to him.
	If we have time-time is short again today-I hope we can have a longer debate on the wider issue of the transparency of public spending when we discuss part 8 of the Bill, but to ensure that the CAG is above suspicion, such information should be in the public domain.

Alan Williams: The CAG already submits his expenses to me as Chairman of the commission and publishes them on a six-monthly basis which, we are assured, goes further than for any other public servant. He is therefore already ahead of the game elsewhere in Whitehall.

David Gauke: The Father of the House makes a good point-the CAG is further ahead. On the whole, we believe there should be greater transparency in public spending, and the CAG could be yet further ahead. I accept that he submits expenses to the Father of the House in his role as Chairman of the Public Accounts Commission, but by putting them in the public domain we would prevent any repetition of what happened with Sir John Bourn, even though such information goes into the public domain every six months.
	Our proposal is a matter of going further. As a rule, we think information on how public money is spent should be in the public domain and published online. The CAG in particular needs to be above suspicion.
	To avoid-I hope-the need for a separate stand part debate, clause 40 states:
	"P's package is to be determined jointly by the Prime Minister and the"
	Chairman
	"of the Committee of Public Accounts before the start of the appointment."
	There is a great deal of flexibility within the clause, which is welcome and sensible, because there are dangers in being too prescriptive, depending on the nature of the CAG candidate. However, we are lucky enough to have the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee in the Chamber, and perhaps he is in a position to say something further on the thinking behind the package. For example, there has been talk about linking it to the salary of the Treasury permanent secretary or the Lord Chief Justice. Historically, there was a link with High Court judges. We have to recognise that we want to get the right person, and pay in the private sector for audit work has increased substantially over the past 20 or 30 years or so. If the CAG is not paid enough, it will have a knock-on effect on everyone else working in the NAO. It is important to get the figure right so that we get the right people.
	It is also right that no performance-related pay is included. It was recommended by the Tiner review, but it could lead to some sort of influence being put on the CAG. The proposals do everything they can to preserve the independence of the CAG and that is welcome. Subject to those queries, we have no objection to the clause, other than to say that it would be strengthened by amendment 57 to put on a statutory basis the publication online of details of the remuneration, allowances and other expenses of the CAG.

Edward Leigh: I am fairly relaxed about amendment 57. The CAG publishes details already of all his expenses and allowances. The commission had a discussion about the pay. It is true that traditionally the CAG has received the same salary as a High Court judge. We did not think that that was appropriate any more, because that is fixed and, in order to get a very high-calibre candidate, it might be necessary to pay more than that. When we put in the advertisement, we said that the package would be broadly in the permanent secretary range. That is an attractive salary, and it is useful to do it that way, because permanent secretaries are paid between £140,000 and £230,000 a year.
	There was some discussion about whether we should link the pay to that of the Lord Chief Justice. Personally, I liked that idea, because I am convinced-having done my job for eight years-of the very great importance of the CAG. It would have sent a message if we had made that link, but I suspect that the Treasury was not entirely happy with that. So we reached a compromise. It is not necessary for me to say in Committee what the CAG actually earns-it is published, it is a good salary and we got a high-calibre candidate.
	Finally, it is important that the CAG, like permanent secretaries, should not be subject to appraisal by anybody and he should not receive any bonuses. The best approach is the one that we have taken-with the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee working with the Prime Minister to set a good salary at the level of a permanent secretary. Let us stick to that. It can go up every year by inflation, but no bonuses should be paid and no appraisal made. That is part of the CAG's independence.

Philip Dunne: I support amendment 57. It is obviously ironic that Members should be talking about the pay and rations of others today, but in this case it is appropriate for the individual who will be the primary custodian of probity in public finance to be prepared to show the way in terms of transparency about pay and rations. We are all acutely aware of the increased transparency that will apply to public figures paid from the public purse, who will have to make that information available. For the CAG to lead the way will set a good example to others in the public sector and will make his job easier. For all those reasons, this is an appropriate amendment.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: Of course, we share everybody's wishes for greater transparency, and, as has been said by many Members, the CAG has been leading the way on that. At an administrative level, the NAO already provides for advance approval of the CAG's expenses by a non-executive member of its audit committee, with recourse to the Public Accounts Commission if necessary. Expenses are discussed with the chairman of the NAO audit committee in advance, and the CAG expenses follow, as far as possible, permanent secretary rules. In addition, since 2007, the expenses and hospitality records of all NAO senior managers, including the CAG, have been published on its websites for each six-month period. We welcome that commitment to transparency.
	The CAG's remuneration package is set before he takes office and then has effect for the full term of office, subject only to uprating, which is permitted, but only in line with a predetermined formula. As was mentioned, the current range for a civil service permanent secretary is fairly wide-a minimum of £140,000 to a maximum of £273,000. In the interests of transparency, I have no objection to saying that Mr. Morse is being paid £210,000 per annum, which is mid-range. The CAG's remuneration is reported in the NAO annual report and accounts. Given that it will change only once a year, in line with the annual uprating formula, I see no great advantage in requiring the NAO to report each month on the salary.
	The other information that hon. Members wish to be published is available already on the NAO website, albeit only six-monthly, not monthly. I think that six months is fine, given that there has to be advance approval for it, so I do not think that the amendment is necessary. I ask the hon. Gentleman to consider withdrawing it.

David Gauke: I am grateful to the Minister for providing the information about the current CAG. Given that he was previously a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers, I suspect that he has taken a substantial pay cut to perform this role. Nothing I say is meant to suggest that Mr. Morse has acted improperly. However, given that we are legislating on the set-up for the CAG, it would be helpful to specify on a statutory basis what the CAG should do. That point should apply more widely within the public sector. Rightly, it now applies to Members of the House. It would improve the structure and lead the way, and it would not cause any harm or unwarranted embarrassment to the CAG. I seek, therefore, to press the amendment to a vote.
	 Question put, That the amendment be made.
	 The Committee proceeded to a Division.

Sylvia Heal: I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.

The Committee divided: Ayes 201, Noes 274.

Question accordingly negatived.
	 Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42
	 — 
	Employment etc of a former Comptroller and Auditor General

David Howarth: I beg to move amendment 29, page 20, line 33, leave out 'specified person' and insert 'Advisory Committee on Public Appointments'.

The First Deputy Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 30, page 20, line 35, leave out subsection (3).
	Amendment 31, page 20, line 36, leave out subsection (4).

David Howarth: The amendments relate to discrepancies between the contents of the Bill and the Public Accounts Commission report. I want to give the Government an opportunity to explain the difference between the two.
	Amendments 29 and 30 are simply about who is to be consulted before the Comptroller and Auditor General is allowed to undertake any further employment after the end of his period in office. The commission said that the Advisory Committee on Public Appointments had to be consulted, whereas the Bill says that some "specified person" who will be
	"specified from time to time by the Commission"
	must be consulted. The Bill is therefore less specific than the recommendation from the commission.
	Clearly, the provision is important, and public confidence in the office of Comptroller and Auditor General must be maintained. It is possible for conflicts of interest apparently to arise in almost any sort of future employment-not just in organisations previously subject to the audit powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General, to which the rest of the clause applies, but those in the private sector. My first question is "Why has that change been made?"
	My second question relates to an even bigger difference between the commission's recommendation and what is proposed in the Bill. It concerns circumstances in which the Comptroller and Auditor General, after leaving office, proposes to take up employment with a body that has previously been within his or her jurisdiction for the purposes of audit. The Bill imposes an absolute ban on such appointments for a limited period of two years.
	The commission, taking a much stricter view, suggested a lifelong ban, stating:
	"It is obviously essential that subsequent employment could not be seen as a reward for actions taken while C&AG, and for that reason there should be a lifetime prohibition on a C&AG or former C&AG accepting any post in any body which the NAO has audited or which is in the gift of the Government."
	Given the very proper concerns that have been expressed throughout the debate about the independence of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the commission's clear recommendation of a lifetime ban, I simply ask the Government why they have opted for such a short period.

Alan Williams: The proposal relating to the advisory committee is certainly what we originally recommended. I think it was then suggested that there might be a more appropriate body at the time, and that the arrangement should therefore be left open. It was not a case of precluding what had been proposed originally; it was merely a case of leaving things open so that a decision could be made at the time.
	We considered the lifetime ban, along with various other options. The Treasury's advice was that a lifetime ban would be an infringement of human rights and was disproportionate, but also that it would deter younger applicants looking 10 years ahead who might feel that their options would be severely limited when they retired.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: As we have established this afternoon, the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General was set up to hold Government to account. We have legislation that enshrines in law a requirement to ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor General is, and is seen to be, independent of any and all outside influence, particularly that of the Executive. The arrangements for appointment, remuneration and removal from office in the national audit provisions of the Bill are intended to ensure that external considerations cannot influence the judgments that the Comptroller and Auditor General needs to make in scrutinising the Government's use of public resources on behalf of the House of Commons.
	That sets clause 42 in context. Let me now turn to the amendments, beginning with amendment 31. Clause 37, to which the Committee agreed earlier, limits the Comptroller and Auditor General's term of office to a maximum 10-year single term. It is likely, therefore, that a Comptroller and Auditor General could have a lengthy working life once he had left office. Mindful of that, the Government have put in place measures to ensure that the hope of future employment could not influence a Comptroller and Auditor General's judgments while in office. That consideration was also important to the Public Accounts Commission, from whose proposals the provision derives.
	The CAG needs to focus all his efforts on carrying out his role without fear or favour right through to the end. Clause 42 therefore restricts a former CAG from working for the Crown or providing services to persons acting on behalf of the Crown for a period of two years after they cease to be CAG.

Andrew Tyrie: Will the definition of working for the Crown be the same as the definition that will be used for determining who is a civil servant under the civil service clauses of the Bill?

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: Off the top of my head, I cannot guarantee that, but I will endeavour to get a response to the hon. Gentleman before I finish speaking; alternatively, I will write to him.
	After two years, a former CAG must take advice from a person nominated by the Public Accounts Commission before taking up other employment of a kind specified by the commission. If amendment 31 is approved, the two-year ban will be removed. The effect of that will be to impose, through subsections (5) and (6), a lifetime restriction on public sector employment for a former CAG. The commission originally recommended that a former CAG should not be eligible at all to take up other employment in the public sector after their term of office. It later recommended a five-year ban. As was said by the Father of the House, the legal advice cautioned there was a real risk that a permanent ban on public sector employment would be found indirectly discriminatory on age grounds.
	The Government accept the importance of the CAG's independence, but we think that any restraints on future employment must be proportionate and within the law. A lifetime ban goes much further than what is required to protect the CAG's independence since it is hard to believe that a serving CAG could be influenced in any real sense while in office by a distant and, by its nature, highly uncertain prospect of remunerated work. Moreover, such a ban is likely to deter candidates, particularly younger ones, from applying for the post of CAG, which is not in anyone's interests.
	As I have said, there is a real risk that a permanent ban on public sector employment would be found indirectly discriminatory on age grounds. Moreover, if such an infringement were found, it is unlikely that it could be defended as being reasonably necessary and objectively justifiable. A lifetime ban is therefore neither necessary nor desirable.
	On amendments 29 and 30, the 15th report of the Public Accounts Commission recommended a lifetime ban on former CAGs accepting any post in any body that the National Audit Office has audited or which is in the gift of Government. It was in this context that the commission considered that some conflicts of interest could arise over posts in the private sector with, for example, defence contractors or other suppliers to the public sector. The commission therefore recommended that the CAG should consult what has been called the "Advisory Committee on Public Appointments". In fact, the correct title of the body is the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments.
	Subsection (2) allows the Public Accounts Commission to nominate a person to advise former CAGs on taking up future offices or appointments. The advantage of the current drafting is that it allows the Public Accounts Commission to decide which person to consult depending on the circumstances at the time. It is therefore capable of adapting to future changes, for example should the name or responsibilities of the adviser change. That advantage should be obvious to Members already since, in attempting to be more specific, the amendment names a body that does not exist. There would, of course, be nothing to stop the commission specifying that the advice should be taken from the chair of the advisory committee if it so wished.
	Turning briefly to Amendment 30, if subsection (3) were to be deleted, as proposed, not only would the Public Accounts Commission be unable to specify the adviser, but it would be unable to specify the description of offices, positions, agreements or arrangements. Therefore, a side effect of the amendment would be to create uncertainty about which positions are covered by subsection (2).
	With that explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) will consider withdrawing his amendment.

David Howarth: Yes, of course I will seek leave to withdraw amendment 29, and I thank the Government and the Father of the House for the explanation offered as to the change. It makes sense for this provision to be more flexible and to take into account the chance that the appropriate body to consult might change.
	I shall not be pressing amendment 31 to a Division either, but the explanation that the Minister offered is slightly puzzling, in that the chances of this indirect discrimination happening and affecting anybody are remote. As I understand it, the argument put forward was that as a younger person would face a longer ban, in terms of years, than an older person, disproportionately more younger people, as opposed to older people, would be put off and that would therefore qualify as indirect discrimination on age grounds against the young. I suppose that is theoretically possible in some remote circumstance, but it does not strike me as the most obvious discrimination case that anyone would bring, especially when one considers the consequence of bringing such a case for one's career.
	The reason for the two-year ban has not been entirely explained. The Minister mentioned the possibility of a five-year ban-I am not entirely clear about in what circumstances the commission suggested a five-year ban-but she did not offer any particular reasoning as to why the ban should be for two years, rather than for five. Given that the whole point of this clause is to maintain public confidence in the neutrality and independence of the CAG, if anything we should err on the side of caution.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: We obviously obtained the views of the commission and considered them carefully. We think that the two-year period achieves a sensible balance between the need to ensure the independence of the CAG and the desire to allow a former CAG to continue their career in the private or public sector, if they so wish. The two-year period is based on that for Ministers who wish to take up outside appointments.

David Howarth: That explains things, and I thank the Minister. Obviously the issue here is whether someone could be made such a big offer of such a big job and such a large salary that they might be tempted by it, even with a two-year delay. I recognise that that is somewhat unlikely, even in the public sector of today. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
	 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	 Clause 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Schedule 6 agreed to.
	 Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Schedule 7 agreed to.

Clause 45
	 — 
	NAO's expenditure

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I beg to move amendment 41, page 21, line 25, leave out 'must' and insert
	'and the Comptroller and Auditor General must jointly'.
	Clause 45 sets out the arrangements for the NAO's expenditure and the approval of its estimates. Government amendment 41 is a minor amendment, which provides for the CAG to prepare the NAO estimates jointly with the NAO. The Bill already provides that the estimate, once prepared, will be presented to the Public Accounts Commission jointly by the CAG and the chair of the NAO.
	 Amendment 41 agreed to.
	 Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Clauses 46 to 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Schedule 8 agreed to.

Schedule 9
	 — 
	Consequential amendments relating to Part 7

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I beg to move amendment 42, page 71, line 20, at end insert-
	 'Government of Wales Act 2006 (c. 32)22A In paragraphs 5 and 8 of Schedule 5 after "Comptroller and Auditor General" insert "or the National Audit Office".'.
	This is a minor and consequential measure. If part 7 is enacted, certain functions carried out by the Comptroller and Auditor General will in future be carried out by the new National Audit Office. The amendment will prevent the provision of an Assembly measure from modifying the functions of the National Audit Office without the consent of the Secretary of State. A similar provision already applies in relation to the functions of the Comptroller and Auditor General.
	 Amendment 42 agreed to.
	 Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
	 Clause 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 24
	 — 
	Powers of National Assembly for Wales: Auditor General for Wales

'(1) Schedule 5 to the Government of Wales Act 2006 (c. 32) is amended as follows.
	(2) In Part 1, under Field 14, insert-
	 "Matter 14.1
	(1) The following aspects of the Auditor General's terms of appointment-
	(a) the period of the appointment;
	(b) salary, allowances and superannuation benefits;
	(c) pensions and gratuities payable after a person has ceased to hold the office.
	(2) The number of times a person may be appointed to the office of Auditor General.
	(3) Restrictions on the other offices and positions which may be held by the person who is the Auditor General; activities of a person who has held the office of Auditor General (but no longer does).
	(4) Provision requiring the Auditor General-
	(a) to aim to do things efficiently and cost-effectively;
	(b) to have regard, as the Auditor General thinks appropriate, to the standards and principles that an expert professional provider of accounting or auditing services would be expected to apply.
	(5) The authorisation of persons to exercise functions of the Auditor General on the Auditor General's behalf (including during a vacancy in the office).
	(6) The oversight or supervision of the Auditor General or of the exercise of the Auditor General's functions.
	(7) The provision or use of resources for the purposes of the Auditor General's functions including (in particular)-
	(a) the employment and use of staff;
	(b) the procurement and use of services;
	(c) the holding of documents or information;
	(d) the keeping of records.
	(8) The charging of fees or other amounts in relation to functions of-
	(a) the Auditor General, or
	(b) auditors appointed by the Auditor General under enactments.
	(9) The restatement of any law relating to the Auditor General."
	(3) In Part 2, after paragraph 6, insert-
	"6A (1) This paragraph applies to a provision of an Assembly Measure which-
	(a) is a Matter 14.1 provision;
	(b) provides for the enforcement of a Matter 14.1 provision or is otherwise appropriate for making a Matter 14.1 provision effective;
	(c) is otherwise incidental to, or consequential on, a Matter 14.1 provision.
	"Matter 14.1 provision" means a provision which relates to Matter 14.1 (and section 94(7) applies for the purposes of this definition as it applies for the purposes of section 94).
	(2) The following provisions do not apply in relation to a provision to which this paragraph applies-
	(a) paragraph 3 so far as it applies in relation to sections 145, 145A and 146A(1) of the Government of Wales Act 1998;
	(b) paragraph 6(1).
	(3) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), a provision to which this paragraph applies cannot-
	(a) modify or confer power by subordinate legislation to modify paragraph 3 of Schedule 8, or
	(b) give or confer power by subordinate legislation to give any role to a committee of the Assembly.
	(4) Sub-paragraph (3) does not limit any role which may be given to a committee of the Assembly which meets the requirements in sub-paragraph (5) (whether established by virtue of a provision to which this paragraph applies or otherwise).
	(5) The requirements are-
	(a) none of the following may be a member of the committee-
	(i) the First Minister or any person designated to exercise functions of the First Minister;
	(ii) a Welsh Minister appointed under section 48;
	(iii) the Counsel General or any person designated to exercise the functions of the Counsel General;
	(iv) a Deputy Welsh Minister;
	(b) the committee must not be chaired by an Assembly member who is a member of a political group with an executive role.".'- (Mr. David.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Wayne David: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The First Deputy Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment 43.

Wayne David: New clause 24 will confer legislative competence on the National Assembly for Wales. Such provisions are commonly known as framework or measure-making powers. I want to apologise to the Committee that this framework power was not included in the Bill on its introduction, as the Government have committed to doing in respect of all framework powers. I regret that the technical nature of the provision meant that it did not prove possible to finalise it in time. The Government have, however, introduced the new clause at the first available opportunity and I am pleased that so many Members attended the briefing session on the provision that I held yesterday with the Welsh Minister, Andrew Davies.

David Gauke: The Minister says that the delay was due to a technical difficulty. Will he reassure the Committee that it was not due to Wales being forgotten? We know that the Government's relationship with the Principality is not what it was-Labour is no longer the most popular political party in Wales-and I fear that this is an example of Welsh neglect.

Wayne David: I assure the hon. Gentleman that that is not the case. Incidentally, the Labour party is back on top, as the recent opinion polls show.
	This measure is very technical, and we wanted to ensure the maximum amount of consultation. That has now taken place, and we are satisfied with what we are proposing.

David Gauke: I shall make a less partisan point. Does this measure have any budgetary implications and, if so, where are the resources coming from?

Wayne David: There are no budgetary implications for this Government. Any budgetary implications would be in the hands of the Welsh Assembly Government.
	The new clause adds a new Matter 14.1 to part 1 of schedule 5 to the Government of Wales Act 2006 in the field of public administration. It also inserts new paragraph 6A into part 2 of schedule 5 to the 2006 Act to modify the general restrictions on the Assembly's competence.
	The competence conferred by Matter 14.1 would allow the National Assembly to pass legislation, known as an Assembly measure, to put in place new arrangements for the Auditor General for Wales and the Wales Audit Office. These arrangements are comparable to the ones set out in part 7 of the Bill for the Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office. However, the Assembly may decide on different arrangements within the scope of the competence conferred.
	In particular, the competence covers the Auditor General's terms of appointment relating to tenure and remuneration, the number of times that a person may be appointed Auditor General, the efficiency and effectiveness of the Auditor General, the other positions that a serving or former Auditor General may hold, the authorisation of other people to perform the Auditor General's functions on his or her behalf, oversight and supervision of the Auditor General, and the provision of resources for the Auditor General and the charging of fees or other amounts.
	It is right that the National Assembly should have the power to decide what arrangements are appropriate in relation to the public auditor for the devolved bodies operating in Wales. The structure of public audit is different in Wales compared with England, and the new clause gives the Assembly power to put in place arrangements for the more effective oversight, supervision and accountability of the Auditor General for Wales. At the same time, it makes sure that the independence of the Auditor General's operational audit work is maintained.
	The Assembly will not be able to modify provisions in the Government of Wales Act 2006 that provide that the Auditor General is not subject to the direction or control of the Assembly or the Assembly Government. That strikes the right balance between allowing the Assembly flexibility to put in place arrangements that it considers appropriate for Wales, and preventing any erosion of the important principle of audit independence.
	New paragraph 6A in part 2 of schedule 5 provides for an exception to the prohibition on the ability of Assembly measures to modify certain provisions of the Government of Wales Acts 1998 and 2006. That will enable those Acts to be amended by Assembly measure, if the purpose of the amendment is about putting in place the new governance arrangements for the Auditor General.
	The competence would also enable the Assembly to transfer functions currently undertaken by its Audit Committee relating to consideration of the estimate of the audit reports of the Auditor General by another Committee of the Assembly. However, it could do so only if the Committee to which the functions are transferred is, like the Audit Committee, composed in a way that is independent of Welsh Ministers and the ruling Administration.
	The consequential Government amendment 43 amends the long title to include the proposed amendments to the Government of Wales Act 2006.
	I commend the new clause and the amendment to the House.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 New clause 24 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 19
	 — 
	Amendment of Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866

'(1) The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 13(1) after "applies", insert ", subject to section 15A,".
	(3) In section 14 at the beginning insert "Subject to section 15A".
	(4) In section 15(1) after "applies", insert ", subject to section 15A,".
	(5) After section 15 insert-
	"15A Authorisation by relevant committee of the House of Commons
	Notwithstanding any Act of Parliament or Resolution of the House of Commons, the Auditor and Comptroller-General shall not grant any credit to the Treasury under this Act unless he is satisfied that a relevant committee of the House of Commons has examined and approved the expenditure concerned for the relevant year,"'.- (David Howarth.)
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

David Howarth: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
	It is something of a shame that a new clause that looks modest but would have the effect of changing our system of Government entirely comes before the Committee with only seven minutes to go before the knife. I therefore do not expect that it will get a proper airing or any proper debate tonight.
	The new clause deals with the control of expenditure by the House before that expenditure is made, as opposed to the auditing of expenditure once the money has been spent, which we tend to be rather better at. It is emblematic that most of this afternoon's debates on this part of the Bill have been about the Comptroller and Auditor General in his role as an auditor, rather than in his very important role as Comptroller.
	The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, which is one of the great Gladstonian reforms of the 19th century, puts on the Comptroller the job of making sure that Government expenditure drawn from the Consolidated Fund is authorised by statute or by a resolution of the House. It is fundamental to the system of supply whereby the House, in theory, controls Government expenditure that the Comptroller has that job.
	This should matter because policy debates are intimately connected with expenditure. A great American political scientist, Aaron Wildavsky, once said that policy is expenditure and expenditure is policy. That is because a policy that does not have any resources attached to it is generally just hot air, and any spending decision is, in reality, a decision about what to spend money on, as opposed to not spending money on something else, and therefore is a policy decision.
	Over the past couple of centuries we have seen a great decline in the practical control of the House over that sort of expenditure decision. There is no time tonight to go through the detailed history of the decline of the supply procedure of the House. By 1896 most of the remaining power of the House was removed by the Conservative party when Mr. Balfour, who was Leader of the House, decided to change the procedure so that all the Government's supply requirements would be decided on one day in August, just in time for the grouse shooting season to start.
	The main purpose of the clause is to suggest to the House-I am sure that the Government will not be interested-that it is now time to try in some way to wrest back our control over Government expenditure before it happens. An important consequence of the House's giving up of its power over supply and expenditure is that it spends all its time talking about legislation instead. This problem is part of the wider problem of there being far too much legislation. What has filled the time that in previous centuries was taken up with discussing Government expenditure before it happened is legislation-new laws. That is what we talk about instead.
	I admit that the new clause would not make a vast difference in itself. We need to get hold not just of the annual process of Government expenditure, but of the comprehensive spending review-the multi-year framework which is generally a process from which we are entirely excluded. Select Committees find themselves excluded from that as well.
	In local government, the systems for controlling expenditure in advance are far better. Even the smallest parish council gives the elected representatives better information and more power over spending decisions than happens in the House. In the end that lack of control leads to worse policy. There is not time to go into the details of what would be different if control were different. I simply leave hon. Members with the thought that the House is withering in its power and in public esteem, and that it will continue to wither until it takes back a role in the setting of policy. That is what the control of expenditure in advance is all about.

Sarah McCarthy-Fry: I thank the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) for his contribution, which reflects his passionate views that the House should have better scrutiny of Government spending for future years. I know that that was one of the themes of his speech on Second Reading, in which he said that serious reform was required of the way in which Parliament relates to Government on money issues.
	The hon. Gentleman will know that the Government published a memorandum in March containing formal proposals to Parliament for better alignment between budgets, estimates and accounts. The memorandum explained the plans to simplify the Government's financial reporting to Parliament, ensuring that they report in a more consistent, transparent and straightforward fashion on spending plans, estimates and expenditure outcomes.
	The hon. Gentleman will know that an important plank in moving towards alignment is covered by part 8, on the transparency of Government financial reporting and, in particular, the inclusion in departmental estimates of resources used by designated bodies.
	On 3 July, the Liaison Committee responded to the memorandum on behalf of the other Select Committees, and in its response it covered some of the same ground as the hon. Gentleman has. In particular-
	 Debate interrupted (Programme Order, 3 November).
	 The Chairman put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83D), That the new clause be added to the Bill.
	 Question put and negatived.
	 The Chairman then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
	 Clause 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
	 The Chairman left the Chair to report progress and ask leave to sit again (Programme Order, 3 November).
	 The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
	 Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.

Business without Debate

DELEGATED LEGISLATION

Madam Deputy Speaker: With the leave of the House, we shall take motions 3 to 7 together.
	 Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),

Saving Gateway Accounts

That the draft Saving Gateway Accounts Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 21 July, be approved.

Income Tax

That the draft Saving Gateway Accounts (No. 2) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 7 July, be approved.

Constitutional Law

That the draft Welsh Ministers (Transfer of Functions) (No. 2) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 20 July, be approved.
	That the draft Government of Wales Act 2006 (Consequential Modifications, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 20 July, be approved.

Provision of Services

That the draft Provision of Services Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 12 October, be approved.- (Mary Creagh.)
	 Question agreed to.

REGIONAL SELECT COMMITTEE (LONDON)

Motion made and Question put ,
	That Ms Karen Buck, Jeremy Corbyn, Clive Efford, Siobhain McDonagh and Mr Andy Slaughter be members of the London Regional Select Committee.- (Mary Creagh . )

Hon. Members: Object.

REGIONAL SELECT COMMITTEE (WEST MIDLANDS)

Resumption of adjourned debate on Question (2 November),
	That Mr David Kidney be discharged from the West Midlands Regional Select Committee and Mrs Janet Dean be added. -(Mary Creagh .)

Hon. Members: Object.
	 Debate to be resumed tomorrow.

REGIONAL SELECT COMMITTEE (SOUTH WEST)

Resumption of adjourned debate on Question (29 October),
	That Linda Gilroy be discharged from the South West Regional Select Committee and Roger Berry be added.- (Mary Creagh.)

Hon. Members: Object.
	 Debate to be resumed tomorrow.

PETITIONS

Waste Plant (North East Derbyshire)

Natascha Engel: I should like to present a petition on behalf of my constituents in Dronfield. The petition is supported by more than 700 individual letters.
	The petitioners request:
	that the House of Commons urges the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government to do all in his power to oppose the building of this hazardous waste gasification and incineration plant and ensure that this proposed technology is not given permission to destroy a whole area of Chesterfield and North East Derbyshire.
	 Following is the full text of the petition:
	 [The Petition of residents of Dronfield, and others
	 Declares that a hazardous waste gasification/incineration plant is proposed to be built on the site of Sheepridge Business Park, only a few miles away from Dronfield; further declares that the technology proposed by the newly established company is untested and unproven; notes that there are no long term case studies on the health effects of these processes, while every day more and more evidence is coming to light of the harmful effects of airborne pollution from industry and traffic;
	 Believes that the site is too close to residents, with 19 schools and around 30,000 people living within just two miles of the proposed site; further notes that the site is in close proximity to many farms, livestock, fisheries and allotments, meaning there is a real danger of dioxins entering the local food chain; further notes that the site is bordered by greenbelt land and protected woodland, threatening the devastation of all the wildlife in the area and risking further contamination of the watercourses and food chain from the movement of wildlife in and around the site; further declares that the site is close to existing businesses that will move away, leading to hundreds of job losses and difficulties attracting any future investment;
	 Further notes that the waste, coming from a 30 mile radius, will need to travel past many schools, through small villages and country lanes to reach the proposed site; believes this is unsafe, unnecessary and unacceptable; further declares that residents have not been reassured by communications from Cyclamax, and do not trust the company to be running such a hazardous process; and considers that profit and money-making are being put before public health and safety.
	 The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government to do all in his power to oppose the building of this hazardous waste gasification and incineration plant and ensure that this proposed technology is not given permission to destroy a whole area of Chesterfield and North East Derbyshire.
	 And the Petitioners remain, etc. ]
	[P000406]

Equitable Life (Meriden)

Caroline Spelman: I wish to present a petition from residents of my constituency, who are members, former members or the personal representatives of deceased members of the Equitable Life Assurance Society. I have been handed 61 signatures in support of the petition, and, Madam Deputy Speaker, you are probably aware that more than 400 former members and members of Equitable Life attended a rally at Parliament today.
	The petitioners request:
	that the House of Commons urges the Government to uphold the constitutional standing of the Parliamentary Ombudsman by complying with the findings and recommendations of her Report upon Equitable Life and to act quickly so that policyholders receive the justice that they have so long been denied.
	I stand in support of this petition and present it to the House.
	 Following is the full text of the petition:
	 [ The Petition of residents of the constituency of Meriden in the West Midlands,
	 Declares that the petitioners either are or they represent or support members, former members or personal representatives of deceased members of the Equitable Life Assurance Society who have suffered maladministration leading to injustice, as found by the Parliamentary Ombudsman in her report upon Equitable Life, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 16 July 2008 and bearing reference number HC 815; and further declares that the petitioners or those whom they represent or support have suffered regulatory failure on the part of the public bodies responsible from the year 1992 onwards, but have not received compensation for the resulting losses.
	 The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to uphold the constitutional standing of the Parliamentary Ombudsman by complying with the findings and recommendations of her Report upon Equitable Life and to act quickly so that policyholders receive the justice that they have so long been denied .
	 And the Petitioners remain, etc. ]
	[P000408]

Scallop Dredging, Cardigan Bay

Mark Williams: I have a petition of 2,200 signatures on behalf of the Save Our Sea group based in the Ceredigion constituency.
	The petition declares:
	The Petition of people of Ceredigion,
	Declares that dredging of the sea bed has been banned and restricted in several areas of the marine environment due to the proven damage that can be caused by intensive and large-scale dredging; further declares that the increased use of dredges in Cardigan Bay has potentially caused severe damage to the marine environment and the habitats of the creatures living there.
	The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to take all possible steps to encourage the Welsh Assembly Government to limit the number of scallop dredging boats licensed to dredge for scallops in Cardigan Bay, based on scientific assessments to be carried out while an interim ban is in place.
	And the Petitioners remain, etc.
	[P000407]

PERNICIOUS ANAEMIA

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. -(Mr. McAvoy.)

Madeleine Moon: I thank Mr. Speaker for giving me the opportunity to hold this debate.
	I am grateful to the Pernicious Anaemia Society for its help in preparing the debate. This small but ambitious charity is based in my constituency and has members throughout the world who are working to bring attention to this common but often misunderstood condition.
	First, I should like to say a few words about pernicious anaemia, its causes and consequences. The condition is caused by a lack of vitamin B12. Vitamin B12 cannot be produced or stored in the body, and deficiency is caused by a failure to absorb vitamin B12 from the diet. Vitamin B12 is vital for the manufacture of new red blood cells. When it is in short supply, red blood cells are produced in smaller numbers, are abnormally large in size-megaloblastic-and do not last as long as they should; and anaemia develops. While the peak incidence of pernicious anaemia occurs within the 60-plus demographic, it can afflict anyone at any age.
	The condition has physiological and mental symptoms. Common physical symptoms include tiredness, fatigue or lethargy; a shortage of breath known as "the sighs"; a swollen tongue and feeling bloated; brittle, easily damaged nails; pins and needles; unaccountable sudden diarrhoea; and an increased sensitivity to sound, scent and taste. Common mental symptoms include "the fogs"-a lack of clarity and focus in everything the sufferer experiences-and irritability, impatience and, often, mood swings. In addition, when vitamin B12 is low, the cells of the nervous and digestive systems may be affected. Undiagnosed or untreated, the condition can lead to damage to the central and peripheral nervous systems with separate symptoms and consequences in itself such as numbness in the limbs, especially the legs; vertigo; balance problems; inability to concentrate; and confusion or forgetfulness.
	The most common reason why pernicious anaemia sufferers develop nerve damage is that its insidious nature, coupled with its vague symptoms, can often lead to a late diagnosis. Consequently, nerve damage has often occurred before pernicious anaemia has been diagnosed. The severity of the symptoms depends on how much damage has been done to the central nervous system. Balance problems can make everyday tasks such as showering, dressing and walking a challenge.
	It is possible that these symptoms are irreversible, so diagnosis of pernicious anaemia needs to be quick and accurate. However, there are problems with its timely and accurate diagnosis. The disease shares common symptoms with a number of other conditions, and the fact that there is no single definitive test can often mean that a diagnosis is delayed. Many sufferers are misdiagnosed with conditions such as depression, multiple sclerosis, myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome, or with being totally well but feeling unwell.
	For some sufferers, a simple blood test can diagnose anaemia and an examination of the red blood cells can determine whether they are larger than normal. If this is the case, a Schilling test, which measures the body's ability to absorb vitamin B12 from the bowel, can determine whether it is pernicious anaemia. However, the Schilling test is no longer widely available. For most people on a normal diet, especially the elderly, a Schilling test is not thought necessary. Instead, a blood test is done to measure levels of vitamin B12. If the levels are low, pernicious anaemia is presumed and treatment started. However, the testing regime is not sufficient for the diagnosis of all patients with pernicious anaemia.
	Typically, vitamin B12 deficiency is suspected when an individual presents with megaloblastic anaemia. However, that may occur only in the most severely vitamin B12-depleted individuals. As the Schilling test is no longer widely available, and the other main diagnostic signposts of low levels of serum B12 cannot be relied upon, sufferers can have high levels of serum B12 and still have pernicious anaemia.
	The intrinsic factor antibody test, which is used to determine whether the patient is able to absorb intrinsic factor B12 from food, is only about 30 per cent. accurate. A better method of determining whether a patient is B12-deficient is based on their active B12 level, because only active B12 plays a part in the complex biochemistry. If a patient's active B12 level is low, he or she will still have the symptoms of pernicious anaemia even though the total level of B12 will be above the lower threshold for determining deficiency. There is a newly developed test that takes that into account and is widely used in Australia and Germany. Many people there who were not previously considered to be B12-deficient now receive B12 injections, with considerable improvement to their quality of life.
	As well as difficulties in diagnosis, there are a number of other issues of concern to sufferers. Pernicious anaemia is treated in this country with injections of hydroxocobalamin, a form of vitamin B12. Patients receive three injections a week for the first two weeks, then one every three months for the rest of their life. More frequent regimes may be used in sufferers who have been diagnosed late and have neurological damage.
	The main concern for sufferers is that the UK practice limits patients to an injection every three months, which is not sufficient. In the 1960s the treatment was an intramuscular injection every month. That changed to one every two months in the 1970s and one every three months in the 1980s. The Pernicious Anaemia Society cannot find any evidence that those changes to the prescription were related to new clinical research.
	People with pernicious anaemia have widely different needs and respond differently to treatment. For some, an injection every three months is adequate, but for others, weekly or even daily injections may be required. In the UK, however, GPs on the whole stick to the three-monthly injections and feel that they are adequate. They generally refuse to allow more frequent injections. That means that sufferers often find themselves looking elsewhere for more regular sources of B12.
	In the UK, vitamin B12 in injectable form is available only on prescription, under the Medicines Act 1968. It is, however, available over the counter in most European countries and readily available using the internet. Many people with pernicious anaemia travel abroad to get top-up injections or order infusions over the internet. That situation is far from ideal, and I know that my hon. Friend the Minister will be horrified to learn about it. It is also extremely expensive and fraught with danger. I am sure that I am not alone in feeling uncomfortable with people ordering any medication over the internet.
	Many people with pernicious anaemia also seek help from the private sector, from which B12 infusions can be bought. The form of B12 used is methylcobalimin, an extremely pure form of the vitamin that can be injected straight into the bloodstream. The patient can self-inject using the same needles used by diabetics. Many sufferers claim that if they return to their doctor to request an additional dose of B12, they are offered antidepressants. However, B12 is a harmless vitamin with no side effects, and it is cheaper than antidepressants. The PAS argues that allowing sufferers to self-inject using insulin needles would free up valuable nursing time, saving money from the NHS budget, and provide patients with a treatment regime based on need. It calculates that £20 million a year could be saved in nursing time by allowing patients to self-inject.
	The PAS recently presented a petition to the Department of Health via the No. 10 e-petition system, highlighting the problems faced by people with the condition. In its response, the Department acknowledged:
	"Too often, people with long-term chronic conditions have been made to fit themselves into the way care is provided locally, regardless of whether that meets their individual needs."
	It went on to state:
	"Our changes to the NHS aim to deliver the right services where they are needed, working with all involved agencies to provide a seamless package of care."
	People with pernicious anaemia are being made to fit in with a treatment that is imposed from the top down. The national service framework for long-term conditions, launched in March 2005, focuses on improving services for people with long-term conditions across England. It states that comprehensive assessment and regular reviews of people's problems should be held and that self-referral would allow people to refer themselves quickly back to services as their care needs change. However, that has not materialised for people with pernicious anaemia.
	There are a number of ways that the Department of Health could improve the care provided to sufferers of pernicious anaemia, and a review of the disease's symptoms, diagnoses and treatment is needed. The current treatment regime would benefit from a review relating to its efficacy and cost-effectiveness. Modern, self-administered treatment regimes that are available should be evaluated to save medical staff time and to provide a more efficient treatment regime based on patients' needs.
	The misdiagnosis of pernicious anaemia could be reduced by launching an education campaign for general practitioners. It should also be made clear that the current three-monthly injection cycle may not address the needs of every patient and that it should be more flexible. Any review could include a study investigating the feasibility of a return to the monthly dose, which was successfully administered with no side effect to a generation of sufferers in the 1960s.
	The review should consider the type of B12 that could be used. Methylcobalamin, which is used in the private sector, is a purer form of B12 that absorbs in the body with better results. The PAS would like sufferers who have a more severe form of pernicious anaemia to have the option of self-injecting daily doses of B12 methylcobalamin. Monitoring such a regime would reveal whether it could be a modern way forward, in which patients can opt for a treatment style that is similar to diabetic provision. It would be helpful if the Department could support the creation of a charity helpline for sufferers, compile the statistics of current misdiagnosis and create a referral service so that sufferers can find the correct medical attention quickly.
	The disease affects people in all right hon. and hon. Members' constituencies. An early-day motion highlighting many of the issues raised, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Dr. Naysmith), has received 73 signatures. I hope the Department considers acting on many of the issues that I have raised this evening. I also hope that it will agree to a future meeting of officials and members of the PAS, so that their concerns can be adequately addressed.

Ann Keen: May I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs. Moon) on securing this debate, which is of course on an important subject? Her constituency has the honour of having the PAS in it, and I am aware of her work with society. She has taken a very close interest in pernicious anaemia and has previously tabled questions on behalf of patients who have that distressing condition.
	As my hon. Friend has so eloquently described the condition, I will not go into the details again, but there are some rarer causes of vitamin B12 deficiency. The root cause of pernicious anaemia, however, is the deficiency of B12 due to the lack of what is known as the "intrinsic factor" needed for its absorption.
	The inability to absorb vitamin B12 orally means that treatment in an injectable form is required, and because the lack of the intrinsic factor cannot be reversed, treatment must be continued for life. That is to avoid the problems associated with uncorrected anaemia as well as the possibility of damage to the central nervous system that can result from prolonged vitamin B12 deficiency.
	My hon. Friend mentioned the role of GPs. In common with a wide range of chronic conditions, the diagnosis and treatment of pernicious anaemia is generally best carried out at primary care level. It is for general practitioners to diagnose the condition, arrange for blood tests and prescribe the treatment that they consider most appropriate. General practice and primary care have increasingly showed themselves to be the preferred settings for discussing and deciding on such treatments, and patients' preference has been supported by increased investment by this Government in a wide range of programmes to expand services locally.
	I recall my days as a district nurse when I provided this facility locally to one of my patients who was a pig farmer. He was reluctant to come to the surgery, so the district nurse went to the pig farm. In fact, the patient was very reluctant to leave the pigs, so-in true district nurse style-my wellingtons came out of the boot of my car and I performed the service where the patient thought it most appropriate. I then went into the farmhouse to wash my hands and was given a cauliflower for my trouble. I remember those days with great warmth, but the advancement in primary care has made it much more possible for patients with chronic conditions to be treated at home or very close to home.
	It has been suggested that GPs are insufficiently aware of the prevalence of pernicious anaemia that they may fail to diagnose the condition and that the Department of Health should take steps to increase awareness. However, assessments of medical professionals and their awareness of conditions such as pernicious anaemia are not matters for the Department of Health. It would be for the relevant specialist professional bodies, such as the Royal College of Pathologists, to provide guidance and professional development on matters relating to haematology. The Department of Health has not issued any recent guidance to general practitioners on the diagnosis or treatment of pernicious anaemia. Nor has the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, to whom the task has now been given.
	I am aware that some patients take the view that injections should be offered more frequently, or that other treatments should be offered, and that patients may become understandably very distressed if they believe that their individual needs are not being taken fully into account. Some of the examples that my hon. Friend gave are very worrying. However, I do think that in this and in other cases, we must rely on GPs using their training, professional judgement and the evidence available to them to decide what treatment they consider appropriate, taking into account the particular needs of the person concerned. I hope that the Pernicious Anaemia Society stresses to its members that they must go to their GP and have a proper clinical assessment.
	I know of the work of the Pernicious Anaemia Society in raising public awareness of pernicious anaemia and also of its proposals concerning diagnosis and treatment of the condition. I am aware that the PAS organised a parliamentary reception last week, and I apologise again to my hon. Friend for being unable to attend. The early-day motion in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, North-West (Dr. Naysmith) has attracted over 70 signatures. It raises five main points and it may be helpful if I respond to each of these in turn, before covering the other points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend.
	The early-day motion states that there are fundamental problems with the diagnosis and treatment of vitamin B12 deficiency and pernicious anaemia. When vitamin B12 deficiency has caused anaemia, its diagnosis is not generally difficult, and I am not aware of significant problems of under-recognition. What people sometimes say, however, is that they felt unwell for some time before developing anaemia, and they attribute that to the early stages of vitamin B12 deficiency. Although that may be true, the difficulties of very widespread testing of the many patients with non-specific malaise and tiredness that would be necessary to detect a few people with very early vitamin B12 deficiency make this unlikely ever to be an appropriate policy. When anaemia is present, my understanding is that most patients respond well to treatment through quarterly injections of vitamin B12 and are able to get on with their lives, despite the inconvenience. I am aware of the discomfort of regular treatment and the impact of the condition. I am told that the injection is very painful because of the nature of what is being injected.
	I am aware that some individuals with pernicious anaemia do not believe that sufficient heed is paid to their particular wishes regarding the nature and frequency of treatment. However, that is a matter for clinicians and patients to decide, taking into account personal circumstances, and professional knowledge and experience. Some patients might wish to play a greater role in their own care, and I would encourage that. The personal experiences of individual patients need to be a significant factor in these discussions and decisions about treatment.
	The early-day motion calls for a review of the efficacy and cost effectiveness of current treatment for pernicious anaemia. The Government established the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence to provide authoritative, independent advice to the NHS on different health-related interventions and forms of care. That is to increase fairness in access to treatments, to be a national source of robust clinical guidance and to speed up the uptake of cost-effective treatments in the NHS.
	There is a clear process for the selection of topics for referral to NICE's work programme and final decisions on that work programme are taken by Ministers. I understand that a number of topic suggestions have been made around the diagnosis and management of pernicious anaemia, including one from the PAS itself. NICE is considering those proposed topics against its published criteria for possible inclusion in future work. However, I hope that my hon. Friend appreciates that NICE cannot advise on every condition or aspect of treatment, and that this topic will need to be considered alongside all the other competing priorities for NICE guidance.
	The early-day motion calls for pernicious anaemia to be included within the national service framework for long-term conditions. As my hon. Friend is aware, we published the framework in 2005. It is a 10-year plan to address inequities in access, a lack of integrated service provision, work force shortages-if there are any-and variations in the quality of care across the country. The framework focuses on neurological conditions, and its quality requirements are based on evidence from services for people with neurological conditions. That focus on neurology highlights and sets in a clear context issues that are also relevant to the millions of people living with other long-term conditions, including pernicious anaemia.
	I understand that the early-day motion proposes that treatment for pernicious anaemia should be more flexible and responsive to the needs of patients. The Government are committed to supporting patients in taking control of their own health and in the management of their own care. I am aware that some patients with pernicious anaemia might prefer to have more frequent injections or other forms of vitamin B12 to be administered by patients. Again, however, I am sure that my hon. Friend will understand that those are matters for individual patients to discuss with their general practitioners; it is not for the Department of Health to specify regimes of care in general practice-thank goodness!
	The early-day motion also proposes that there should be a review of symptoms, diagnosis and treatment. As I have said, since coming into office in 1997, the Government have established a series of national service frameworks and other clinical strategies looking at diagnosis and treatment of major diseases. Through the NSF approach, we have substantially improved mortality rates and eased the burden of ill health caused by major diseases.
	We recently announced our intention to produce a clinical service strategy for liver disease and we will shortly be publishing a draft strategy for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. However, we are aware that not every service area can be identified as a priority suitable for a national service framework or clinical service strategy. That has been recognised in the establishment of the National Quality Board, which is a key element of the NHS next stage review led by Lord Darzi. All recommendations for service reviews or strategies must now be considered by the National Quality Board, which will advise the Government.
	This is a long overdue debate, which my hon. Friend has been requesting for some time. I congratulate her on raising the subject. I also welcome the activities of the Pernicious Anaemia Society in raising awareness of the condition among the public and clinicians. The society may wish to make representations to NICE about the review of treatments for the condition and to the National Quality Board. I acknowledge my hon. Friend's request for the society to meet officials and I will ask officials to arrange that at the earliest opportunity.
	Most people who have developed pernicious anaemia receive excellent support from their GPs in diagnosis, treatment and other forms of support. However, I cannot let this debate end without mentioning the district nurses, whom I believe will support their patients in the community to the best of their ability and follow the example set by this Minister, because patients are patients, wherever they happen to be.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 House adjourned.